Edouard Roblotdescribes electricity as a natural resource that should continue to be supported, and even developed, given the increasing scarcity of fossil fuels. He outlines the history of electricity since the 1970s, with the development of nuclear power in France, the aim of which was already to move away from fossil fuels and achieve energy independence. The author identifies the various sectors in which the development of electricity presents an opportunity in the years to come, particularly in domestic applications. He then addresses the power supply for electric vehicles, whether private cars or road transport, whose widespread adoption of electric power would require the installation of charging stations at all parking spaces to enable them to be charged. The author also proposes reducing daily travel distances by clustering residential areas, thereby limiting emissions, with the added benefit of revitalising local shops. Another challenge outlined is the need to promote the thermal renovation of buildings, but also, and above all, to eliminate energy-inefficient buildings, by implementing a programEdouard me for new, eco-friendly buildings with the support of the State. This would have the advantage of avoiding certain shortcomings of the current thermal renovation programmes, which involve the preparation of voluminous applications that rarely lead to successful outcomes. Finally, the large-scale deployment of low-cost, low-carbon electricity generated from renewable energy sources is a key issue in securing the future of energy in France, given the ageing nuclear power plants. In this context, the proposal is to focus on new nuclear power, offshore wind energy, solar energy for car parks and buildings, and hydropower. Edouard Roblot emphasises the importance of concentrating on these seven battles to be fought, without spreading oneself too thin and ultimately achieving nothing in an effective and meaningful way, by focusing on the fight against global warming and CO₂ emissions. These are challenges that need to be addressed within a reasonable timeframe. Throughout the book, the technological shifts proposed could lead to a societal change that would support these new developments, as possible future solutions to emerge from the current crisis and envisage a better life. Edouard Roblot is a graduate of the École Polytechnique and the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, specialising in energy transition. His career has focused on the energy sector, where he held the position of Low-Carbon Buildings Director at IDEX. He has worked as a Renewable Energy Project Manager at the Energy Regulatory Commission and as a Foresight Manager for the Total Group. Pona SAMNIK  

This book deserves the attention of elected officials and election candidates, as well as that of all taxpayers. It traces the history of the taxes, duties and contributions that increasingly affect the French population. While presented as a textbook on comparative taxation, it encompasses an in-depth examination of the theoretical foundations, the triggering events, the positive and negative externalities, and, above all, the possible avenues for reform of the French socio-tax system. The book is structured into five chapters covering taxes on expenditure (VAT), personal income, corporations, inheritance and property wealth. The book is rounded off by two chapters on the full cost of public funds and on the ‘Laffer effect’. The evolution of the CSG (contribution sociale généralisée – general social contribution) illustrates the entire history of French taxation: a contribution that initially had a broad base and a reduced rate has, for electoral reasons, become a complex tax with numerous exemptions. The author analyses the causes of the inefficiency of public services, demonstrating that demand for most public services has more negative effects than demand for equivalent private services, since, in a market, everyone must pay the price of what they consume. He identifies the inactivity traps created by certain taxes. He deconstructs certain claims advanced by the ‘egalitarian economists’, who developed the numerous theories underpinning France’s socio-tax systems. He distinguishes between economic taxes and ideological (or ‘clientelist’) taxes, and observes that the latter are increasingly dominating the former. His analysis of the Laffer curve is original. In principle, the curve, or the theorem, makes it possible to determine the rate at which taxation becomes inefficient, as it is perceived as excessive by the taxpayer and leads to deviant  behavior. The author observes that the effects of over-taxation are unpredictable due to the differences between countries in the elasticity of income and/or profits in relation to taxation. The author concludes by arguing that the taxation of the future must be fair and efficient. To achieve this, it is necessary to shift the tax burden as far as possible onto consumption, to introduce a proportional rate of income tax, to set corporate tax at 15%, and to abolish inheritance tax and property wealth tax. Priority should be given to broad-based, low-rate taxes. Taxation must not hinder the functioning of markets, which generate productive jobs and create value. Every citizen must take responsibility for themselves. Taxation is not intended to be redistributive. To achieve this objective, the tax structure must be fundamentally reformed. The main economic handicaps are of fiscal origin. If the French do not abandon their utopian egalitarian ideal, France will come under the control of other nations and the financial markets. François Facchini is professeur in économics at Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne University. Jean-Jacques Pluchart

This short book has the merit of presenting the numerous scholarly works devoted to the themes and practices related to populist economics and cultures around the world. The authors outline the numerous ideological, discursive, socio-cultural and economic definitions and approaches to populism. They review the histories and analyze the agendas of the three main currents: the left (LFI in France), the right (RN) and the center (the ‘Gilets Jaunes’). The first group bases its program on a critique of neoliberalism, a fight against inequality, and a form of communitarianism. The second focuses its actions on an identity-based withdrawal and on sovereignty. The third group criticizes the elites and the tax system. In particular, the authors present the work of Downs, who argues that populism is based on ‘rational ignorance and irrationality’, as populist agendas rely on reasoning that is both superficial and biased. They seek a ‘minimal democratic consensus’. Overall, populist economists seek to demonstrate that technological progress favours capital and destroys labour, and that deindustrialization – a factor in unemployment and inequality – results from insufficient control of imports (which do not comply with national and international standards). Socio-cultural research attributes the rise of right-wing populism to fears of the decline of traditional or religious values and, above all, of social decline. The authors also highlight the partisan role played by certain media outlets and social networks. Both right- and left-wing movements are engaging in ‘platform populism’ through the use of AI. In a final section, the authors present a map of populist movements in the Americas (North and South) and Europe (West and East), categorized according to their more or less non-aligned ideologies. They analyze the findings of key scientific studies (including those by Nobel Prize-winning economists), demonstrating that all radical populist agendas have failed and have led to a decline of at least 10% in the GDP of the country under populist rule over a 10-year period. The authors consider whether ‘illiberal democracies’ are viable in the long term. Alexandre Chirat is a lecturer and researcher at the University of Besançon. Gilles Ivaldi is a researcher at the CNRS, and Emilie Sartre is a lecturer at the University of Nottingham. Jean-Jacques Pluchart

The idea of a generational conflict has now become a recurring framework through which public debate in France is interpreted. Baby boomers, born in the immediate post-war period and now largely retired, are often portrayed as the beneficiaries of a system whose advantages they are said to have appropriated at the expense of subsequent generations, whose future prospects and retirement security have thereby been undermined. Should this indictment be regarded as an objective reality, or rather as the product of a contemporary myth sustained by clichés? Hippolyte d’Albis invites us to move beyond such oversimplified representations by drawing on the economics of age, now established as an autonomous field of economic analysis, grounded in the use of statistical data and national transfer accounts. The value of this method lies in its ability to capture all the flows that contribute to individuals’ well-being throughout the course of life, whether these derive from the family, the market, or the state. In this respect, it departs from traditional approaches based on rigid administrative age categories—children, working-age adults, retirees—in order to privilege a functional reading of life trajectories. What matters is no longer belonging to a given age category, but rather the actual capacity of individuals to generate sufficient income to cover their current consumption, or conversely, the extent to which they find themselves in a situation of deficit or surplus. Such an approach makes it possible to better understand how generations are articulated with one another within the broader framework of collective production and redistribution. Since national transfer accounts have been available since 1979, it is possible to observe over the long term the transformations of these equilibria. Two major lessons emerge from this analysis. The first concerns the evolution of the economic life cycle. Contrary to what one might expect, the age at which individuals enter the surplus phase has not been postponed. It remains fixed at 24, despite the lengthening of higher education. This apparently paradoxical result can be explained by the low incomes earned at the beginning of careers in the 1980s, which at the time delayed full economic autonomy. By contrast, the age at which individuals enter the second deficit phase has shifted markedly upward, rising from 58 in 1980 to 60 today, a change explained primarily by the increase in senior employment rates. Far from freezing generational positions, the analysis thus highlights the plasticity of economic ages. The second lesson concerns the structure of well-being transfers. Since the late 1970s, the state has remained the principal provider of resources, with a relatively stable share of around 70 percent. At the same time, the role of the family has declined considerably, its contribution having been cut in half, while that of the market has tripled. This reconfiguration has not, however, taken place uniformly across age groups. The role of the state has strengthened in favor of the young, partly offsetting the erosion of family support, while it has diminished for older people, among whom market-based resources—especially those derived from assets and wealth—have come to occupy a growing place. Such an evolution directly contradicts the idea that baby boomers systematically benefit from more favorable treatment than younger generations. In reality, solidarity mechanisms benefit the young first and foremost, through spending on education, training, and labor-market integration. Older generations rely more heavily on capital income than on increased public support. The real source of tension therefore lies less in any supposed intergenerational appropriation of collective resources than in the effects of a particular demographic structure: the numerical weight of the baby-boom cohorts places specific pressure on the balance of the social protection system. But can one reasonably blame a generation for being numerous ? Still, this clarification does not settle the normative question. For while it would be absurd to hold a generation responsible for its own demographic weight, it does not follow that current generations should bear alone the cost of the resulting imbalance. The demographic argument cannot suffice to justify an unequal distribution of effort. This is why some rebalancing appears inevitable—not in order to condemn past generations, but to restore a measure of justice between those that succeed one another. Hippolyte d’Albis, Professor at ESSEC and Vice-President of the Cercle des économistes. Ph Alezard

In Public Policies through Tax Expenditures, the authors analyse a phenomenon that has become central to French public action: the growing use of taxation as a tool to steer economic and social behaviour. The book focuses on tax expenditures — often referred to as “tax loopholes” — and assesses their rationale, cost and effectiveness. The main argument is clear: tax incentives are a form of public policy in their own right. Even when they do not appear as visible budgetary spending, they mobilise collective resources and shape the decisions of households and firms. Over time, this instrument has expanded into many areas, including employment, health, family policy, long-term care, research and development, housing, and philanthropy. The authors show that this trend follows a strong political logic. Tax measures are easier to introduce than direct spending programmes and often appear less costly, since they take the form of foregone revenue rather than explicit expenditure. Yet their multiplication makes the system more complex and increasingly difficult to manage. A recurring finding of the book is that the effectiveness of these measures is uneven. In several cases, evaluations highlight windfall effects or benefits concentrated among higher-income households. Family policies, certain long-term care measures and housing-related tax incentives illustrate the gap that can emerge between stated objectives and actual outcomes. Once implemented, these mechanisms also become difficult to reverse, which encourages their accumulation over time. Employment policy provides a particularly telling example. France has relied heavily on tax and social contribution reductions to lower labour costs. While these measures have produced some positive effects, their overall cost raises questions about their real efficiency and about the opportunity cost compared with direct investment or training policies. The chapter on research and development points to another limitation: despite significant tax incentives, innovation performance remains below that of several comparable economies. Here again, the authors highlight issues of targeting and uneven effectiveness across programmes. The analysis of housing and philanthropy extends this diagnosis. Tax incentives can contribute to inflationary effects or indirectly steer public resources towards the preferences of wealthier taxpayers. The debate therefore goes beyond financial cost and raises broader questions about governance and policy coherence. The book does not reject tax incentives as a whole. Instead, it reminds readers that a tax advantage remains a form of public spending and should be assessed accordingly. As governments increasingly rely on taxation to implement policy, the risk is that public action becomes less transparent and harder to control. The book ultimately raises a simple question: when is fiscal incentive the right tool, and when should governments rely on direct, clearly debated public spending? Clément Carbonnier is an economist (Paris 1, CES, LIEPP),Nathalie Morel is a political scientist (Sciences Po-CEE, LIEPP),Bruno Palier is a political scientist (CNRS, Sciences Po-CEE, LIEPP),Michaël Zemmour is an economist (Lyon 2, Triangle, LIEPP). Benoit FRAYER