Jean-Jacques Pluchart The many stakeholders involved in Artificial Intelligence are questioning the ability of generative AI models and LLMs (large language models) to generate profits for their designers and productivity gains for their users. The latest report from the MIT (MassachusettsInstitute of Technology) entitled “The GenAI Divide: State of AI in Business 2025″, notes that 95% of generative AI programmes launched since 2022 have still not achievedtheir profitability targets among publishers and American user companies. It is true that global spending on AI peaked in 2026, with investment projects estimated at €2.5 trillion worldwide, having more than tripled since 2023. After sharp price increases, the fear of severe stock market corrections is intensifying, and the most recognised experts seem to be unable to predict the timing and extent of the corrections. However, the stock market outlook differs depending on the links in the AI value chain: the stock prices of semiconductor equipment manufacturers (Nvidia in the USA, TSMC in Taiwan, Samsung in Korea) and those of electricity suppliers are on a positive trend; those of data, computing, storage and rental (cloud) centers are uneven; software publishers, such as the GAFA companies, are more uncertain, as are those of European equipment manufacturers (ASML and STMicroelectronics). The AI ecosystem seems to be threatened by the “Thucydides trap”, whereby a rivalry between a leader and its followers often leads to takeovers and sometimes conflicts. The trap threatens industry leaders such as Open AI and Anthropic, who are competing with several application developers, but also American leaders who are being challenged by Chinese designers such as MiniMax M3 and DeepSeek V4 Pro. Western and Asian companies are increasingly testing Chinese applications, which are less expensive in terms of tokens and more energy-efficient. They are also striving to diversify their sources of supply for equipment and applications, for fear of higher fees and a US or Chinese embargo on certain applications. Finally, in Europe, designers and users may be taxed by the governments of the Member States in order to contribute to public investments in the infrastructure (electricity, water, access routes) of digital platforms. For all these reasons, the prospects, particularly the financial ones, of the AI ecosystem can be described as a “black swan” in the sense of Taleb.
Collectif Le Grand Continent, L’ennemi qui nous désigne, Éditeur Gallimard,mai 2026 , 378 pages.
“The enemy who designates us” means that we become the enemy of others as soon as they choose to consider us as such, regardless of our intentions or our protests.” Carl SCHMITT. It’s 1965 at the Sorbonne. A young philosopher, Julien Freund, is sitting behind a table. In front of him, several great masters of French philosophy are listening to him, with a mixture of interest and concern. We need to return to his mysterious phrase: “The enemy will prevent you from cultivating your garden”, to understand the world into which the presidency of Donald Trump has dramatically plunged us. And Julien Freund goes on to say to a distinguished member of the jury: “You think that it is you who designates the enemy, like all pacifists. And so, as long as we don’t want an enemy, we won’t have one! But it is the enemy who designates you, and if it wants you to be its enemy, you are! This is the starting point of this fifth volume of Le Grand Continent, which once again brings together leading specialists and decisive voices to help us navigate this geopolitical moment. If we feel so dizzy in the face of the current upheavals, it is perhaps because we still refuse to take into account a massive dimension of the contemporary world: China. The authors devote an exclusive report to it by publishing – often for the first time in French – renowned Sinologists and key Xi Jinping doctrinaires who openly and authoritatively state why and how the West “will lose”. “We are currently experiencing changes that are unprecedented in a century, and it is we who, together, are at the origin of these changes,” President Xi told Vladimir Putin. Thus, all the converging forces risk subjecting the European liberal democracies to a fate not unlike that of the Florentine Republic in the time of Machiavelli, who said to the Florentine citizens: “Do not be deceived by the hundred years you have lived and in which you have kept yourselves free, ….for you will see that it is impossible for you to safeguard your freedom today in the manner of yesterday.” Within this framework of reflection and action, Le Grand Continent strives to provide, in addition to analytical tools, some means of learning to resist predators. While the outlines of the threat appear, at this stage, terribly clear, a response commensurate with the times is struggling to emerge. Giuliano da Empoli, with contributions from Michael Albertus, Robert-Henri Berger, Emily Feng, Stacie Goddard, Beeban Kidron, Phil Klay, Oleksandra Matviitchouk, Abraham Newman, Minxin Pei, Paul Saffo, Afra Wang, Dan Wang and Meredith Whittaker, draws a quantified map of the trends that are already shaping a new industrial and technological hegemony. The China dossier, under the scientific direction of David Ownby, includes contributions from Lu Feng, Wang Huning, Jiang Shigong and Zhao Xiaozhuo, who argues that no service-based power has ever won against technologically well-equipped adversaries. This confirms the Chinese military adage that the best victory is the one obtained without having fought a battle. The contents of the book are as follows: Introduction by Giuliano da Empoli and Gilles Gressani; Stacie Goddard and Abraham Newman, Neo-Royalism: The New World Order of Donald J. Trump; Phil Klay, The Digital Colosseum: The Geopolitics of Brainrot; Meredith Whittaker, The Digital Infrastructure of Sovereignty Depends on Our Choices; Michael Albertus, Recolonisation: The Return of Empire and Grounding in the 21stCentury; Oleksandra Matviïtchouk, The Strength of Our Struggle: Dan Wang; An Engineer State: Figures and Trends of the New Chinese Hegemony: Minxin Pei; Emily Feng, Totalitarian Modernisation: At the Origins of Xi Jinping’s Regime; “Let the Red Flowers”: The Problem of Chinese Identity: Wang Huning; America Against America: Selected Excerpts: Lu Feng; Industrial Maximalism: The Economic Doctrine of the Chinese Century: Zhao Xiaozhuo; The Chinese Plan to Take Taiwan: Jiang Shigong; The Empire and the World Order: Paul Saffo; The New Grotius Moment: Beeban Kidron; AI Generation: Notes for the Lost Children of the Digital Age: Robert-Henri Berger; Winning the War: For a New Army: Afterword by Afra Wang; The Awakening of Lingao: Presentation of the authors. Le Grand Continent, a journal that was created online and is driven by a new generation, has established itself as the leading platform for strategic, political and intellectual debate on a continental scale. This very clear “albeit technical” book should be read by anyone interested in the future of our liberal democracy, particularly in this six-month period that will lead France and Europe to make crucial choices. As JF Kennedy said, it will not be easy, but it is because it is difficult that we must choose this path! Dominique CHESNEAU
Yao ASSOGBA, La Françafrique à l’épreuve du Panafricanisme. Réinvestir la pensée de Kwame Nkrumah, L’Harmattan, 2026, 318 pages.
Professor Yao Assogba offers an original reflection on Pan-Africanism and Françafrique. He recalls the origins of the Pan-African movements initiated in 1900 by Henry Sylvester-Williams of Trinidad, influenced by Rosa Louis McKarly and by Martin Luther King, then developed by Marcus Aurelius Mosiah Garvey (1887-1940), who founded the Race First doctrine and the Back to Africa project, and by William Edward Burghardt Du Bois (1863-1963), who championed the cause of “Africa for the Africans”. These two currents were united in the thinking of Kwame Nkrumah (1909-1970), the first president of the Republic of Ghana, author of the book Africa Must Unite. “Nkumanism” is a political movement whose objectives are the complete independence of African states and the creation of the United States of Africa, modelled on the United States of America. It opposes all forms of neo-colonialism and espouses a materialist and socialist ideology, combining African traditions and Western modernity. It is based on “humanist and egalitarian principles”. It is based on the ideal type of the new political homo africanus”. The movement still has a certain influence on the population and especially on African youth, particularly within the framework of the Alliance of Sahel States, made up of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Yao Assogba applies the sociological approach advocated by Max Weber to analyse the Françafrique system put in place by France in 1960 when the states of West Africa, East Africa and the Great Lakes (i.e. 400 million inhabitants and 8 million km2), which had been part of the colonial Empire and then of the French Community, declared their independence. The system is based on the recognition of the independence of each state and the establishment of a “post-colonial pact” comprising several forms of industrial cooperation (the exploitation of resources and public procurement), economic cooperation (the CFA franc, the exclusivity of certain trade exchanges, etc.), geopolitical cooperation (the representation of African states by France in certain international bodies) and cultural cooperation (the Francophonie). In conclusion, the author outlines an analysis of the current situation in the former French-speaking Africa, based on the verbatim accounts of certain French figures involved in the conflicts in the Sahel. He notes that Nkrumanism is losing ground to the advances of Islamic movements, Iran, Russia and China. Yao Assogba is Professor Emeritus of Sociology at Laval University (Canada) and holds the Chair of La Francophonie. Jean-Jacques Pluchart
Benoît Mandelbrot or the rough geometry of financial markets
With Black, Scholes and Merton, modern finance had found one of its most powerful formulations. The price of an option could be deduced from arbitrage reasoning, a dynamic hedging strategy and a differential equation derived from Brownian diffusion. Financial randomness thus became an object that could be calculated, neutralised and almost domesticated. Where Bachelier had introduced the random movement of prices, where Wiener had given a rigorous structure to Brownian motion, where Markowitz had organised portfolio selection under uncertainty, Black, Scholes and Merton took a further step: they showed that a contingent right could be valued on the risk itself. But this construction was based on a particular representation of chance. Price changes are continuous, returns are assumed to be sufficiently close to a normal distribution, and volatility is considered constant or, at the very least, controllable within the framework of the model. The world thus described is unstable, but with a regular instability; uncertain, but with a disciplined uncertainty; random, but with a randomness that is sufficiently smooth to be integrated into an equation. It is precisely this representation that Benoît Mandelbrot disrupts. His contribution to finance does not consist in proposing a new valuation formula comparable to that of Black-Scholes. It is more profound and, in a way, more unsettling. Mandelbrot asserts that financial markets are not only uncertain: they are rough. They do not always fluctuate according to a smooth and continuous geometry; they experience breaks, accelerations, discontinuities, concentrations of volatility, and extreme events more frequently than the Gaussian model predicts. With him, finance can no longer be content with thinking of risk as a regular dispersion around an average. It must learn to think about irregularity itself. Benoît Mandelbrot was born in Warsaw on 20 November 1924 into a Jewish family of Lithuanian origin. His father was a businessman and his mother a doctor. The Mandelbrot family belonged to that world of Central Europe where scientific culture, languages, migration and historical uncertainty were closely intertwined. Very early on, the young Benoît was shaped by a demanding intellectual environment. His uncle, Szolem Mandelbrojt[1], was a renowned mathematician, a professor at the Collège de France, a specialist in analysis and close to the Bourbaki group[2]. This family presence played an important role in his intellectual orientation, even though Mandelbrot would always remain at a distance from established schools and mathematical orthodoxies. In 1936, faced with the growing dangers in Eastern Europe, the family left Poland for France. Benoît Mandelbrot arrived in Paris at the age of eleven. This geographical and cultural break was decisive. It exposed him both to the richness of the French intellectual system and to the violence of history. During the Second World War, the family had to take refuge in the provinces to escape persecution. These war years interrupted normal schooling, but they developed a very particular form of visual and intuitive intelligence in Mandelbrot. He would later say that he often learned better through images, shapes and geometric analogies than through traditional linear demonstrations. This uniqueness made him stand out very early on. After the war, he entered the École Polytechnique, where he benefited in particular from the teaching of Gaston Julia[3], one of the great names in the theory of complex functions. From the beginning of the 20th century, Julia had studied mathematical objects that would later become central to fractal theory. At the time, these shapes were still largely considered as analytical curiosities, or even as mathematical monsters: sets that were difficult to visualise, irregular, and beyond the reach of classical geometric intuition. Mandelbrot would later find in them one of the profound sources of his work. After the École Polytechnique, he continued his studies in the United States, notably at the California Institute of Technology, then returned to France before working at the CNRS. But he did not fully identify with the dominant style of post-war French mathematics. The Bourbaki group, to which his uncle was close, promoted very abstract, axiomatic, structural mathematics, detached from immediate applications. Mandelbrot, on the contrary, was attracted to concrete phenomena, irregular shapes, empirical data, and misclassified objects. He was interested in linguistics as much as in turbulence, the geography of coastlines, the distribution of income, transmission noise in telephone lines or variations in financial prices. He does not seek only to demonstrate; he seeks to see. This intellectual freedom explains his departure for the United States. In 1958, he joined the IBM laboratories, where he remained for several decades. This choice was fundamental. IBM offered him a rare environment: the opportunity to work at the frontier of mathematics, computer science, physics and economics, without being confined by the constraints of a traditional university department. Above all, IBM gave him access to powerful computers, which would play a decisive role in the visualisation of fractal objects. For Mandelbrot, the computer was not just a calculating machine; it became an instrument for geometric exploration. It made it possible to make visible shapes that classical mathematics had foreseen but could not yet fully represent. The word “fractal” would not appear until later, in the 1970s. Mandelbrot coined it from the Latin fractus, which means broken, fragmented, irregular. A fractal is a shape whose complexity is repeated at different scales. A coastline, a cloud, a mountain, a vascular network or a fern all have this property: when you zoom in on a part, you find patterns that resemble the overall structure. This is self-similarity or scale invariance. These shapes cannot be described correctly by classical Euclidean geometry. A line, a circle, a triangle or a sphere are suitable for representing an ideal, smooth and regular world; but the real world is often rough, fragmented and uneven. Mandelbrot’s great insight was to show that this roughness is not pure disorder. It has a structure. It can be measured, described, compared. The apparent chaos conceals a form of order, but an order that is different from that of classical geometry. Where Euclid describes simple shapes, Mandelbrot seeks to describe
THE ETHICAL APPROACH OF AI
In order to limit the effects of the biases that taint the practices of sustainable AI oriented towards ESG, “coalitions” made up of institutions, companies, scientists and think tanks, strive to define ethical frameworks – in the form of codes and charters – based on philosophical, sociological and psychological reflections, but this framework provokes debates between regulators and libertarians. The Foundations of AI Ethics Ethical deliberations on AI practices follow three main approaches: universal, normative, and applied. The first – of an axiological nature and inspired by Kant and Rousseau – is based on the principles and values that underpin life in society: respect for man, truth, justice, nature, etc. The second – called legalistic or prescriptive – covers moral judgments and social values, such as true or false, good or bad, fair or unfair, etc. The third – of a praxeological nature – measures the consequences, externalities or impacts of a system, behavior or object on the economy, nature, society or the person. It is most often applied to new technologies, in particular AI, and to management, in particular sustainable management (Pistilli, 2024). AI ethics frameworks In order to limit their negative impacts on collective and individual thoughts, decisions or behaviors, guides or ethical charters published by companies and normative codes, references and/or regulations issued by regulators (international organizations, nation-states, associations), aim to frame the design of software and the use of their data and results by companies (Constantinides & al, 2024). Codes generally do not have an ethical or moral dimension, unlike charters, guides or, in France, the “raisons d’être” of companies. International institutions such as the OECD, the UN, UNESCO and the G7 have been working since 2019 to establish a “normative ethics” and “global governance of AI”. The Vatican, inspired by the work of Bonanti (2018), who inspired several codes, advocates the advent of an “algorithmic ethics” (or ethics of algorithms) based on the principles of “transparency, social inclusion, responsibility, impartiality and reliability”. Overall, according to Menecoeur (2020), the 126 documents on the ethics of AI identified worldwide are divided between public codes (national and international) and private guides (companies, universities and associations). But the rulers of the United States, the People’s Republic of China and the European Union, as well as the leaders of their digital and/or ESG-oriented companies, have applied rules, codes and ethical guides that respond to often different approaches. The ethical relativism of AI and ESG European texts – and in particular the AI Act – are the subject of intense lobbying, in particular by GAFAM, in order to avoid open source AI and the downgrading of certain generative AI software. Most European think tanks advise strengthening the regulation of AI, such as the Montaigne Institute, which launched the Objectif IA operation for digital training, the CSR Observatory, which strives to put AI at the service of the application of ESG standards, and the Louis Bachelier Institute, which has launched the Good in Tech program to measurethe impact of AI on society. But a collective of 30 global AI leaders denounced the European approach, stating that “Europe has become less competitive and less innovative compared to other regions, and it now risks falling even further behind in the AI era due to inconsistent regulatory decisions”. These reactions show that AI codes and guides are subject to a form of “ethical relativism”, because they depend on both technological and economic factors, but also – and increasingly – on geopolitical and cultural considerations. They are the subject of different readings according to the disciplines, professions and ideologies of the actors of AI and ideology. In the United States, under the influence of the Federal Guidelines for Sentencing Organizations (1991), practical guides (guidelines) are more common among American companies than among European or Chinese firms. The GAFAM have initiated a Partnership on AI which recommends the application of general principles and a collective commitment: “We are committed to conducting open research and dialogue on the ethical, social and economic implications of AI” (Hern, 2016). But the interpretation of these principles differs from one society to another. Google focuses on social criteria (including non-discrimination). Apple displays a charter based on honesty and respect for stakeholders. Meta only declares that it applies the professional standards in force. Amazon takes up the fundamental principles, but paradoxically states that “AI drives humans”; Microsoft and Open AI display “Codes of trust reflecting their cultures and values; they recognize “the potential for bias in algorithms and strive to mitigate their impact”. In Europe, reflections on the ethics of AI were launched in 2015 and led to a regulation aimed at the protection of personal data (Data Governance Act) published in 2018 (but applied in 2023), then a white paper on AI (2020), a directive on microprocessors (Chips Act, 2023) and a directive on artificial intelligence (AI Act) passed in 2024, (but applicable in 2026). These texts strive to manage the risks induced by AI and to promote a “trustworthy AI” based on compliance with laws (Lawful AI), ethical values (ethical AI) and technical skills (robust AI). The principles – borrowed from bioethics – relate to human autonomy (respect for the rights of citizens), the prevention of any infringement (protection of people and property), equity (between users) and explainability (of software). These principles were then broken down into “requirements”: systems (data, software, results) must “remain under human control”; they must be “robust, safe and transparent”. Compliance with the requirements is controlled by so-called “technical” methods: audit of “trustworthy architectures” (Trustworthy AI), control of the application of design standards (X-by-design), methods of explanation, tests, validations and implementations. Non-technical methods complete this system: regulation by codes, charters and guides, certification of systems, orientation of AI training and AI research. Among these methods, the AI Act prioritizes so-called “foundational” AI systems according to three levels of risk to public and private lives: models classified as “unacceptable”, leading to intrusive and discriminatory uses of AI, are prohibited; systems classified as “high risk”, which may affect
Roch Cyriaque GALEBAYI, La modernisation des systèmes éducatifs africains. Étude comparée et solutions, Eds L’Harmattan, 2026, 263 pages.
The author notes that African countries are more than ever faced with the challenge of modernity in order to hold their place in the community of nations. He argues that African modernity can only be based on growth, consumption and technological innovation, which are the foundations of Western modernity. He is aware that “the lights of Western reason will not be enough” to reform African institutions and practices, particularly in the field of education and training. The African education system must indeed train elites capable of responding to the multiple challenges of the contemporary world. To fulfil its mission, the system must acquire true “educational sovereignty”. But he notes that the idea of revolutionising education systems faces multiple political and bureaucratic obstacles in Africa. In some countries, academic freedom is “manipulated” by the ideologies and interests of the social groups in power, by religious or ethnic traditions, and by the “symbolic violence” and “economic imperialism” of Western capitalism. The author courageously denounces certain “patronage” practices used in universities, which favour the selection of students, the appointment and promotion of professors, the setting of teaching programmes and the organisation of examinations. In particular, the author analyses the procedures that contribute to the reproduction of the elites and their alignment with the practices of the groups or coalitions in power. According to the author, African universities must provide spaces for freedom of teaching, research and innovation. In order for the education system to reflect a country’s cultural identity and serve the deepest aspirations of its population, the new system must partially break free from the colonial education model and better integrate the African socio-cultural paradigm. The author is aware that, following the Western model, each African state will have to deconstruct certain traditions, modernise its administration, reform its institutions and rethink its governance. The role of schools and universities will be essential in implementing this reconstruction, through realistic diagnoses of problems, effective support for decision-making, implementation and monitoring of execution. He courageously advocates for a reform of African education systems that aims to break free from colonial models and integrate the continent’s cultural particularities, but his well-documented plea shows the extent of the path still to be travelled by the African continent. Roch Cyriaque GALEBAYI is a graduate of the IEP of Aixen Provence and holds a doctorate in history. He is a trainer in African military schools.
Geopolitical shocks and contagion between risk “silos”: the failure of recognition and the illusion of governance
Prepared by Michelle Thomson, QRD®, Chair Florence Anglès, Vice-Chair Contributors DCRO Emerging Topics Subcommittee: Joy Albright; Chukwunomnso Anyichie, QRD®; Cesar Chalhoub; Aku Odinkemelu; Brian Prentice; Mai Shuaibi; David Streliski; Benson Uwheru, Secretary. Originally developed through the DCRO Emerging Topics Subcommittee. Submitted to Club Turgot | July 2026. Geopolitical crises do not stay where they start. What begins as a regional event spreads rapidly through commodity markets, supply chains, financial systems, regulation and corporate strategy. For boards, the defining challenge is not the initial shock — it is recognising how quickly its consequences migrate across the organisation before any single committee has seen the whole picture. Geopolitical crises have become a permanent feature of the global business environment. They rarely remain confined to their point of origin. What begins as a regional event can quickly spread through commodity markets, supply chains, financial systems, regulation and corporate strategy. For boards, the defining challenge is not the initial shock itself but recognising how rapidly its consequences migrate across the organisation. The paper shows that the principal governance challenge is recognition rather than prediction. Boards oversee risk through specialised committees, each performing its mandate effectively. During systemic crises, however, information becomes fragmented. Every committee sees part of the problem; none sees the complete picture. By the time directors assemble an integrated view, cross-silo contagion is often already underway. This structural weakness is described as the Governance Illusion. Drawing on the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1973 OAPEC Oil Embargo, the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the paper identifies a recurring pattern: geopolitical disruption, energy shock, supply-chain disruption, inflation, tighter financial conditions, sovereign stress and long-term structural adjustment. Across all four events, the common governance failure was delayed recognition rather than lack of information. Three analytical tools support earlier recognition. The Potential Cross-Silo Contagion Pathways helps directors anticipate how risks migrate across business functions. The Committee Lag Map explains why committees receive signals at different moments, delaying enterprise-wide understanding. The Asymmetry Map identifies the regions and structural conditions where contagion is most likely to emerge first, enabling boards to focus on leading rather than lagging indicators. Each tool is presented as a visual framework in the full paper. The historical evidence also highlights three recurring governance failures: concentrating on immediate impacts while overlooking second- and third-order effects; assuming geographically distant crises will remain contained; and underestimating how individually manageable risks interact to create systemic disruption. These structural weaknesses are reinforced by behavioural biases including confirmation bias, threat rigidity and bounded rationality. Recommendations Three recommendations emerge. First, establish an Integration Function capable of consolidating information across board committees into a coherent view of systemic risk. Second, appoint a Designated Challenger responsible for questioning prevailing assumptions, exploring alternative scenarios and ensuring weak signals receive appropriate attention. Third, complement these structural changes with behavioural discipline through regular cross-committee dialogue, explicit consideration of second-order effects and continued vigilance during periods of apparent stabilisation. Geopolitical shocks cannot be prevented, but governance failures can. Boards that integrate information, challenge assumptions and recognise cross-silo contagion early will be better positioned to protect long-term value and strengthen organisational resilience in an increasingly interconnected world. The full paper, including the analytical frameworks and historical case analyses, is available at
THE STRANGE DEFEAT OF FRANCE IN 1940 AND OF EUROPE IN 2026
Jean-Jacques Pluchart Now that Marc Bloch has just been interred in the Panthéon and is thus held up as an example to the French, it is advisable to read or reread his book entitled “L’étrange défaite” (The Strange Defeat), in which he examines the reasons for the debacle of the French army and the discouragement of the French in 1940. The reader cannot help but be confused by the current resonance of his observation. The France of yesterday, invaded by German mechanical force, seems to foreshadow the Europe of today, threatened by American digital supremacy and Chinese commercial domination. As a captain in the 1st Army in 1939, Marc Bloch clearly observes the errors of the strategists, the indecision of the tacticians and the disarray of the troops. He notes that the general staff, which is surrounded by “too many agencies”, retains, in the face of the enemy, “the cult of beautiful paper” and “bureaucratic reflexes”. He observes “a whole network of cronies around the rulers who redouble their devotion and intrigue”. He confesses “the bitter aftertaste left by this war, which was badly conducted and ended even worse”. After criticising the “diplomacy of the Treaty of Versailles and the invasion of the Ruhr”, he deplores the spirit of Munich and the political instability that drives the French political class. He welcomed “the attempt of the Popular Front”, but regretted “that it succumbed because of the follies of some of its supporters”. He criticised the role of the press, dominated by a “bourgeois elite concerned with its own interests”. He mocked the “old “preachers, who over time have amassed a whole arsenal of verbal patterns to which their intelligence clings like rusty nails”. He lamented a “resignation of the elites” and a renunciation of effort by the French. Marc Bloch went further by attributing the cause of the defeat to the “government of old men” in France in the 1930s. He attributed much of the country’s ills to the teaching at the École de Guerre, which focused on the tactics of Napoleon’s armies and the trench plans of the Great War. He advised his sons to “reflect on the faults of their elders”, adding “that he would not have the presumption to draw up a programme for them”. He criticises the Vichy government for proposing “only a return to the land and to the values of yesteryear, elevated to the status of virtue”. like the amercan Republicans, the reader of Marc Bloch cannot help but think that today’s Europe, the “land of arts and culture”, is perpetuating the Europe of the 1930s, which Marc Bloch described as a “museum of antiquities”. Marc Bloch, a history professor at the Sorbonne, argued that countries in difficulty should learn from the past. Through his book, 83 years after his death, he gives us his final lesson.
Serge LATOUCHE, La décroissance. De l’utopie à la (re)construction d’un monde commun, eds Edisens, 2026, 163 pages.
The author develops the theory initiated by Karl Polanyi in his seminal book entitled The Great Transformation, which argues in favour of a “re-embedding of the economy in society”. Serge Latouche strives – following Castoriadis and Lefort – to go beyond this thesis by showing that degrowth is less economic than political and social, more “frugal and cultural” than material and financial. He denounces the excessive importance taken on by the neo-liberal economy founded in the 18th century and on the English enclosure movement denounced by Thomas More, then on the research of Hayek, Friedman and the Mont Pèlerin Society. He proposes a project for society based on sharing and living together. He criticises the “neo-libertarian narrative of growth”, by contrasting it with the “counter-narrative” of the “grand narrative of degrowth”, which is based on plans to develop common goods (resources and public services) and the common good (shared values). The aim of the project is to put an end to the failures of the state and the market economy. The author notes that, despite the calls for vigilance from eco-socialists, the growth economy, which is based on “sad passions” such as “the thirst for wealth and power”, continues to prosper, in particular thanks to the “post-truth” maintained by AI. The author considers the most suitable political regime for initiating the degrowth project, and concludes that “direct and decentralised democracy” is preferable to a “plutocratic technocracy”, the former transforming society from below and the latter from above. He advocates “local action, the eco-region and the urban village”. He argues that the growth society destroys the common goods (natural resources) and the common good (the societal project and collective values), and that it is based on a one-dimensional man: homo economicus. He comments on the debates between the different schools of degrowth thought and criticises the fact that most eco-socialists call for the advent of degrowth through catastrophic discourses , such as those of the IPCC. The reader of the book will better understand the themes and language codes of the degrowthers, but will also appreciate the impasses of some of their projects. Serge Latouche is Professor Emeritus at the University of Saclay and author of numerous books and articles on the Social and Solidarity Economy. Jean-Jacques Pluchart
The ethical approach to AI: towards sustainable AI
Jean-Jacques Pluchart The encyclical Magnifique Humanité published in May 2026 (see clubturgot.com 114) has rekindled the debate on the ethical principles of AI. Various movements, made up of institutions, companies, scientific laboratories and think tanks, are striving to define ethical frameworks – in the form of codes and charters – based on philosophical, sociological and psychological considerations, but this framework is sparking debates between regulationists and libertarians. The foundations of AI ethics Ethical deliberations relating to AI practices follow three main approaches: universal, normative and applied. The first – of an axiological nature and inspired by Kant and Rousseau – is based on the principles and values that underpin life in society: respect for people, truth, justice, nature, etc. The second – known as legalistic or prescriptive – covers moral judgements and social values, such as true or false, good or bad, fair or unfair, etc. The third – of a praxeological nature – measures the consequences, externalities or impacts of a system, behaviour or object on the economy, nature, society or the individual. It is most often applied to new technologies, in particular AI, and to management, in particular sustainable management (Pistilli, 2024). Ethical frameworks for AI In order to limit their negative impacts on collective and individual thoughts, decisions or behaviours, guides or ethical charters published by companies and normative codes, frameworks and/or regulations issued by regulators (international organisations, nation-states, associations), aim to provide a framework for the design of software and the use of its data and results by companies (Constantinides & al, 2024). The codes generally do not have a deontological or moral dimension, unlike charters, guides or, in France, the “raisons d’être” of companies. International institutions such as the OECD, the UN, UNESCO and the G7 have been working since 2019 to establish a “normative ethics” and “global governance of AI”. The Vatican, notably inspired by the work of Bonanti (2018), who inspired several codes, advocates the advent of an “algo-ethics” (or ethics of algorithms) based on the principles “of transparency, social inclusion, responsibility,impartiality and reliability”. Overall, according to Menecoeur (2020), the 126 documents on AI ethics identified worldwide are divided between public codes (national and international) and private guides (from companies, universities and associations). But the leaders of the United States, the People’s Republic of China and the European Union, as well as the leaders of their digital companies, apply in practice rules, codes and ethical guides that often reflect different approaches. The ethical relativism of AI European texts – and in particular the AI Act – are the subject of intense lobbying, particularly by GAFAM, in order to avoid open-source AI and the decommissioning of certain generative AI software. Most European think tanks recommend strengthening the regulation of AI, such as the Institut Montaigne, which launched the Objectif IA operation in favour of digital training, the Observatoire de la RSE, which is striving to put AI at the service of the application of ESG standards, and the Institute Louis Bachelier, which has initiated the Good in Tech program to measure the impact of AI on society. But a collective of 30 global AI leaders has denounced the European approach, stating that “Europe hasbecome less competitive and less innovative compared to other regions, andit now risks falling further behind in the AI era due toinconsistent regulatory decisions“. These reactions show that AI codes and guidelines are subject to a form of “ethical relativism”, because they depend on both technological and economic factors, but also – and increasingly – on geopolitical and cultural considerations. They are interpreted differently depending on the disciplines, professions and ideologies of the AI stakeholders and ideology. In the United States, under the influence of the Federal Guidelines for Sentencing Organisations (1991), practical guides (guidelines) are more common among American companies than among European or Chinese firms. The GAFAM companies have initiated a Partnership on AI which recommends the application of general principles and a collective commitment: “We are committed to conducting open research and dialogue on the ethical, social and economic implications of AI” (Hern, 2016). But the interpretation of these principles differs from one company to another. Google focuses on social criteria (in particular non-discrimination). Apple has a charter based on honesty and respect for stakeholders. Meta only states that it applies the professional standards in force. Amazon adopts the fundamental principles, but paradoxically states that “AI guides humans”; Microsoft and Open AI display “Codes of trust reflecting their cultures and values”; they recognise “the potential for bias in algorithms and strive to mitigate its impact”. In Europe, reflections on the ethics of AI were launched in 2015 and led to a regulation aimed at the protection of personal data (Data Governance Act) published in 2018 (but applied in 2023), then a white paper on AI (2020), a directive on microprocessors (Chips Act, 2023) and a directive on artificial intelligence (AI Act) passed in 2024 (but applicable in 2026). These texts seek to manage the risks induced by AI and to promote a “trustworthy AI” based on compliance with the law (Lawful AI), ethical values (ethical AI) and technical skills (robust AI). The principles – borrowed from bioethics – relate to human autonomy (respect for citizens’ rights), the prevention of any harm (protection of people and property), fairness (between users) and explainability (of software). These principles were then broken down into “requirements”: the systems (data, software, results) must “remain under human control”; they must be robust, reliable and transparent “. Compliance with the requirements is monitored by so-called “technical” methods: auditing of “trustworthy architectures” (Trustworthy AI), monitoring of the application of design standards (X-by-design), methods of explanation, testing, validation and implementation. Non-technical methods complete this system: regulation by codes, charters and guides, certification of systems, guidance on AI training and AI research. Among these methods, the AI Act prioritizes so-called “foundational” AI systems according to three levels of risk to public and private life: models classified as “unacceptable”, leading to intrusive and discriminatory uses of AI, are prohibited; systems classified as