The Fifth Republic is based on a simple fact: whoever holds the majority holds power. Yet this majority has become elusive. Power has left the Élysée Palace, is not in the National Assembly, and no longer resides in the government. The aim of this book is to understand how a system that has long functioned on the basis of a clear majority becomes unstable when that majority disappears. Benjamin Morel begins by examining the reasons why we have shifted from a stable two-party system to a dysfunctional three-party system. He then analyzes the effects of this shift on the political system: the temptation to expand the powers of the head of state by overinterpreting the Constitution, the proliferation of expedients to govern regardless (maintaining a resigned government, executive orders…), all of which are precedents whose accumulation paves the way for an illiberal drift. The book presents the following themes: tripolarization, an unstable legislature, escaping the trap of instability, a regime in a fragile balance, and governing nonetheless under a Constitution designed to ward off instability while remaining vulnerable to illiberal abuses. The book’s conclusion is tinged with a certain optimism: the one who defines the crisis is also the one who provides solutions, provided we do not allow ourselves to be misled by false prophets. Changing the electoral system is not an end in itself. Parliament must be better equipped to enable it to ensure the co-construction of legislation between Parliament and the government. The functioning of a regime is not a metaphysical property of the norm; it is a property of the society that receives it. The state functions like public services. A government can lose its political legitimacy when it can no longer translate election results into consent: To govern despite this is to govern in spite of it!  What holds a legal order together is everyone’s conviction that it is in their interest to respect it and play by the rules. Some say it would be easy to solve the problem. A new Constitution would cure our ills. A new election would sweep away our worries. What is causing the crisis is the overall mismatch between the election and the expectations surrounding it. These expectations are divided into three camps, yet they all expect one of them to govern with the absolute powers of a majority bloc. All eyes remain fixed on the presidential election, even as the electoral landscape makes the return of a Jupiter unlikely. Faced with this paradox, which every citizen carries within them, the solutions lie not in the texts but in the minds! Dominique Chesneau

The encyclical, which “does not offer an analysis of AI because it is not possible to provide a single, comprehensive definition of it,” focuses on human dignity and moral responsibility in the face of emerging technologies. It follows in the footsteps of Leo XIII, who presented the social doctrine of the Church and emphasized that the pursuit of profit cannot be the be-all and end-all of human society. The Pope explains two reasons why the book is not technical: any statement about AI risks quickly becoming obsolete given the speed at which these systems evolve; and all of us, including those who design them, know little about how they actually work! Furthermore, the book does not make alarmist claims such as that AI would lead to mass layoffs and a widespread dumbing down of the population (“do not be afraid”), but, drawing on the work of numerous working groups cited in the book, it argues that good will come from this revolution, provided that this good is not monopolized by a tiny minority because “a large part of this technology falls under the common good.” In seeking to establish humanistic principles for the development and use of AI, the goal is not to create restrictive regulations that would stifle innovation, but rather to incorporate ethical and moral considerations into the design of models and the selection of training data. And according to Ricoeur and Levinas, the essence of ethics lies in respecting the other by seeing oneself in the gaze of one’s counterpart, beyond laws and rules. A few chapters—the 3rd and 4th deserve special attention among: (1) The evolution of the Church’s social doctrine and its role as a “theology of communion” throughout history, (2) The foundations and principles of social doctrine, including human dignity, the common good, the universal destination of goods, subsidiarity, solidarity, and social justice, (3) Analysis of the risks associated with artificial intelligence, the concentration of technologies, and the need for a common code of ethics, (4) Preserving the human dimension in the digital transformation, valuing work, education, and freedom in the face of commodification, (5) Building a “civilization of love” in the digital age, promoting peace, dialogue, and multilateralism. We will recall the five principles of the Catholic Church’s social doctrine, which have been presented by past and present economists and elaborated upon in the first two chapters: the principle of the common good (developed by Jean Tirole in his seminal work), the principle of the universal destination of goods (mentioned by 18th-century moralists), the principle of subsidiarity (in management literature, the term “subsidiarity” and the difficulty of its implementation are discussed in France-Lanord and Vannier 2014; Verrier and Bourgeois 2016, 27); the principle of solidarity and the principle of social justice. To illustrate the relevance of the topics discussed, let us cite a few illustrative excerpts from the book: let us avoid the pretension of a single language capable of translating everything into data and performance metrics, even the mystery of the person; entrusting, in practice, to an algorithm the power to select who deserves what, without anyone bearing the weight of the decision, amounts to entrusting it with the task of redefining the limits of human possibilities; data ownership must be regulated and managed as a common good ( !); developers bear an ethical responsibility because every design choice expresses a vision of humanity These concerns and humanistic recommendations are echoed by Anthropic, which cannot predict whether the phenomenon of AI misalignment (when an artificial intelligence pursues goals that conflict with human values or do not truly correspond to what humans have asked of it, Ed.) will ever be fully resolved. Anthropic continues in a text published by its think tank, the Anthropic Institute: “We believe it would be good for the world to have the option to slow down or temporarily suspend the development of advanced AI, in order to allow societal structures and alignment research to keep pace with technological progress.” This nearly 200-page letter, dedicated to “the protection of the human person in the age of artificial intelligence,” resonates far beyond Catholic circles and “constitutes a political and humanist manifesto of unprecedented scope.” Dominique Chesneau

The authors trace the genealogy of the concept of “scarcity” of natural resources. They distinguish between Neo-Aristotelian, utopian, Malthusian, romantic, socialist and planetary scarcities. They criticise the capitalist and liberal system that has developed since the First Industrial Revolution and advocate rethinking the “relationship between nature and the economy”, which has gone through several periods since the origin of humanity. This relationship begins with the “cornucopian” approach, marked by the illusion that nature will eternally provide for all of man’s needs (despite food shortages and famines). This approach is opposed to the “finitist thesis”, according to which the world’s population must moderate its consumption by becoming aware of the gradual and inevitable extinction of natural resources. Globalisation is putting increasing pressure on natural resources and biodiversity. Is 21st-century man capable of stopping the reduction of his ecological footprint?  This approach has gradually extended to multiple resources: metals and rare earths, arable land, endangered species, etc. During the classical age, the physiocrats hoped for a “great restoration” made possible by the “rational exploitation of the land”; they were certain that “man would decipher the source code of nature”. From the Age of Enlightenment onwards, philosophers believed that “technical reason” would dominate the “naturalist ideal”, and in the 19th century, the engineers of the Industrial Revolution advocated the division of labour and free trade. Economists were confident that, in order to avoid degrading their environment, households would adapt their consumption patterns and that companies would create new processes and products that were economical in terms of energy and non-recyclable by-products.  Man was then considered a homo faber capable of “sculpting the world in his image”. But it was not until the 1970s that governments became fully aware of the challenges of preserving the environment and the need to establish a “sustainable and people-friendly economy” that meets the real needs of the population. The authors then recall the criticisms of modern consumerism and environmental degradation that were formulated by the Vatican in its encyclical Laudato si and by the various environmental movements. In particular, they analyse the effects of carbon emissions, ocean acidification, damage to biodiversity, etc. The phenomenon seems all the more worrying to them because 20 th -century man is unable to measure and correct the long-term effects of his activities. They share certain principles advocated by radical environmental movements, in favour of self-sufficiency and economic degrowth. They support the theory of Kahneman (Nobel Prize winner in Economics) according to which, due to a “negativity bias”, the pessimistic forecasts of the Club of Rome or the IPCC are generally viewed with disbelief or scepticism by the majority of the population.   The book testifies to the scholarship, persuasiveness and activist experience of its authors; it sheds light on the dilemma of the choice between a sustainable economy and a sustainable natural environment, without being able to resolve it. Frederik ALBRITTON JONSSON is a professor at the University of Chicago and Carl WENNERLIND is a historian specialising in modern Europe.

The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz brings us face to face with our dependence on fossil fuels and especially on oil. The energy transition is now facing a conflict where the stoppage of the supply of oil and gas is disrupting the world’s economies. The occupant of the White House, as a staunch defender of coal and the “liquid gold” of oil and gas, is blowing hot and cold on the markets to the detriment of the user, who sees their fuel bill skyrocket. Published last October, Cédric Philibert’s essay addresses the energy transition and renewable energies from an optimistic perspective. The solutions for a decarbonised world are there, and it is urgent to continue the transition that has begun. The author challenges a number of preconceived ideas through numerous quantified arguments. He sets the record straight in a polarised debate between climate sceptics and proponents of degrowth. In this essay, he demonstrates that resources such as solar or wind power are sufficient and abundant to achieve the transition. Having these energies available at a moderate cost will make it possible to move towards other possibilities, such as heating ores to several hundred degrees in order to accelerate hydrometallurgical processes, applicable to copper and rare earths, among others. One of the main levers for achieving carbon neutrality concerns the energy efficiency of vehicles. The author even claims that electric cars are good for the climate. Indeed, with the exponential development of renewable energies, electric vehicles will benefit from increasingly low-carbon electricity during their manufacture and lifetime. In addition, he also demonstrates that it is possible to achieve this transition without having harmful consequences for biodiversity. He believes that the energy transition as a whole does not have a significant impact on the rate of artificialisation. The development of agrivoltaics is a real opportunity to achieve the goal of decarbonising energy and has more impact than producing biofuels. As a solution, the author gives pride of place to moderation. To move towards net-zero emissions, it is necessary to divide net emissions of CO2, methane and nitrous oxide by 8 or 10. Nevertheless, we must remain vigilant about the “rebound effect”. Studies have shown that investments in the thermal renovation of buildings do not lead to a significant decrease in the energy consumption of buildings; since they are better insulated, the owners focus on their comfort.   A book to recommend to all readers who are keen on the issues of the energy transition and who want an objective view from an energy and climate expert. Cédric PHILIBERT is an independent consultant and senior analystin the field of energy and climate. He is also an associate researcher atthe French Institute of International Relations (Ifri). He advised theDirector General of the French Environment and Energy Management Agency(ADEME), before joining the United Nations Environment Programme(UNEP), then the IEA until 2019. Sophie FRIOT

This very concise book deals with a subject that is very much in the news: the decline in the birth rate. This has also been a concern for most governments for several years. The angle chosen by the author is interesting insofar as he is primarily concerned with the impact of this demographic phenomenon on the economy, which it affects significantly. This book is based on recent research to make a diagnosis of France before expanding its analysis to a global scope. The decline in the birth rate in France has been steady since the second half of the 18th century, with only one real reversal during the “Glorious Thirty”. The recent acceleration of this decline and the increase in the number of deaths today are leading to a crossing of the curves, which is creating economic concern. Only the large net migration has made it possible to observe an increase in the population. Although for a long time a number of children per woman of around 2.1 has been considered a figure that allows the renewal and safeguarding of social and pension systems, the current figure of 1.6 children per woman is cause for concern. This trend is generally shared in most countries, except in a number of African countries or in the United States in the future due to high immigration. This factual situation will pose problems for the financing of social security and pensions, despite an increase in the rate of the working population, with an increase in the number of elderly people, who are, however, in poorer health. All this is expected to lead to a decline in economic growth with a reduced workforce, a decline in business innovation and an increase in automation. Governments have launched programs to try to halt this decline in the birth rate with numerous initiatives such as job security for women or tax measures, but these have generally proved ineffective, whether due to time constraints, particularly with women working more, or also biological constraints with the arrival of children later in life, which have overall lowered the number of children per woman. The alternative to this situation is often the integration of immigrant populations who generally have more children, even though this solution is highly controversial in terms of social acceptability and future impact. The structural factors behind this low birth rate are very well described, starting with the socialisation of risks, which allows an interesting parallel to be drawn between pensions and fertility. Indeed, there is a paradox in the fact that generous pensions ultimately do not encourage people to have large families. The emancipation of women has also reduced the need for a large number of children, which could be seen as security for the future. The decline in marriages, which are often later, reduces the childbearing period, as does celibacy, which is more often imposed than chosen and particularly affects men without children, whose numbers have increased significantly. On the other hand, a child is today often considered a parental investment, both in terms of optimising the time dedicated to them and financing their education, with quality largely taking precedence over quantity. Faced with a structural change whose future is not completely clear, the author recommends that we adapt our economic and social model to this demography. There are obviously opportunities linked to degrowth, particularly environmental ones, even if the impact of the number of inhabitants must be qualified by the lifestyle observed since the 1960s. This also makes it possible to rebalance the use of resources between rich countries and developing countries, with quite different trends in birth rates. In the short term, this situation should make it possible to save on public finances with fewer unemployed people or less funding, particularly for education. This situation will also open up significant “Silver Economy” opportunities for many companies. To take a longer-term view, however, it is necessary to prepare for the impact of this decline on the economy: investing in innovation and human capital to increase productivity, enhancing skills, better integrating young people, mobilising older people and reforming the social protection and pension system (in particular through supplementary schemes). In conclusion, the author draws a parallel with the recent awareness of climate change and urges us to organise ourselves quickly to deal with the impact of the falling birth rate on the economy in the short and medium term. Pauline ROSSI is Professor of Economics at the Ecole Polytechnique Olivier STEPHAN

The author repeatedly highlights a glaring lack of investment in research, innovation and digital transformation. To close the gap, France would need to increase its R&D spending to 3% of GDP, compared to 2.19% in 2023. Unlike Germany, which uses its investments abroad to strengthen its domestic economy, France has focused on the internationalisation of its multinationals, whose success brings little benefit to the country. Another weakness highlighted is the management of public spending: despite budgets above the European average in key areas such as health and education, the tangible results are struggling to convince the public. In conclusion, this book, which is rich in factual data, offers a nuanced view of France: a country that is performing well in some areas, struggling in others, and sometimes in decline. However, solutions do exist, as the country possesses strengths and potential that urgently need to be harnessed. This book is recommended for all curious minds seeking a clear, well-documented view of France today. Pierre-André Buigues is an economist. For 22 years, he held senior positions at the European Commission, and subsequently worked as a lecturer at Toulouse Business School. An expert on European affairs, he has also worked as an international consultant and adviser for various global institutions. He is the author of numerous reference works. Book review by Sophie FRIOT

The object of our desires, the driving force behind our ingenuity… What if money were also humanity’s greatest invention? Did you know that the piastre was the predecessor of the dollar? That Hitler and Lenin used currency to manipulate the masses? That *The Wizard of Oz* is actually about the deflation associated with the gold standard? That our financial future lies not in Bitcoin but in phone credit? From the Sumerians’ barley grains to cryptocurrencies, via the revolutionary assignats and the invention of the dollar, David McWilliams traces, with a lively and accessible pen, the history of this invention which—just like the wheel or fire—has shaped human relationships. Far from the dry economic treatises, David McWilliams shows us that money is not merely an instrument of power. It can also lead to cooperation and collective progress. This is not the first book on money in literature or in the Cercle Turgot’s list of reviews. The renewed interest in this type of work lies in the author’s background and his own perception of money. This informs his choice of historical timeline and examples. Admittedly, we begin with Part 1, which is devoted to antiquity and the famous “fortune,” and continue with: money in the Middle Ages, revolutionary money, modern money, and finally, liberated money (who controls money, the psychology of money, the evolution of money, modern monetary theory, and M-Pesa). The book also explores numerous cultures that have contributed to the development of money and the innovations each has brought. The mastery of money coincided with other major advances such as writing, mathematics, law, democracy, and philosophy. This evolution raises a question: was money the cause of these other developments, or did these developments lead to the evolution of money? Which came first, the chicken or the egg? This is the originality of this book, which was named Book of the Year by the Financial Times: it provides food for thought in an attempt to answer that question. David McWilliams is a social commentator, so he has drawn on a wide range of advice and contributions, and expresses opinions—and… errors—that are his own and those of the people cited in the book. The reader’s task is not to identify any potential blunders, but to understand the intellectual journey of the contributors that may have led to “deviations from the consensus of economists specializing in monetary matters.” A book that should be read by anyone curious about ideas and their interpretation: money and currency are personal concepts. It is a common good and an…individual good as well! Dominique Chesneau

Europe, probably the greatest political and human enterprise of modern times, was built upon the reconciliation between France and Germany, as well as the definitive rejection of the use of force between these two nations. This project, born in the minds and voices of former deportees as early as the autumn of 1945, was the prelude to the creation of the Common Market and later the European Union, which grew from six to twenty-seven member states within a few decades. However, Europe poorly understands the ontological blind spot that weakens it: it protects us from our own demons, but it does not protect us from external aggression. This objective was never truly political, nor even part of its identity, and the protection provided by the American umbrella after the Second World War long distanced us from any ambition of strategic autonomy. By politically and institutionally delegating its defense to NATO, and therefore to the United States, Europe contributed to the formation of the American empire: a protective empire that now seems, in some respects, to be joining the club of predators. China, Russia, and the United States now speak about Europe in remarkably similar terms, marked by strategic contempt. For Donald Trump, Europe belongs to the past: it is a civilization in decline. For Vladimir Putin, we are a soft planet made up of weak and “woke” societies. For Xi Jinping, we are democracies in irreversible decline. Paradoxically, this convergence among predatory powers could open the door for Europe’s affirmation. By neglecting the transatlantic alliance, the United States is giving Europe the opportunity to seize its strategic autonomy. By invading Ukraine, Russia is forcing the Old Continent to urgently rethink its rearmament and security. Finally, through its commercial predation, China is compelling Europe to rebuild its weakened competitiveness and relearn the logic of power. Europe must understand that power relations are not negotiated solely through law or trade. Greenland recently provided a demonstration of this reality, illustrating the brutality of a world in which great powers no longer hesitate to impose their interests. For Europe is far less weak than it believes itself to be. The demographic decline that causes so much concern is in fact a global phenomenon. In the same way, Europe’s dependence on Asia should not be mistaken for inevitability. Europe remains wealthy, possesses a powerful market, and retains significant productive capacity. Its weaknesses are known and widely described. The real difficulty lies less in identifying them than in acting upon them. Facing these three predatory empires, the technocratic and regulatory empire that Europe has become will have to reinvent itself. It must regain speed of execution, agility in the fields of security, technology, and energy. It must also relearn how to engage with the countries of the Global South, without remaining trapped by a colonial guilt linked to a history that is centuries old, sometimes dating back several hundred years. Ultimately, Europe must stop internalizing its supposed weakness and servility. To achieve this, it must learn the brutality of the world without renouncing its principles. Clearly asserting its interests, making them understood, and ensuring they are respected with determination has now become essential. Ph Alezard

Reading the book will be particularly useful for future candidates in the 2027 elections, as thedrift in French public debt has reached such a level that its merestabilisation requires increasingly technical and radical reforms. The authors clearly show that the slippages in public spending and compulsory levies result from political compromises or non-decisions on the part of both right- and left-wing governments. The retrospective covers the period from 1958 to 2025, marked by four sequences: from 1958 to 1980 (balance, the key to the Fifth Republic); from 1981 to 1997 (imbalance, the new norm); from 1997 to 2007 (European collective balance, a fragile safeguard); and since 2007 (balance, crises, imbalance). Each sequence has three phases, which reveal little-known aspects of the historyof the French budget, such as the budgetary slippage following the oilshock, the “turning point of austerity” in 1983, which was austerity in name only; thereasons for the failure of the “Juppé plan” of 1995; the errors in macroeconomicforecasts, particularly in 2025…    The study clearly shows that successive governments, regardless of their political leanings, have made – or failed to make – certain decisions that have had long-term detrimental effects on public finances. The drift in expenditure is  due in particular to the increase in public expenditure, with the number of employees (estimatedat 5.9 million at the beginning of 2026) in State, local and hospital functionshaving increased by more than 20% over thelast 20 years,  compared to 15% for the French population as a whole.  The multiplication of social benefits through various channels (in particular that of tax niches), the decentralization of certain State functions to local authorities and France’s contribution to the Community and then European budget have been increasingly difficult to control. France has thus reached the highest rate of compulsory levies (with increasingly declining returns) in the OECD. The authors conclude by stating that the debt has reached a “limit point” and that any recovery will be all the more difficult due to the country’s political instability.  Jean Dubertret was an adviser to the Prime Minister, a senior official at the Inspectorate of Finance and an expert at the IMF. Nicolas Ragache is Chief Economist of the AFEPafter having been a ministerial adviser. Jean-Jacques Pluchart