The object of our desires, the driving force behind our ingenuity… What if money were also humanity’s greatest invention? Did you know that the piastre was the predecessor of the dollar? That Hitler and Lenin used currency to manipulate the masses? That *The Wizard of Oz* is actually about the deflation associated with the gold standard? That our financial future lies not in Bitcoin but in phone credit? From the Sumerians’ barley grains to cryptocurrencies, via the revolutionary assignats and the invention of the dollar, David McWilliams traces, with a lively and accessible pen, the history of this invention which—just like the wheel or fire—has shaped human relationships. Far from the dry economic treatises, David McWilliams shows us that money is not merely an instrument of power. It can also lead to cooperation and collective progress. This is not the first book on money in literature or in the Cercle Turgot’s list of reviews. The renewed interest in this type of work lies in the author’s background and his own perception of money. This informs his choice of historical timeline and examples. Admittedly, we begin with Part 1, which is devoted to antiquity and the famous “fortune,” and continue with: money in the Middle Ages, revolutionary money, modern money, and finally, liberated money (who controls money, the psychology of money, the evolution of money, modern monetary theory, and M-Pesa). The book also explores numerous cultures that have contributed to the development of money and the innovations each has brought. The mastery of money coincided with other major advances such as writing, mathematics, law, democracy, and philosophy. This evolution raises a question: was money the cause of these other developments, or did these developments lead to the evolution of money? Which came first, the chicken or the egg? This is the originality of this book, which was named Book of the Year by the Financial Times: it provides food for thought in an attempt to answer that question. David McWilliams is a social commentator, so he has drawn on a wide range of advice and contributions, and expresses opinions—and… errors—that are his own and those of the people cited in the book. The reader’s task is not to identify any potential blunders, but to understand the intellectual journey of the contributors that may have led to “deviations from the consensus of economists specializing in monetary matters.” A book that should be read by anyone curious about ideas and their interpretation: money and currency are personal concepts. It is a common good and an…individual good as well! Dominique Chesneau

The former deputy chief of staff to Pierre Mauroy, from 1981 to 1983, paints a polemical portrait of the economic, social, political and trade-union situation of our country. Democracy is weakened, society is fractured, the economy is in decline, public finances are heavily in deficit, and the political and trade-union world continues to demonstrate its inability to meet these challenges. The vertical concentration of power at every level, the refusal of dualism, the denial of reality, economic illiteracy, compounded by the intellectual fraud of a few, have pushed France into such disorder that democracy itself is threatened with disappearance. France is not capable, on its own, of forming a cohesive society. Post-revolutionary historical facts remind us of this: from the Terror to the Third Republic, which established itself after militarily defeating the Commune, France has reformed itself through riots and bloodshed. The various social forces and numerous political parties seek only to gain access to this supreme vertical power. Each therefore defends its own positions in its own interest, without concern for the common good. For the author, the current situation is not without resemblance to that of the July Monarchy. The crisis threatening us is at once economic, financial and political. Both the deficit and the debt are out of control, and our productive apparatus suffers from a lack of competitiveness. Employers’ organisations and trade unions remain entrenched in their positions, while, on the political side, the left, still profoundly anti-capitalist, remains trapped in the myth of the ultra-rich who should be taxed ever more heavily, and the right indulges in illusions, believing that it would be enough to reduce public spending without touching social expenditure. Meanwhile, extremists on both the left and the right, whose programmes have not the slightest capacity to restore the country’s economy, hold out promises of change and social upheaval in order to attract those at the bottom of the social ladder. And yet solutions do exist to address each of these problems. They are known and documented. But who, on the left or on the right, is prepared to state and explain what should be implemented? Solutions are born of drama: this is a very French habit. So must we first plunge into chaos — this being the most likely scenario according to the author — in order to see, once again, the emergence of a providential man or woman capable of solving the fundamental problems and finally changing our methods of governance ? Ph Alezard

The aim of the book is to ‘revisit the work of a great French economist, little known in his own country but recognised abroad, for example in the United States, in the light of the current situation in 21st-century France’. The economist Florin Aftalion said of him: ‘Bastiat’s understanding of the workings of the state was so keen that he predicted the introduction of social security and that it would run into deficit even before it existed.’ In his book, Michel Albouy clearly demonstrates the continuing relevance of Bastiat’s ideas more than 150 years later. Bastiat believes that ‘the defence of the market and of competition appears to be one of the most enlightening issues for our era of resurgent socialism and interventionism’. He asks ‘why we pay such high taxes’, why the national education system struggles so much to properly educate young French people, why a war does not create jobs… By posing these questions, Bastiat proves to be a ‘visionary’. In his view, ‘the market and free trade are the foundations of national prosperity’, protectionism is recessionary, and price freezes create shortages. Bastiat criticises the inconsistency of citizens who approve of subsidies for businesses but criticise tax increases. At the heart of Bastiat’s thinking is also private property, which he considers a natural right predating the law, constituting ‘a bulwark against the arbitrariness of the State’ and a factor of freedom. He is a staunch advocate of the market economy, which makes it possible to ‘meet the real needs of ordinary people’, because it is ‘the most modest people, the poorest populations, who benefit from competition’. Using a bibliography of Frédéric Bastiat’s works as a starting point, Michel Albouy sets out his own understanding of the social role of economists, which he believes is to explain the consequences of economic policies and to inform public decision-making. This is precisely what Frédéric Bastiat did through his books and colums. Michel Albouy is Professor Emeritus of Finance. In particular, he observed that ‘it is the shareholder who finances their own dividend’ or that, in the event of a takeover bid, people criticise the resulting redundancies, forgetting that ‘the company in question was poorly managed and/or that the merger would make it possible to save what could still be saved’. Jean Jacques Pluchart

The author opens his essay with a stark observation. After the Trente Glorieuses, a period during which Europe and France recorded growth rates of around 5 to 6% per year, enabling them to regain a level of GDP per capita almost comparable to that of the United States, a profound divergence gradually set in from the mid-1980s onward. This divergence has become so pronounced that France, like most European countries, now finds itself, in terms of GDP per capita, in a situation that is not unlike that of the post-war years. According to the author, the root cause of this decline lies in the accumulation of delays in achieving economic sustainability, but also in our inability to redirect the productive system toward innovation. The economic and social model shaped over the past four decades has allowed neither companies truly to take risks nor disruptive innovation to be financed effectively. Europe has thus become a space constrained by an entanglement of administrative, bureaucratic and regulatory norms. Each of these norms, in the social, financial, economic, industrial or environmental spheres, admittedly stems from legitimate preferences; yet their accumulation, as much as their interlocking nature, has generated such complexity that it now hampers the development of European businesses. This evolution has resulted in a decline in productivity at the very moment when productivity was being driven first in the United States by the spread of new technologies — personal computers, microprocessors, digital services and artificial intelligence — and then, over the past two decades, by China. Europe now finds itself in a position of heavy dependence on American digital services. The deficit associated with these services is estimated at more than €150 billion per year. Beyond this trade imbalance, such dependence above all reveals the inadequacy of a technological and industrial ecosystem capable of processing, hosting and enhancing strategic data. This weakness directly undermines Europe’s ability to develop high-performing, autonomous and competitive artificial intelligence models. The situation appears all the more worrying as power relations with Donald Trump’s United States and with China are hardening, while this transformation is unfolding in a particularly strained budgetary context for France. And yet, this context could also represent a historic opportunity for the Old Continent. It could compel Europe to reconnect with a genuine industrial ambition. For that to happen, Europe would need to be given a true driver of innovation, to stop artificially designating champions that capture funding, and to allow competition, experimentation and risk-taking to play a greater role in distributing the chances of success. It is equally necessary to stem the hemorrhage of talent, ideas and capital, and to put an end to the fragmentation of markets and career paths by offering more attractive careers, more flexible and dynamic environments, and better-adapted, more rewarding savings products. Artificial intelligence is undoubtedly still in its infancy; Europe could therefore reshuffle the deck by moving toward a more frugal model, compatible with climate objectives, and capable of establishing itself as a desirable benchmark. Economic history shows that setbacks are never irreversible. But such a recovery requires us to accept uncomfortable truths, finally to build a genuine capital markets union, to reject fragmentation and all that it entails, and to break both with the easy recourse to deficits and with the fear of change. For our social model can only be preserved over the long term at the cost of renewed economic efficiency. Ph Alezard

In his essay, France’s social debt (1974-2024), Nicolas Dufourcq performs far more than a mere fiscal autopsy; he conducts an ontological deconstruction of the French welfare state. As the head of BPI France, the country’s public investment bank, Mr Dufourcq exposes what he terms a “family secret”: that two-thirds of France’s sovereign debt, some €2 trillion, has morphed into a colossal “consumer credit” facility, used to bankroll daily benefits rather than to invest in the nation’s future. The diagnosis is as clinical as it is compelling. Mr Dufourcq identifies 1974 as the year of the fall, when France inaugurated its first “whatever it takes” policy, shifting from a contributory insurance model to a permanent infusion of debt-funded assistance. Invoking Clément Rosset’s philosophy of “the real and its double,” the author lambasts a collective denial that ignores the “longevity revolution” and its impact on a sclerotic economy. While the “social horse” gallops ahead, fueled by the “white powder” of debt, the “economic horse” is left gasping for air. To break this cycle, he proposes an “Iron Rule”: a constitutional mandate for strictly balanced social accounts. The work is meticulously documented, drawing on testimonies from fifty members of the political and administrative elite. Yet, despite being dedicated to the nation’s entrepreneurs, they are conspicuously absent from the interviews. Here lies the work’s tragic paradox, and perhaps that of France itself: by giving voice solely to the mandarins of the state, the analysis remains partially confined within the circle of those who managed, justified, or presided over the very imbalances it decries. When former minister Marisol Touraine “vigorously contests that deficits stem from runaway social spending”, the reader perceives the extent to which the chronicle of failure is still being written by its own protagonists. The original sin of the system has been the progressive decoupling of social rights from the requirement of production. This is the hamartia of a system that, by substituting social entitlements for wealth creation, has condemned its pact of solidarity to become little more than a pious wish, broken by the unforgiving arithmetic of economy and demographics. Recalling Virgil’s labor improbus omnia vincit, Mr Dufourcq reminds us that one does not reform a country by fighting against reality. The ultimate lesson is clear: the social Republic will be saved neither by incantations nor denial, but by rehabilitating wealth creation as the prerequisite for solidarity. France must now decide if it is ready for the discipline of the real. A lifetime civil servant and graduate of HEC Paris and Sciences Po, Nicolas Dufourcq is a former official of the Inspection générale des finances and has served as Chief Executive Officer of Bpifrance since its inception in 2013. Yoann Lopez

The multitude  of  regional  conflicts  raging across our planet  (Ukraine,  Iran, Palestine, the Middle  East, the Asia-Pacific region, among others)  is fuelling growing    fears about the  risks  of  globalisation ultimately leading to    the outbreak of a  third world  war. A ‘non-zero’ risk, as experts would say!  However, it  would be too hasty to forget  that the supreme art  of war,  as advocated by   Sun  Tzu, is  to subdue the enemy  without  combat.  The importance of strategy and cunning, of subtle tactics to neutralise the adversary    without engagement, therefore remains the true victory: the ability to neutralise the enemy’s actions without resorting to brute force.   In  this new publication, Jean-Luc Buchalet, a renowned expert, lecturer  and author of numerous books on economics (winner of the Turgot Special Prize in 2013), draws on  his in-depth knowledge  of  Chinese history  and culture  to  convey a form of subliminal message through a work of fiction with clear family ties. As the pages unfold  , a  highly  complex Chinese reality emerges, intertwined with  that of contrasting personalities    and  great leaders – profoundly human figures, most often  dark and manipulative,  from Mao to Xi.  Through the intersecting perspectives, the history    and the  testimonies of the extraordinary characters  in this novel,  some of whom are members    of the author’s own family  (his own father-in-law, a veterinarian  who was in charge  of a  region and was imprisoned, and  whose wife, a  soldier and Red Guard, saved his life), we also discover    the harsh reality of China’s modern history. Under  Xi, digitalisation ‘has  become a tool of mass control, extending the authoritarian legacy  of the Cultural Revolution’. China’s growing rivalry with the United States raises the spectre of a major conflict, particularly   over Taiwan… But the worst is never  over… at least,  we can hope so!  The plot of  this remarkable novel combines historical  narrative and suspense, offering an intimate immersion into the ‘Chinese soul’. The author’s excellent writing skills play a significant role in this. This is also one of his  great strengths  , which readers will particularly appreciate. Jean-Luc Buchalet: agricultural engineer and economist – lecturer at the Sorbonne and at IAE Paris, speaker, columnist, author of numerous books and leading specialist on China  Jean-Luc  CHAMBON

Edouard Roblotdescribes electricity as a natural resource that should continue to be supported, and even developed, given the increasing scarcity of fossil fuels. He outlines the history of electricity since the 1970s, with the development of nuclear power in France, the aim of which was already to move away from fossil fuels and achieve energy independence. The author identifies the various sectors in which the development of electricity presents an opportunity in the years to come, particularly in domestic applications. He then addresses the power supply for electric vehicles, whether private cars or road transport, whose widespread adoption of electric power would require the installation of charging stations at all parking spaces to enable them to be charged. The author also proposes reducing daily travel distances by clustering residential areas, thereby limiting emissions, with the added benefit of revitalising local shops. Another challenge outlined is the need to promote the thermal renovation of buildings, but also, and above all, to eliminate energy-inefficient buildings, by implementing a programEdouard me for new, eco-friendly buildings with the support of the State. This would have the advantage of avoiding certain shortcomings of the current thermal renovation programmes, which involve the preparation of voluminous applications that rarely lead to successful outcomes. Finally, the large-scale deployment of low-cost, low-carbon electricity generated from renewable energy sources is a key issue in securing the future of energy in France, given the ageing nuclear power plants. In this context, the proposal is to focus on new nuclear power, offshore wind energy, solar energy for car parks and buildings, and hydropower. Edouard Roblot emphasises the importance of concentrating on these seven battles to be fought, without spreading oneself too thin and ultimately achieving nothing in an effective and meaningful way, by focusing on the fight against global warming and CO₂ emissions. These are challenges that need to be addressed within a reasonable timeframe. Throughout the book, the technological shifts proposed could lead to a societal change that would support these new developments, as possible future solutions to emerge from the current crisis and envisage a better life. Edouard Roblot is a graduate of the École Polytechnique and the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, specialising in energy transition. His career has focused on the energy sector, where he held the position of Low-Carbon Buildings Director at IDEX. He has worked as a Renewable Energy Project Manager at the Energy Regulatory Commission and as a Foresight Manager for the Total Group. Pona SAMNIK  

This book deserves the attention of elected officials and election candidates, as well as that of all taxpayers. It traces the history of the taxes, duties and contributions that increasingly affect the French population. While presented as a textbook on comparative taxation, it encompasses an in-depth examination of the theoretical foundations, the triggering events, the positive and negative externalities, and, above all, the possible avenues for reform of the French socio-tax system. The book is structured into five chapters covering taxes on expenditure (VAT), personal income, corporations, inheritance and property wealth. The book is rounded off by two chapters on the full cost of public funds and on the ‘Laffer effect’. The evolution of the CSG (contribution sociale généralisée – general social contribution) illustrates the entire history of French taxation: a contribution that initially had a broad base and a reduced rate has, for electoral reasons, become a complex tax with numerous exemptions. The author analyses the causes of the inefficiency of public services, demonstrating that demand for most public services has more negative effects than demand for equivalent private services, since, in a market, everyone must pay the price of what they consume. He identifies the inactivity traps created by certain taxes. He deconstructs certain claims advanced by the ‘egalitarian economists’, who developed the numerous theories underpinning France’s socio-tax systems. He distinguishes between economic taxes and ideological (or ‘clientelist’) taxes, and observes that the latter are increasingly dominating the former. His analysis of the Laffer curve is original. In principle, the curve, or the theorem, makes it possible to determine the rate at which taxation becomes inefficient, as it is perceived as excessive by the taxpayer and leads to deviant  behavior. The author observes that the effects of over-taxation are unpredictable due to the differences between countries in the elasticity of income and/or profits in relation to taxation. The author concludes by arguing that the taxation of the future must be fair and efficient. To achieve this, it is necessary to shift the tax burden as far as possible onto consumption, to introduce a proportional rate of income tax, to set corporate tax at 15%, and to abolish inheritance tax and property wealth tax. Priority should be given to broad-based, low-rate taxes. Taxation must not hinder the functioning of markets, which generate productive jobs and create value. Every citizen must take responsibility for themselves. Taxation is not intended to be redistributive. To achieve this objective, the tax structure must be fundamentally reformed. The main economic handicaps are of fiscal origin. If the French do not abandon their utopian egalitarian ideal, France will come under the control of other nations and the financial markets. François Facchini is professeur in économics at Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne University. Jean-Jacques Pluchart

This short book has the merit of presenting the numerous scholarly works devoted to the themes and practices related to populist economics and cultures around the world. The authors outline the numerous ideological, discursive, socio-cultural and economic definitions and approaches to populism. They review the histories and analyze the agendas of the three main currents: the left (LFI in France), the right (RN) and the center (the ‘Gilets Jaunes’). The first group bases its program on a critique of neoliberalism, a fight against inequality, and a form of communitarianism. The second focuses its actions on an identity-based withdrawal and on sovereignty. The third group criticizes the elites and the tax system. In particular, the authors present the work of Downs, who argues that populism is based on ‘rational ignorance and irrationality’, as populist agendas rely on reasoning that is both superficial and biased. They seek a ‘minimal democratic consensus’. Overall, populist economists seek to demonstrate that technological progress favours capital and destroys labour, and that deindustrialization – a factor in unemployment and inequality – results from insufficient control of imports (which do not comply with national and international standards). Socio-cultural research attributes the rise of right-wing populism to fears of the decline of traditional or religious values and, above all, of social decline. The authors also highlight the partisan role played by certain media outlets and social networks. Both right- and left-wing movements are engaging in ‘platform populism’ through the use of AI. In a final section, the authors present a map of populist movements in the Americas (North and South) and Europe (West and East), categorized according to their more or less non-aligned ideologies. They analyze the findings of key scientific studies (including those by Nobel Prize-winning economists), demonstrating that all radical populist agendas have failed and have led to a decline of at least 10% in the GDP of the country under populist rule over a 10-year period. The authors consider whether ‘illiberal democracies’ are viable in the long term. Alexandre Chirat is a lecturer and researcher at the University of Besançon. Gilles Ivaldi is a researcher at the CNRS, and Emilie Sartre is a lecturer at the University of Nottingham. Jean-Jacques Pluchart

The idea of a generational conflict has now become a recurring framework through which public debate in France is interpreted. Baby boomers, born in the immediate post-war period and now largely retired, are often portrayed as the beneficiaries of a system whose advantages they are said to have appropriated at the expense of subsequent generations, whose future prospects and retirement security have thereby been undermined. Should this indictment be regarded as an objective reality, or rather as the product of a contemporary myth sustained by clichés? Hippolyte d’Albis invites us to move beyond such oversimplified representations by drawing on the economics of age, now established as an autonomous field of economic analysis, grounded in the use of statistical data and national transfer accounts. The value of this method lies in its ability to capture all the flows that contribute to individuals’ well-being throughout the course of life, whether these derive from the family, the market, or the state. In this respect, it departs from traditional approaches based on rigid administrative age categories—children, working-age adults, retirees—in order to privilege a functional reading of life trajectories. What matters is no longer belonging to a given age category, but rather the actual capacity of individuals to generate sufficient income to cover their current consumption, or conversely, the extent to which they find themselves in a situation of deficit or surplus. Such an approach makes it possible to better understand how generations are articulated with one another within the broader framework of collective production and redistribution. Since national transfer accounts have been available since 1979, it is possible to observe over the long term the transformations of these equilibria. Two major lessons emerge from this analysis. The first concerns the evolution of the economic life cycle. Contrary to what one might expect, the age at which individuals enter the surplus phase has not been postponed. It remains fixed at 24, despite the lengthening of higher education. This apparently paradoxical result can be explained by the low incomes earned at the beginning of careers in the 1980s, which at the time delayed full economic autonomy. By contrast, the age at which individuals enter the second deficit phase has shifted markedly upward, rising from 58 in 1980 to 60 today, a change explained primarily by the increase in senior employment rates. Far from freezing generational positions, the analysis thus highlights the plasticity of economic ages. The second lesson concerns the structure of well-being transfers. Since the late 1970s, the state has remained the principal provider of resources, with a relatively stable share of around 70 percent. At the same time, the role of the family has declined considerably, its contribution having been cut in half, while that of the market has tripled. This reconfiguration has not, however, taken place uniformly across age groups. The role of the state has strengthened in favor of the young, partly offsetting the erosion of family support, while it has diminished for older people, among whom market-based resources—especially those derived from assets and wealth—have come to occupy a growing place. Such an evolution directly contradicts the idea that baby boomers systematically benefit from more favorable treatment than younger generations. In reality, solidarity mechanisms benefit the young first and foremost, through spending on education, training, and labor-market integration. Older generations rely more heavily on capital income than on increased public support. The real source of tension therefore lies less in any supposed intergenerational appropriation of collective resources than in the effects of a particular demographic structure: the numerical weight of the baby-boom cohorts places specific pressure on the balance of the social protection system. But can one reasonably blame a generation for being numerous ? Still, this clarification does not settle the normative question. For while it would be absurd to hold a generation responsible for its own demographic weight, it does not follow that current generations should bear alone the cost of the resulting imbalance. The demographic argument cannot suffice to justify an unequal distribution of effort. This is why some rebalancing appears inevitable—not in order to condemn past generations, but to restore a measure of justice between those that succeed one another. Hippolyte d’Albis, Professor at ESSEC and Vice-President of the Cercle des économistes. Ph Alezard