The author seeks to challenge us on the fact that public debt has not been a part of the debate in France as it has been in Great Britain or Germany. How did we arrive at this sometimes irrational, denied or dramatized relationship? After financing the war of 1914-18, the Treasury Bond invites itself into homes, and already voices are being raised to note how insufficient the financial education of the public is. The lack of consent to taxation in France prevents any forced savings solution, as in Great Britain, where public debt becomes a sustainable and discreet way of financing state expenditure. After the Second World War, France did not choose rigor and austerity, but decided to settle its war debts through inflation and the devaluation of the franc. The period 1959-1973 saw the return to a more orthodox doctrine which has been described as a virtuous decade, with budget balance once again becoming the priority. After the oil shock of 1973, a generalized social assistance system financed directly by the state was put in place to respond to the concern of public opinion, more concerned with unemployment and its purchasing power than with the budget deficit. Government bond issues were reserved for professionals, which made public debt “invisible”.  Since 1975, France’s budget has never been balanced and its deficit is mainly financed by loans. The word debt was not used and was confused with that of budget deficit. The establishment of the Euro obliged France to be more virtuous, and the theme of debt entered more and more frequently into public debate. With its political and economic weight, France can be less virtuous than other countries in the euro zone. In 2006, the publication of the Pébereau commission’s report “Breaking with the facility of public debt” highlighted the State’s lack of productivity, the proliferation of ineffective actors and instruments, and above all, France’s ease of indebtedness on the financial markets, which played a numbing role, and received a real response from the media and politicians. After the sovereign debt crisis of 2010, debt became a key issue in public debate and became politicized. Debt plays a major role in balancing public accounts and, in turn, in the standard of living of the population. Since the pandemic and the “whatever it takes” attitude that has made the discourse on budgetary seriousness inaudible, public debt has become a matter of concern. The Court of Auditors issued a warning before the vote on the 2024 budget: “if we do nothing, the explosion of debt will paralyze public action”. The diversion of debt for political purposes prevents a real democratic debate on its social implications. The social divide is coupled with a generational divide that prevents any consensus. This is a decisive collective and political issue that must be addressed quickly. Chronicle written by Michel GABET

The author traces the history of economic policies undertaken in France and Europe since 1944. She engages in a thorough critique of the measures taken by French rulers, mainly in financial and monetary matters. Her book is presented in the original form of a linear narrative without theoretical references but illustrated with numerous quotes that make reading more lively. The author demonstrates exceptional historical knowledge, as evidenced by references to great financiers, bankers, politicians, and economists, but also philosophers, novelists, and poets. In a precise and metaphorical style, she brings to life the main events that have marked contemporary history and… many readers of the book.   Christina Peicuti shows in particular that since the post-war period, France’s economic recovery plans and its opening to Europe and world markets have often been thwarted by internal and external events of various kinds: colonial wars, the “May 68 crisis”, oil shocks, the subprime crisis, the pandemic, the “yellow vests” movement, the war in Ukraine, etc. Regardless of their political orientations, successive governments have ignored the phases of international market cycles and have favored, in all circumstances, operating expenses (the “whatever it takes”), “fiscal hammering” (especially of companies) and public debt, over structural reforms and, above all, investments in research, in order to fight against unemployment with unequal results. This “economic dirigisme” and “inflationary Keynesianism” have led to a decline in France that is increasingly difficult to reverse. This “culture of spending” has stifled the revival of economic activity, slowed down France’s European integration and contributed to its deindustrialization. Cristina Peicuti (professor at ESCP) is an economist in a cooperative banking group. Her doctoral thesis (Université Paris 2) focused on the 2008 financial crisis and the credit channel. She is the author of several books and scientific articles, including The European Economy in 100 Quotes, PUF, also published in 2024. Review written by J-J. PLUCHART

J-B. Fressoz has published an original book on the history of energy and a reflection on economic thought. He engages in a polemic against “Nobelized” economists such as Jevons, Veblen, Nordhaus and Romer. Their theses have concealed the gravity and urgency of the climate challenge. In particular, he argues that the notion of “creative destruction”, put forward by Schumpeter, is responsible for the relative inaction of governments in the face of the climate crisis. Fressoz revisits the history of energy, which covers a succession of energy systems, separated by transitions “from the organic economy to the mineral economy,” “from coal to oil,” or “from fossil fuels to renewable energies.” These transitions are marked, according to the author, by perception biases that he describes as “transitionist.” The author analyzes  “the symbiotic entanglement and expansion of all energies” since the beginning of the19th century, stating that “the history of energy is not that of an accumulation”, but that of the “intellectual construction of the energy transition” – both “technological project” and “industrial slogan” – which, since the 1970s, has been imposed as “the future of experts, governments and companies”. Fressoz’s account innovates both conceptually and formally. In particular, he introduces the notion of a “symbiotic entity”: he considers, for example, that wood, coal, and oil are more “symbiotic entities” than mere sources of primary energy competing with each other. The economist must integrate all the material processes related to the production of these three energies, and demonstrate that each of them “has drawn consumption from the other two, including for energy uses” . Fressoz’s “new history of energy” covers two centuries of industrialization of the world, marked not by “transitions”, additions, or energy destruction, but by “new symbioses between fossil and alternative energy sources. » The entire book remains homogeneous, although some excerpts are revised versions of articles or chapters of previously published works. Jean Baptiste Fressoz is a historian of science, technology and the environment. After having been a lecturer at Imperial College London, he is now a researcher at CNRS and a teacher at the École des Ponts et Chausssées. Review written by Jean-Jacques PLUCHART

(speech by B. Stirn on October 7, 2024, at the meeting of the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences) I would like to place on the desk of the Academy the book by Jean-Denis Combrexelle, Les normes à l’assaut de la démocratie, published by Odile Jacob. Our country’s taste for standards is old. Montaigne wrote that “we have in France more laws than the rest of the world together and more than would be necessary to regulate all the worlds of Epicurus”. Montesquieu noted that “unnecessary laws weaken necessary laws”. But the disease tends to get worse. In three successive studies, published in 1991, 2006 and 2016, the Council of State expressed concern about normative inflation and instability. It must be said, however, that the situation has hardly improved. The book by Jean-Denis Combrexelle is therefore a very timely contribution to the debate, as it helps us to understand the phenomenon and offers prospects for progress. The author was particularly qualified to undertake such a task. During his rich administrative career, Jean-Denis Combrexelle served for thirteen years as Director General of Labour, and he knows better than anyone how much labour law is affected by excessive standards. He then chaired the social section and then the litigation section of the Council of State before heading the cabinets of the Minister of Justice and, finally, of Prime Minister Elisabeth Borne. His book leads us safely into the “law factory”, of which the author knows every corner. Jean-Denis Combrexelle notes that “the law, often poorly mastered, has taken a disproportionate and excessive place in administrative action and most often masks a form of conformism and cultural refusal of reform and change”.  He observes that “lawyers and administrations have built cathedrals, but only a few specialists understand the liturgy that is celebrated there”. It is not a question of blaming anyone, and in particular not “the deep state”, which Jean-Denis Combrexelle shows to be largely a myth. Taking a pragmatic approach, his book emphasizes that responsibilities are shared and that the excessive use of the norm actually has sociological roots. “Our society suffers from an addiction to the norm, and more particularly to the norm contained in the law,” explains our author. The various actors in society seek to assert their uniqueness and to over-guarantee what they believe to be their legal certainty.  The result is worrying for the authority of the law as well as for administrative efficiency. Jean-Denis Combrexelle underlines that “if all the norms were applied, in their entirety, by all the actors, it is more than likely that society would be blocked”. He notes that “in the vast majority of cases, existing standards and texts already make it possible to achieve the desired goal without the need to add additional layers of measures”.   He rightly points out that the inflation of standards feeds public spending since “the more complex and numerous the standards, the more human and budgetary resources are needed to implement and control them”.   Ultimately, democracy itself is at stake, since, as Jean-Denis Combrexelle tells us, “far from serving democracy…the rule of law, in its inflationary form, can reduce its effectiveness and put it in difficulty in the eyes of public opinion”. There is therefore “an urgent need to reverse, in a significant and lasting way, the curve of normative inflation if we want to prevent democracy from being assimilated to an inefficient bureaucracy”. Courses of action are therefore sought, here too with a concern for pragmatism in the approach and efficiency in the result.  Jean-Denis Combrexelle shows that we must beware of false good solutions, which are simplistic and ultimately without real effect. Far from breaking the “steel cage” that the administrative technostructure constitutes, it is necessary to mobilize public officials by means of adapted methods, such as a “public accounting of the norm”, so that they deploy their qualities in the right direction. Parasitic structures, which duplicate the work of other administrations, should be abolished. Reform without a norm is to be favored, and the culture of the result is to be disseminated. Without being a miracle cure, artificial intelligence is an opportunity to better reflect on “the place, content and meaning of the norm”. Accessible to a wide audience, Jean-Denis Combrexelle’s book provides an informed and measured insight into one of the stumbling blocks of our public action. He emphasizes that beyond the quality of the law, normative inflation undermines the effectiveness of the administration and contributes to the questioning of democracy. Even if, as the author acknowledges, “there is no modern society without complex standards”, a leap is needed, which invites the State to better play its role as guardian of democracy “through its standards, through its organization, by listening to civil society, by its efficiency, by its ability to deeply question itself and to reform itself, by the courage of its members “. It seemed to me that this call deserved to be heard by our academy. (speech reported by JJ  PLUCHART)

 The author wishes to create a reading grid in order to make us aware of the actions of sovereign wealth funds and public enterprises. Since the 2000s, states have acquired more assets than they have sold on a global scale. Behind this fact we find essentially “developing powers”. Public investors generally cultivate secrecy by hiding their investments behind cascading corporate structures. These funds have become the silent weapons of the economic war that states wish to lead by building the conditions to impose their will in the international order of tomorrow. The financial crisis of 2008 suddenly highlighted their power. Thanks to their considerable resources and flexible budgetary constraints, sovereign wealth funds can afford to take risks and bet on the long term. They are becoming key players in many sectors and in the technologies of the future. The financial assault of predatory states is probably just beginning. The European Commission has determined that many private strategic sectors are now half controlled by non-European players, which opens the possibility of systematic looting of our best assets. Europe has become aware of this with much delay and we appear in the eyes of other economic players as the weak link. The analysis of political relations between states reveals that as a result of sovereign investments, the international policy positions of target countries tend to align with those of the investing countries. The actual capacity of a harmful investment is difficult to assess, but even the tacit threat invites docility. These dependencies make us vulnerable to political pressure. In the future, in case of strategic disagreement, they will provide powerful tools of threat and could turn into lethal weapons. In a quarter of a century, the center of gravity of world wealth production has shifted at an unprecedented speed. Europe is undoubtedly the region that has lost the most in this movement. The author asks the real question: are we ready to consider economic security as a component of European collective security? This broader vision of security – adopted by the United States, Japan, Australia, and Canada – would allow the system to become a defensive weapon of choice in international competition.  The European Commission and the other institutions of the Union refuse to do so. The author makes a number of proposals, including the creation of a sovereign wealth fund for strategic independence as well as the creation of an expanded ministry of strategic sovereignty directly attached to the Prime Minister’s office. François-Xavier Carayon is a graduate of Oxford and Warwick universities in anthropology, economics, political science, and philosophy. After teaching at HEC, he became a strategy consultant and continues to research. Chronicle written by Michel GABET

The year 2022, with its two major events, the Russia-Ukraine War, the awakening of a cold war between the USA and China, as well as the 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, marking the end of collegial management in favor of an autocratic Neo-Lenino-Marxist management, marks the end of a thirty-year cycle, which began in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall. The period that is beginning sees the War Economy succeeding the Peace Economy, fueled by an explosive cocktail of four concomitant crises: an energy crisis, a democratic and societal crisis, a debt crisis and an environmental crisis. The author already perceives the new characteristics of this War Economy: a shift in value from demand to production – the one who controls their productive apparatus is the master; the replacement of trust by mistrust; an arbitrariness that replaces the law; a re-establishment of borders replacing free trade. A new way of shaping trade relations; the transactional approach is strangling respect for fundamental values – the triumph of the “deal by deal” approach, of opportunism and negotiations are no longer based solely on power relations, but on dependency relations. Therefore, we are going to live in a planet of chaos. We must prepare for it because we are witnessing the forced marriage of geopolitics and the economy if these two worlds want to continue to prosper. After having thus defined his observation of the world, the author endeavors to illustrate this evolution by recalling recent developments in the industrial fields, that of components or even AI, but also by analyzing the long-term strategic decisions of the main global players, for whom success is assessed today by the relationship of interdependence measured by the trade balance and the balance of current payments and no longer by the evolution of GNP. A new ESG: “Energy, Security, War” is therefore opening up and only those who know how to adapt to its requirements will resist or even prosper. The author concludes his work by analyzing the probable impacts of this “new neo-governance” on the major economic flows such as inflation, debt, and monetary stability and, consequently, on the evolution of a new geopolitics of monetary flows and their allocations, in China, the United States of America, and Europe. Those who succeed in merging geopolitics and economics will be the big winners in the entry into war economics. The author, former portfolio manager at Fidelity Investments in London and Boston, then founding partner of KDA Capital, a European equity fund long only until 2010, David Baverez is based in Hong Kong, and is currently an investor and essayist. He is also a columnist for L’Opinion and the author of several books. Column written by K WANTZ O’ROURKE