Is a new world order being created? China and Russia want to de-dollarize the world, the race for economic, military, and financial supremacy is open. Since the re-election of Donald Trump, the United States does not really seem to want to build alliances with democratic countries. The 47th President initiated his new mandate with a declaration of commercial war, ending 70 years of multilateralism. On April 2, during his announcement on “Liberation Day”, Trump locked the United States in a customs citadel. Faced with this upheaval in the hierarchy of nations, Europe seems to be in dire straits. It has failed to enter the digital world and is lagging behind in processors, it faces productivity problems, it is over-regulated with constrained funding, and is in a delicate geostrategic situation. The Draghi report made a scathing observation of all the shortcomings of this European bureaucratic world. For the author, Europe has become “a bureaucratic machine powerless against the United States, China, and Russia”, governed by regulations and prohibitions rather than by a clear strategic vision. While this Europe, which made economic, social, and moral progress possible in the 17th and 18th centuries through the competition of useful knowledge, has many assets. To do this, it will be necessary to review the role and missions of the European Commission, which were established in another world 7 decades ago. An entrepreneurial and decentralized approach must be adopted, fostering innovation. It must have a real capacity to control imports, an obligation to act in the service of European sovereignty, simplify bureaucratic procedures, encourage the development of AI, promote research infrastructures, and relaunch industry while maintaining the decarbonization trajectory by boosting its productivity. But can we entrust the Brussels bureaucracy with the mission of de-bureaucratizing? The answer is obviously no, we must develop agencies such as DARPA or BARDA, which are at the origin of major innovations in the United States, within an intergovernmental European alliance for research and technology. The European Union must focus on three objectives: building an integrated market with reciprocal openness and therefore closure with our trading partners, enforcing the foundations of liberal democracy, and promoting sustainable growth. At the same time, we must create a cooperative of nations with a qualified majority, built on the principle of strategic power and not bureaucracy, which will be in charge of industry, defense, research, and innovation. This core would be the third world power, contributing to international geostrategic stabilization. Christian Saint-Etienne, est universitaire ayant enseigné à Science Po, Dauphine et au CNAM Philippe Alezard
Louis de CREVOISIER et Paul-Armand VEILLON, Repartir du réel. Economie : la parole aux classes moyennes, L’Observatoire, 205 pages.
This essay answers a fundamental question that is shared by half of the French: how to meet the economic expectations and social aspirations of the French middle classes. The authors recall that this was already the objective of the government during the Thirty Glorious Years: social ascent, improvement of the standard of living, economic and political stability. Half a century later, these objectives remain relevant when reading the grievance books written by more than 700,000 French people after the “yellow vests” crisis. The authors note that the proposals formulated in these notebooks have never really been the subject of in-depth analysis, and even less so of concrete application. This implies moving from a macroeconomic vision to a microeconomic approach, from theoretical modeling to pragmatic representation, and from “false populist promises” to sustainable projects. The authors formulate proposals to “rebuild the middle class”, which has been “excluded from the social model” and battered by crises, inflation, taxation, over-regulation, and income redistribution. They propose to “start from experience” and build a “new economic grammar based on the essential issues of everyday life”. In the first part, they recommend ensuring more economic security for the French, in particular thanks to a reduction in the cost of labor, a fairer distribution of the value created, the establishment of a “wage shield” between assets and inactive, the establishment of a “more incentive” and “more virtuous” tax system. They propose to “protect the purchasing power” of the French, through a better valorization of energy (especially electricity) and a set of reforms concerning VAT, complementary health and consumer goods prices. In the second part, they advocate “a sustainable way of life”, including a renovation of medium-sized cities, a revision of mobility systems, a “selected reindustrialization”… In the third part, they suggest offering new opportunities to the middle classes, by revaluing scientific studies and promoting research, a better access for children of the popular and middle classes to higher education and to careers as executives and liberal professions. They advocate a reform of inheritance tax, and more selective incentives for innovation (they consider the start-up nation program launched in 2017 too elitist and the Research Tax Credit ineffective). They conclude with some common-sense advice to economists who are considered too theoretical, to public services that are insufficiently close to the public, and to political leaders who are disconnected from citizens. With their common sense advice, the authors expose themselves to criticism from the working classes – who make up the majority of the “yellow vests” authors of the “citizens’ notebooks” -, the upper classes – who consider themselves overtaxed -, but also the middle classes themselves, who are particularly divided (active-retired, urban-rural, employees-independent, heirs-creators…). The authors draw their reflections from their experiences in public service, from a careful reading of the grievance books and, above all, from the latest reports, books, and speeches of the most influential economists and industrialists. The book deserves to be read by all French people, but especially by elected officials in search of re-election, by economists in search of notoriety, and by the media in search of readers. Louis de Crevoisier (HEC-ENA-Inspection des finances) is a senior official at the Ministry of Economy and Paul-Armand Veillon ((X-ENSAE) is an administrator at INSEE. Note by J-J. Pluchart
Eve Chiapelo and Alexandre Violle, Sociologie des circuits financiers. Les infrastructures de l’argent et leurs politiques (Sociology of Financial Circuits. Les infrastructures de l’argent et leurs politiques (The Infrastructures of Money and Their Policies), Eds Setemtrion, 420 pages.
This collective work brings together 16 teacher-researchers affiliated with CEMS (CNRS-EHESS), whose object of study, both original and complex, focuses on the sociology of financial circuits, defined as “systems of financial action” or “sets of rules of law and accounting, distribution and collection of money in its monetary and non-monetary forms.” These circuits mobilize public and private operators linked by trust and combining technical, administrative, economic, accounting, and IT skills (assisted in particular by AI). The authors tackle the historical and geographical dimensions of this issue, focusing their analyses on the materiality of financial and extra-financial circuits, that is, on the practical conditions of their implementation. The research analyzes in particular the financialization of political institutions and the economic systems of territories (Unions, States, local authorities). Reading the book requires concentration and synthesis because of the heterogeneity of the concepts involved, the systems analyzed, and the case studies observed, but these efforts help convince the reader of the increasingly essential role played by finance in modern society. The first part of the book, entitled “The Making of the Sovereign through Circuits,” uses the example of the birth of Swiss social welfare to show that the formation of a modern state is based on “its ability to levy taxes and to structure financing systems in a sustainable way.” This part is also devoted to the construction of the first European financial circuits under the supervision of the European Central Bank. The second part focuses on “the making of public policy by financial circuits” and revisits the many French reforms of public aid and subsidies, and in particular, the French reforms of pension schemes in 1967 and 1983, which were made possible by the merging of unemployment insurance and pension systems. Another study focuses on “the greening of French energy policy, and on the action of the French Development Agency, which has been transformed by combining various forms of credit and free aid. The way in which financial circuits create organizations and the way in which organizations create circuits is at the heart of Part 3 (The Making of Organizations by Circuits). The case studied is that of the Italian “Banking Foundations (FOB)” born from the reform of the Italian banking system, which created a capital link between them and the Italian banks. The FOBs then helped to create a new housing finance circuit. The study also analyzes “Culture Action Europe,” which shows that the origin of the funds that support it has important consequences on the functioning of the organization and the way it carries out its missions. Part 4 (The infrapolitics of circuits) focuses on the consequences of the least visible circuits and addresses the unintentional sequences produced by changes in certain elements of the circuits on other circuits. It shows that in some situations, public policy may have been hampered by a lasting failure of IT and administrative infrastructures. The case of toxic loans taken out by local authorities due to “incremental changes” in bank and community financing circuits is also discussed. The last chapter uses the example of the pension funds of Belgian local authority officials and the budgets of these authorities to show that these two circuits are linked: personnel management policies and the statutes of agents interact in a deferred manner on pension policies and vice versa. In conclusion, the authors synthesize the theoretical contributions to the public debate. They aim to do for macroeconomics what has been done for the links between the sociology of markets and microeconomics. This project was conceived from a research program on financialization, an interdisciplinary field of research that sees macroeconomic and sociological work intersecting, focusing on particular systems or sites of power. The book aims to contribute “pragmatically” to the debates on the financing of the ecological transition and on “digital currencies.” One idea is to shift the focus from the volumes of money needed to the way in which the funds will be disbursed when the authorities do not always have the infrastructure or the technical skills to allow the money to be put into circulation for projects. Another idea is “to consider new taxes and new distribution channels and reorientations of flows.” As for “digital currencies”, they change, compared to “fiat” currencies, the nature of the infrastructure and the organization of the circuit. They could make it possible, according to the authors, “to change the currency in order to ‘change the economic world and transform both the state and capitalism’.” This book is at the crossroads of many disciplines, most of which fall under sociology and few under economics. The approach is the result of a highly documented, painstaking work. Admittedly, money is too serious a subject to be left to monetary economists alone, and “related” ideas bring freshness to classical thought. Nevertheless, several observations seem to be the egg of Columbus even if the historically observed ideas are explained and finely analyzed. The conceptual contribution remains more sociological than monetary. Changing money to change capitalism and therefore change life is a vast program! Note prepared by Dominique Chesneau and Jean Jacques Pluchart
EOCHE-DUVAL Christophe Regulatory Inflation, PLON, 224 pages
Christophe EOCHE-DUVAL has for several years made overproduction of legislation his warhorse and in this book offers an objective inventory of the normative apparatus. This is in order to enlighten the reader and make them aware of the impacts of this overproduction on the functioning of our country. First of all, the author focuses on demonstrating this overabundance of standards. To measure it, he will rely on the one hand on the number of pages of the “Official Journal” and on the other hand, in the annual report “Statistics of the standard” of the General Secretariat of the Government established since 2019. From the latter, we can note the number of “Légifrance” words registered in the “Official Journal” as well as in all the norms (laws, ordinances, decrees, orders…). The findings are clear: with more than 400,000 standards already in force, the number of “Légifrance” words has more than doubled in 20 years, reaching more than 46 million in 2024. Also, over the years, the State publishes fewer texts but they are getting longer and longer. In order to understand this inflation, the author presents the sources. International standards, including those of the UN and its satellites, are the primary providers of standards. Each bill has been ratified by the French Parliament since 1958, although this is not mandatory. Then come the European standards that automatically enter into force in national law. Other strata are added to the previous ones, such as prefectural and municipal by-laws, the exact number of which seems impossible to know. Once the inventory is complete, the author seeks to measure the impacts and notes that these standards often paralyze the productive apparatus in all sectors of activity. To make it more noticeable, he tries to estimate the cost. The various analyses seem to converge towards a figure of 3.7% of GDP, or about 60 billion per year. Beyond the cost aspect, these overlapping standards that have accumulated since the beginning of the Fifth Republic at the mercy of the various heads of state, makes it difficult to know which version is in force at the time this document is being written. The State, itself caught in this vice, ends up circumventing the rules in order to speed up the machine that produces the standards. In recent years, the triggering of Article 49.3 or the publication of ordinances, allowing the executive to pass laws in place of Parliament, are examples. The author dedicates a chapter to two accelerators of normative inflation: the finance and Social Security financing laws. These laws, based on government texts, must be validated in a limited time; not allowing sufficient parliamentary time. Another effect of this normative inflation is exposed in the chapter “Legiscracy against democracy”, since only 4% of French people are able to understand the texts and laws. Despite this terrible observation where the state and politicians seem to be caught and struggle to get out of this straitjacket, the author proposes pragmatic solutions which, he hopes, can be raised during the debates of the next presidential election in 2027. He insists on legislating less and focusing on applying existing laws by lowering the normative pace, thus freeing up parliamentary time. He also advocates transparency on the costs of implementing laws to better assess their relevance. This book has a pedagogical virtue for any reader in search of a better understanding of our legislative arsenal. Christophe EOCHE-DUVAL is a senior civil servant and state advisor. Sophie Friot’s note
Jean-Hervé LORENZI, Mickael BERREBI, Un monde de violences. Et après ? Eds Eyrolles, Avril 2025, 303 pages
Each generation believes that it has a special destiny and that progress is bound to follow. Yet our world is plagued by eruptions of violence on an unprecedented scale. Ten years ago, Jean-Hervé Lorenzi and Mickaël Berrebi were already describing the political, economic and social tensions, and explaining that the result would be geostrategic conflicts that could lead to wars on the very borders of the West. In this fascinating essay, the authors document in precise detail and with an extensive bibliography the following observations: the breakdown of productivity gains, the curse of ageing, the irresistible acceleration of inequalities, the extreme difficulty of reindustrialization, the illusion of definanciarization, savings, the ultimate scarce resource. Of the three known transitions, the demographic shock is at least as important as the climate shock. It’s easy to believe that the markets themselves will find the answers to these immense difficulties, but we know that this perception is not shared by the authors, who have been campaigning for years for regulation (such as the late Michel Aglietta) and political initiatives to play an active role in accompanying global change. Due to a rise in raw materials prices (not yet confirmed, but likely in the medium term), which would imply a decrease in industrial supply, and the ageing of a population that consumes more sservices, the much-vaunted reindustrialization cannot be a pale copy of the production systems of the last two centuries. “Will trade pacify international relations – Montesquieu’s sweet commerce? Unlikely (!) With a declining industrial supply and an aging population that is more inclined to consume services, the much-vaunted reindustrialization cannot be a pale copy of the production systems of the last two centuries. “Will trade pacify international relations – Montesquieu’s sweet commerce? Unlikely (!) And current events seem to largely vindicate the authors, who do not hesitate to mention that “constraints” have become “conflicts” and that, if nothing is done, the situation will become a “confrontation”! Underestimating today’s dangers, and failing to find a global solution for them, means leaving the field open to all possible scenarios, including the most unmanageable. The authors describe 14 major ruptures – global ones, as the authors emphasize, which makes it all the more difficult to implement the proposed solutions – but necessary to meet the challenge of the 6 constraints that structure the world: the breakdown of productivity gains, the aging of the population, the explosion of inequalities, the massive transfer of activities on a global scale, the unlimited financialization of the economy and the impossibility of financing our investments. If these changes are understood and implemented, we can escape the worst. The 14 ruptures are listed as follows: Centering the world on its youth, building a “French-style” immigration model, socializing scarce resources, importing a virtuous wage-profit split, regulating the rules of inheritance, dismantling the Big Tech monopoly, Engendering a digital métissage, taming debt, rebuilding risk-sharing, launching a new Bretton Woods, Subjecting globalization to climate demands, investing massively in the three transitions, investing massively in Africa, preparing for pandemics. The chapters are presented in a balanced way, even if the authors “commit” themselves. They do not address questions such as: how far should open borders go? How should the quota strategy be approached? To think “calmly, it is normal to evoke the terms assimilation and regulation”. In other words, faced with a Gordian knot that some are wondering how to untie, let’s slice it open and see what comes out. Reflections will therefore focus on the origins, history and balance between assimilation and regulation. With regard to inheritance, the idea is to “align” the rules on this issue with those that prevailed when the IFI was created. The current rules tend towards an “increase in inequalities of birth to the detriment of the common good”. But public opinion is not ready – nor is it desirable – for an increase in taxation. On the other hand, the demographic transition so dear to the authors’ hearts could be financed “virtuously” by a transfer of productive wealth invested for the long term. And this share – blocked for 10 or 15 years – would benefit from lower taxation than at present, while the other would bear higher duties. This debate should take place to generate a social and economic consensus, albeit a relative one. In the face of AI, which can be a factor of exclusion, the authors recommend “creating the conditions for a digital crossbreeding … i.e. the creation of a new societal framework favorable to a just transition to better mitigate technological unemployment and the consequent social risks”. On the subject of debt, the main idea is to mutualize debt. To waltz, you need two people, and so does mutualization. But one element of conviction is to mutualize only those debts that serve exclusively to finance projects that are profitable for the future, with measurable and measured results; in the same way as “green” and “COVID” debts. It’s easy to see how difficult it would be to go down this road in France, where a large proportion of borrowings are used to “make ends meet”. Mutualization would have a virtuous character… as long as society agrees and our private partners are convinced. The point of internationalizing the SDR is also addressed, and the authors are careful not to decide, but they do recommend increasing its use. One point that is not popular is the CIR. All or nothing” is not the right approach. We need to think in terms of financing only breakthrough investments. Question: we only know the result, as in the case of recognized bubbles, when they have burst, when the breakthrough has occurred. And legislators are not necessarily the best equipped for this forward-looking task… The book recommends a new way of sharing risk, through the generalization of public partnerships. These proposals are necessary, but probably insufficient, conditions that should be applied on a country-by-country basis, in no particular order of importance, but they are all vital if we are to steer
France’s Digital Inclusion Plan
By Jean-Jacques Pluchart In April 2025, the National Productivity Council (CNP) published its 5th report entitled “A Changing World – Productivity, Competitiveness and Digital Transition”, which presents the opportunities offered to the French economy by a better contribution of digital technology. The report is structured in 3 parts: the evolution of productivity, the relative competitiveness of the country and the impact of new technologies on growth. Established in 2018, the CNP, chaired by Natacha Valla and reporting to France Strategy, is responsible for advising the government on economic policies related to productivity, assessing their effects and feeding the public debate. It shows that the ongoing transformations of the French economy are divided between short-term objectives and long-term structural imperatives. The experts note that in France, current labor productivity per capita is 5.9% below its pre-Covid level. Two-thirds of this drop in productivity over 5 years can be explained by transitory factors: apprenticeships, job retention in sectors facing a decline in activity, effects of workforce composition (higher proportion of lower-skilled jobs, etc.). The remaining third is due to a structural weakening of productivity in Europe. This lack of dynamism can only be stemmed by new investments – particularly in digital technology – and by a transformation of the production system. Employment growth alone cannot ensure the sustainability of economic growth. The report points to the still ambiguous role of digital technologies – notably GenAI and robotics – in the evolution of productivity. Their overall impact is perceived as insufficient in France, but there are indications that a catch-up is possible, provided that AI is more widely implemented in labor-intensive sectors and that workers are rapidly retrained. The report reveals that around 14 million French people, or 28% of the population, are not digitally literate, which is a real handicap in a context of increasing digitization of the world’s population. The experts estimate that a 10-year plan to digitalize 4.7 million French people could generate annual gains of 1.6 billion euros, in the fields of the digital economy, employment and training, relations with public services, social inclusion and well-being. The first area is the digital economy, which includes online purchasing and the collaborative economy. Developing the online purchasing capabilities of a third of the target population, via collaborative economy platforms, could generate purchasing power gains of around €450 million a year. The second area concerns employment and training. Overall, Internet use has a positive impact on the educational success and qualification levels of the French population. This would generate annual savings of around 130 million euros. The third area is the relationship with public services, and in particular online administrative procedures. A digital inclusion plan would generate annual savings of 150 million euros. Fortunately, the latest indicators show some improvement in European competitiveness, particularly in manufacturing. In 2023 and 2024, the reduction in France’s trade deficit was accompanied by a recovery in its export market share. Competitiveness has also benefited from a relative drop in real wage costs. However, overall, French labor costs remain higher than the eurozone average, particularly in countries such as Spain and Italy. Recent cost rises in business services and freight costs could rapidly call into question the gains observed. Non-price competitiveness remains an issue, as French intermediate, investment and consumer products are often perceived as too expensive in relation to their quality. Further increases in labor and transport costs could once again weigh on price competitiveness. France therefore has two strategic choices: to focus on innovation to improve productivity and strengthen non-price competitiveness, or to control labor costs to maintain its competitiveness on international markets. France lags far behind the United States in terms of technological investment, and this deficit could have a lasting impact on potential growth. The Draghi report (2024), which calls for a stronger European framework to stimulate economic growth, is a good example of this. France lags far behind the USA in terms of technological investment, and this deficit could have a lasting impact on potential growth. The Draghi Report (2024), which calls for a stronger European framework to boost competitiveness through innovation (1), underlines this urgency. In the CNP’s view, only a strategy of investment in digital technology, driven by both national industrial policies and European directives, could be one of the levers of tomorrow’s productivity, employment and economic sovereignty. (1) The first effects of the “Draghi report” will be presented in the next blog.
Vivien LEVY-GARBOUA, La finance du futur (The Finance of the Future), Eds Amazon, 2025, 282 pages.
This book is a timely response to current questions about the transformation of banks and the future of the monetary and financial markets. It is presented as the logbook of a great banker confronted with the storms of the latest economic and financial crises, as well as the pitfalls of banking regulations. As in any diary, the author delivers his reflections on events experienced and expresses his opinion on measures taken, but he also offers the reader a real living treaty on banking economics, which requires careful reading because of the great technicality of certain subjects. The book offers three levels of reading. It is structured in three sequences, devoted respectively to the post-2008 crisis banking reform (2011-2014), the adaptation of the financial systems (2015-2020), and the new monetary and banking world (2020-2024). It covers ten themes: the State and public debt, markets and their infrastructures, Central Banks, monetary policy, regulatory policy, banks, non-banks, international, macroeconomics, and digitalization. It raises 61 issues in short columns. The reader is struck by the seriousness of the problems encountered and the creativity of the responses provided by bankers and financial experts, who are too often divided. The latter must manage the new types of risks generated by the disintermediation of banks and the intermediation of markets, the competition of online banks and the development of non-banks (shadow banking), the collateralization of credits and the diversification of financial instruments, the digitalization and securing of transactions – and in particular the multiplication of digital currencies issued by Central banks and private organizations (bitcoin, token, libra, terra-luna, etc.) -, the “greening” of credits, the withdrawal of banking networks, and above all, the political and administrative difficulty of reforming the systems… The reader will appreciate the relevance of the (always on going) questions asked, the mastery of the (sometimes very technical) subjects covered, the pedagogical qualities (attested by a useful index of acronyms) and the author’s way with words (“collateral: private virtue, collective vice”, “financial reforms: everyone is looking for their cat”, “should banks stay in the basement?”, “the three crises or the parable of the forest fire”, “should cash be abolished?”, “the magic martingale of public debt”, “Central bankers tomorrow: plumbers or watchmakers?”… The author (X-Mines, PhD Harvard) was one of the Executive Committee members of BNP Paribas and is a professor of economics at Sciences Po Paris. He has published numerous books, one of which, The Zero Interest Rate World, received the Turgot Prize in 2017. clubturgot.com paid tribute to his work in 2024. Review by J-J. PLUCHART
Laurice ALEXANDRE and Nathalie LAMETA (coord.), Entrepreneurship. Theoretical and practical tools, EMS, 227 pages.
The collective work written by 17 French-speaking teacher-researchers who are members of the Association of Entrepreneurship and Innovation chaired by Professor Sattin, is part of the new collection “decarbonated management” created by the Fondation nationale pour l’enseignement de la gestion des entreprises (FNEGE). It raises an issue that is both original and current: launching and managing a low-carbon entrepreneurial project. The authors recall the challenges and the urgency of saving carbon, water and non-renewable resources. They stress that these requirements apply to companies of all sizes and all sectors of industrial activity and services. They note the modesty of the progress made in these areas, but they welcome the sometimes unknown initiatives taken by the public authorities in favor of low-carbon entrepreneurship and competitiveness clusters. They present examples of virtuous companies in terms of decarbonation. They deplore the cumbersome administrative, financial and fiscal procedures that go with the creation of a business. The book is structured in two parts. The first is devoted to the fundamentals of entrepreneurial projects, the search for creative opportunities and the development of the business plan and the finance plan. The second part focuses on the processes of creation, business recovery, and intrapreneurship. This last model is inherited from the project management that emerged in the United States during the 1970s and which evolved under the influence of start-up creations and high-tech laboratories. The book is illustrated with numerous diagrams, graphs, tables and bibliographical references, which give it great pedagogical qualities. It is enriched by case studies representative of creations and by “questions for reflection” allowing a deeper understanding of one of the main processes of creating economic and human value in modern society. Laurice Alexandre is a professor at the University of Paris Cité and Nathalie Lameta is a lecturer at the University of Corsica. Note by J-J. Pluchart
The new forms of economic patriotism
Jean-Jacques Pluchart* Since the accession of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States, economic patriotism has invited itself into the current debates animating all nation-states. These exchanges reveal not only the polemical nature but also the polysemous nature of the term economic patriotism, often equated with that of economic nationalism. It is true that these notions have been embraced by sometimes opposing schools of thought, and that they still lack a solid scientific foundation. Their perceptions differ according to the political opinions and states of mind of different social groups. Economic patriotism is distinguished from economic nationalism by its nature: the former reflects a rather defensive sentiment (attachment to a country and defense of its economic equilibrium), while the latter covers an offensive ideology (the quest for the economic supremacy of a nation-state). The former enjoys a generally positive image, while the latter suffers from rather negative prejudices, notably inherited from the history of the 20th century. Economic patriotism is therefore a less confrontational concept than economic nationalism. The current resurgence of economic patriotism is mainly driven by the need to rebalance trade balances and alleviate the foreign debts of certain countries, such as the United States and France. In some countries, such as France and Italy, it is justified by the need to reduce unemployment by promoting local production, and to combat inequalities of income and wealth between citizens. It is also explained by consumers’ growing expectations in terms of respect for human rights, public health and environmental protection, which justify their demands for worker protection and product traceability. In Europe, demonstrations in favor of a return to protectionism, deglobalization of trade, relocation of factories, deconsumerism, etc., have been relaunched since the 2000s and relayed by official declarations and reports (notably the Draghi and Carayon reports). On the ideological front, polemics about economic patriotism pit defenders against opponents of free trade, and federalists against sovereignists. Economic patriotism is denounced by the former as provoking “trade wars”, and by the latter as engendering unfair globalization of trade. Some see it as an alternative to the cosmopolitanization of societies and the globalization of economies – which generate unemployment and inequalities in Western countries – while others see it as a factor in the contraction of trade and the slowing of growth of societies and the globalization of economies – generating unemployment and inequalities in Western countries – but represented by others as a factor in the contraction of trade and the slowdown of growth. These debates have been rekindled by the contestation of the latest international trade agreements (such as CETA and TAFTA) and the one-upmanship (the tit for tat theorized by Axelrod) between states, illustrated in particular by the threat to raise US tariffs on Chinese imports, countered by the devaluation of the Chinese yuan. The paradoxes observed in current discourses on trade help to shed light on the nature of contemporary economic patriotism and explain its revival. It responds to the main forces transforming international trade: globalization and the integration of production chains, financialization and the digitization of transactions. It meets the founding criteria – political, social and cultural – of patriotism. It mobilizes all the stakeholders in each nation-state, and concerns its material, immaterial and financial resources. It calls on an ever-expanding arsenal of customs, tax and regulatory practices and instruments, borrowing from hard, soft and rough laws, traditional negotiation methods and social networks. It embraces both state and spontaneous patriotisms, and is a source of great satisfaction to our customers. It draws on an ever-expanding arsenal of customs, tax and regulatory practices and instruments, borrowing from hard, soft and rough laws, traditional negotiation methods and social networks. It encompasses patriotisms that are both state-sponsored and spontaneous, defensive and offensive, flexible and variable-geometry. It requires an appropriation of the territory that combines a global approach with local roots for economic exchanges. It is part of a process of “glocalization” of exchanges, exploiting both global and local resources. It strives to reconcile local, national and universal solidarity. The emergence of new forms of economic patriotism relies on States guaranteeing national sovereignty, citizens respectful of universal values, companies concerned with correcting the negative externalities of their activities, and consumers aware of the effects of their purchasing behavior. Respecting these conditions should help preserve the socio-economic equilibrium of nation-states and the social, societal and environmental of XXI th century. *inspired by J-J. Pluchart, « Les nouvelles formes du patriotisme économique », chapitre in C. de Boissieu et D. Chesneau (dir.), Le patriotisme économique a-t-il un sens aujourd’hui ?, Eds Maxima, novembre 2020.
Frédéric CHARILLON, Géopolitique de l’intimidation – Seuls face à la guerre?, Odile Jacob, March 2025, 300 pages.
Intimidation is a rational act. It is part of a conflict logic that does not exclude negotiation, but only on condition that it takes place according to the terms and conditions imposed by the intimidator. When the latter relies on a tradition of extraterritorial sanctions against the global financial system, it’s all very well to pretend that Donald Trump is losing his mind: no leader is insane in the sense of any mental disorder. Describing a decision as “crazy” or “irrational” is misleadingly easy. On the other hand, says Frédéric Charillon, analyzing behavior from the angle of a possible intimidation strategy seems more relevant. The phenomenon of the “American red pangolin” and the state of “flabbergastedness” conceded by the French minister recently interviewed, have difficulty masking an ignorance of international relations as transcribed in the famous essay by Thomas Schelling, Nobel Prize winner in economics in 2005 (for a work published in 1960!): the strategy of conflict. On the subject of extraterritoriality, let’s cite a few precedents: the Helms-Burton and Amato-Kennedy Acts, passed in 1996 under President Clinton, sanction foreign companies trading with Cuba, Venezuela or Iran; the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 under Obama targets the sectors of the ussia’s energy, defense and financial sectors. As for Trump’s supposed irrationality, it’s worth remembering that the “Madman in Chief” was none other than Richard Nixon when he suggested that his behavior could be dangerously unpredictable during the Vietnam War – at the risk of unleashing nuclear fire (less ambitious, Donald Trump merely mentioned the possibility of shooting someone Fifth Avenue without losing votes). The outcome? Nobody knows at this stage… Besides, the book ends with a “Provisional Conclusion”. But let’s not forget that, for Schelling, conflict is inseparable from negotiation: “to study conflict strategy is first and foremost to become aware of the fact that most conflict situations are also negotiation situations.” In his view, “the search for an eventual agreement becomes the major element of conflict”. Frédéric CHARILLON is Professor of Political Science at the University of Auvergne and Associate Researcher at the Centre Thucydide – analysis and research in international relations, Université Panthéon – Assas (Paris II) Alain Brunet