Over the past few years, one expression has become common across banks: Basel IV. It is heard in ALM committees, risk departments and discussions between finance teams and business lines. Yet officially, this term does not exist. Regulators continue to refer to the “finalisation of Basel III”. This distinction is not merely semantic — it reflects the very philosophy of the reform. In reality, Basel IV is not a new regulatory framework. It is a strengthened, refined and more harmonised version of Basel III. The objective remains unchanged: to reinforce the resilience of the banking system after the 2008 financial crisis. However, years of implementation have revealed a key issue — comparable banks could report significantly different capital levels depending on their internal models. The recent adjustments aim primarily to reduce these discrepancies. At the core of the reform lies the output floor. Its principle is straightforward: risk-weighted assets calculated using internal models cannot fall below 72.5% of those calculated under standardised approaches. Sophistication is still allowed, but it can no longer endlessly reduce capital consumption. This represents a major shift in logic. For years, the ability to develop advanced internal models was a competitive advantage. That advantage is now framed within clear boundaries. Models are not disappearing, but they are being brought back into a common corridor. This is one of the main reasons why banks have adopted the term Basel IV: the philosophy has changed. The industry is moving from a system where optimisation played a central role to a more harmonised and comparable framework. But this is not the only evolution. Credit risk has been significantly revised. The scope of internal models has been restricted, and key parameters are now subject to floors. Standardised approaches have become more risk-sensitive, particularly for real estate exposures, specialised lending and off-balance-sheet commitments. The objective is clear: to prevent structural underestimation of risk. Operational risk is also evolving. Former methodologies — often complex and highly dependent on internal modelling — are being replaced by a simpler, standardised approach. Once again, the guiding principles are comparability and readability. Counterparty risk and market risk are also being reshaped. The Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB), postponed to 2027 in Europe, redefines the boundary between the banking book and the trading book while strengthening sensitivity to market conditions. Taken individually, these adjustments may appear technical. Taken together, they produce a structural effect: a reduction in banks’ room for interpretation when calculating capital requirements. Yet the most silent transformation may lie elsewhere — in data. The reform goes beyond capital ratios. It deeply reshapes prudential reporting and external disclosure. Data reported to supervisors and data published under Pillar 3 are now converging. Every prudential figure becomes potentially public. This increase in transparency raises the bar significantly in terms of data quality, consistency and traceability. Banks must now produce two views of capital: one based on internal models and another incorporating the prudential floor. This dual perspective changes internal steering. An activity that appeared efficient under historical modelling assumptions may become more capital-consuming once the floor applies. This shift explains why the term Basel IV has gained traction. It may not represent an official regulatory break, but it clearly reflects an operational one. Why, then, do supervisors avoid this term? Because they want to emphasise continuity. From their perspective, this is not a new philosophy but the logical completion of the post-crisis framework. Acknowledging a Basel IV would imply that Basel III was incomplete. Why, on the other hand, do banks continue to use it? Because it helps describe an internal change of paradigm. Capital steering becomes more constrained, more standardised and increasingly data-driven. The impact on pricing, capital allocation and commercial strategy is significant enough to justify a new label in everyday language. In practice, the truth lies somewhere in between. Yes, Basel IV does not exist legally. Yes, it is the final stage of Basel III. But yes as well: for banks, the transformation is deep enough to feel like a new chapter. The gradual implementation through 2033 confirms that this is not a simple technical update. It is a long adaptation phase requiring changes in organisations, systems and management culture. Ultimately, the real novelty is not regulatory — it is managerial. Capital becomes a resource to be actively managed in real time, just like liquidity or commercial profitability. Business decisions will increasingly need to integrate prudential considerations from the outset. Perhaps that is the best definition of what the market calls Basel IV: not a new standard, but a Basel III that has reached maturity. And as often in banking, what changes most is not the rulebook itself — but the way institutions learn to live with it. Benoit Frayer
RAVEAUD Gilles. Inflation. La Grande Arnaque, Editions Les échappés, 2025, 170 pages
What is the level of inflation that allows each citizen to live at an adequate standard of living? What are the causes of inflation that is too high or too low? In this study, Gilles RAVEAUD provides answers on the “Very High Inflation” observed in France over the period 2022-2024; leading to a sharp decline in the standard of living of the French. First of all, he questions the measurement of inflation by INSEE, which seems to underestimate the rise in prices and overestimate the rise in income. INSEE uses the CPI (consumer price index) but should use the European HICP index (harmonized index of consumer prices), which would be more faithful to the real structure of household consumption although it would mean a sharp increase in public spending. The latest price increases have mainly concerned food and energy, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In addition, he also believes that inflation is due to excessive profits over the period and not to wage increases. Indeed, according to the author, the “Very Great Inflation” in Europe over the period can be explained by corporate profits, which account for almost half of the increase. The latter are accused of having taken advantage of the energy shock on their costs to increase their margins. This was also observed by the IMF, which posted in June 2023: “the increasing profits of companies have been the main contributor to inflation in Europe over the last 2 years “. The author then focuses on the centralization of the European electricity market and the setting of its price. He criticises the fact that the sharp rise in electricity prices in 2022 is linked to the sharp rise in gas prices in Europe. Mario Draghi also made the observation: “gas produces only 20% of European electricity, but it dictates prices 63% of the time” The ECB saw inflation as a serious and immediate danger that it had to fight. The ECB therefore raised its interest rates in order to penalize credit and consumption. This monetary tightening has had a major impact on the real estate sector. ”In 2024, only 250,000 homes were built in France, an unprecedented level since …1960 “. The victory over inflation has reduced access to property for many first-time buyers. In summary, the author presents 7 proposals to allow France to take its destiny back into its own hands and to be more in control of its public debt, its industry and its agriculture, with the guarantee of a minimum purchase price, among other things. He does not hesitate to reshuffle the cards of the great principles that govern our economy and those of the central bankers. The reader will be able to find well-defined opinions through reasoned analyses and thus continue the perpetual debate on inflation. Gilles RAVEAUD is a lecturer in economics atthe Institute of European Studies of the University of Paris 8-Saint-Denis. Sophie FRIOT
Aurélien RAGAIGNE, Jean-Laurent VIVIANI, Hélène RAINLELLI-WEISS coord., Evaluer l’impact extra-financier des organisations, Eds EMS, 2026, 288 pages.
This work is eminently collective: no less than 21 contributors, most of them from the University of Rennes (Accounting – Finance of the IGR-IAE Rennes) to analyse the extra-financial impact of organisations.Despite institutionalised extra-financial evaluation practices and systematic reporting by large companies, ambiguity and tension seem to determine the evaluation of the extra-financial impact of organisations. Ambiguity of the place given to evaluations by beneficiary organisations when the activities of the Vigéo agency (social and environmental rating agency created in 2002 with Nicole Notat, former secretary general of the CFDT) were bought by Moody’s in 2019. Therefore, it becomes difficult not to underline the link of subordination that exists between the financial and the extra-financial. We already know that finance is a long-term process. The authors highlight the recurring tensions between financial and extra-financial performance, two objectives that are at the heart of sustainable finance. Three avenues of reflection are envisaged: (i) promotion of a new balance between these two objectives, leaving more room for the expression of stakeholders, (ii) implementation of a more relevant regulation, replacing the relative ESG measures with absolute measures of extra-financial performance, (iii) determination of the real level of stakeholder involvement to support more sustainable business models. If the authors’ stated ambition is to provide a structuring support for the development of partnerships dedicated to the study of contemporary issues of overall performance and responsibility of organizations, it can be said that the book has arrived at the right time. Indeed, Patrick d’Humières, author of “Entreprise et géopolitique” (Business and Geopolitics) does not fail to point out that the request for ESG information first came from investors and that we can only be surprised that this lever is not used against the Chinese manufacturing submersion to “stop illegitimate dumping in the name of social, environmental and loyalty differentials, contrary to the values that constitute the foundation of our model of society”. Aurélien Ragaigne works on the subject of extra-financial indicators and managerial situationssubject to tensions and paradoxes. Jean-Laurent Viviani’s research focuses oncorporate finance, risk management and sustainable finance. HélèneRAINELLI-WEISS is Director of the Master’s in Finance, Treasury course, and is interestedin how organisational theories can help to understand thefunctioning of the financial industry. Alain Brunet
Gilles Lipovetsky, L’odyssée de la surpuissance, Eds Odile Jacob, 380 pages.
Power, or superpower, has been asserting itself since the dawn of time. It is rooted in all civilizations. From the Dogons of Mali to the Tukanos of the Amazon, and the Australian Aborigines, people believe in creators, gods, mythical figures of superpower whose extraordinary powers far exceed those of human beings. This advent of superpower is affirmed with monotheism and the idea that there exists one single creator. God reigns without rival, and His power is absolute over the entire universe. With the emergence of states, around the third millennium BCE, and of god-kings, superpower entered the human world. Modernity took shape in Europe from the eighteenth century onwards. Although democratic in essence, it nevertheless remained archaic in many ways, and the centralized, militarized, and organized state constituted the core element of modern superpower. For the author, this state-centered superpower is no longer ours. The hypertrophy of law, supranational institutions, external constraints, financial markets, and hyper-individualism have reduced the room for manoeuver of nation-states. Politics is receding in favor of polycentric systems organized around technology and economy. Technoscience and hyper-capitalism have become the driving forces of a technical superpower that seems to go hand in hand with political impotence. Liberal democracies are weakened by excessive media coverage and fake news; new technologies are taking over and posing unprecedented challenges to political leaders. Social media is shaping a citizen into consumers of immediate, fragmented information.The hypermodern uniformity of a Western civilization sharing the same values was a myth. Europe, deemed too “woke,” too regulated, too bureaucratic, too liberal in terms of values, is no longer considered a partner by D. Trump. We are living in a time of the West against the West, of the “de-Europeanization” of the world; economically, it is the opposition between market capitalism and state capitalism. Democracies are retreating while authoritarian regimes are on the rise.Today’s superpower, with its ts capabilities, speed, and intensity, has nothing in common with anything humanity has ever known before. It is an anthropotechnical metamorphosis whose limits we do not know. And this absence of limits generates fear and insecurity. This is the paradox of boundless superpower: the feeling of insecurity extends to all spheres of daily life — the air we breathe, GMOs, 5G, the erosion of biodiversity, climate change, gluten, pesticides. Everything is perceived as threatening. This heightened sensitivity to risk intensifies a demand for protection that becomes obsessive. And yet, never before has humanity possessed so many means to transform the world; never before have measurable indicators of living standards, life expectancy, access to healthcare, and human rights been so high.We undeniably live better today than we did yesterday. However, what about our quality of life? Is happiness faltering, or have we lost the ability to appreciate moments of intense joy? Much is still to be expected from advances in technoscience; but it would be an illusiory to believe that these could domesticate happiness into scientific laws or algorithms. Perhaps therein lies the limit of the superpowered society: this anthropological, faceless and unmasterable limit — the inappropriable happiness of each individual. Gilles Lipovetsky is a philosopher and essayist. Ph Alezard
Bruno CABRILLAC, Pierre JAILLET (dir), Revue d’économie financière, n°160, Mutation géopolitiques, fragmentations économiques et financières.
So-called “happy” globalisation is now a thing of the past. With it, the promise of continuous growth based on the indefinite intensification of international trade has faded. The turn of the 2020s marks a profound rupture in the global economic and geopolitical order, under the combined effect of major shocks — the Covid-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, the rise of economic sanctions, the resurgence of inflation, the resurgence of protectionism — as well as the rise of the fourth industrial revolution driven by digital technology and artificial intelligence. In this context, the transformations brought about by technological giants with unprecedented capitalisation are reshaping the economic, social and political balance on a global scale. This volume of the Revue d’économie financière analyses these recompositions through the contributions of thirteen experts, articulated around three structuring axes. The first part examines the questioning of the international order. Geopolitical tensions have led to an increasing fragmentation of world trade, which is now structured around strategic blocs. Security is emerging as an organising principle of international relations, reconfiguring economic interdependencies. The asymmetries resulting from globalisation, formerly vectors of integration, are becoming instruments of power and coercion. In this context, Europe is faced with an imperative to strengthen its strategic autonomy, both militarily and energetically, as well as financially and digitally. The second part analyses the changes in contemporary capitalism in an environment marked by systemic crises since 2008. The hypothesis of convergence towards a single model has given way to a plurality of trajectories. American market capitalism and Chinese state capitalism now structure the global economy, while Europe is developing its own path, based on normative framework and the search for a balance between innovation and protection. These differences are particularly evident in the development of artificial intelligence, which has become a major strategic issue. The third part deals with monetary and financial fragmentation. It recalls, from a historical perspective, the constant intertwining of finance and geopolitics, characteristic of the great economic powers. The question of monetary sovereignty is addressed in close connection with that of the sovereignty of payments. While Europe has a sovereign currency, it remains dependent on largely extraterritorial payment infrastructures. This vulnerability is a major strategic issue in a context where financial instruments can become levers of economic pressure. Through these analyses, this volume aims to contribute to the debate on the new dynamics of power and the conditions for European strategic autonomy in a permanently fragmented world. Philippe Alezard
AFRICA, A BEACON OF MODERN MANAGEMENT
Jean-Jacques Pluchart Management in post-colonial Africa has long been reduced to the management of SMEs or domestic cooperatives and the administration of subsidiaries of Western groups. Recent African literature [1] shows that the continent is going through a period of transition marked by the redeployment of sectors of activity such as agri-food, energy, construction, tourism, as well as health and telephony sectors. These transformations are being driven by a new African elite, itself stimulated by a youth that refuses to be condemned to emigration and wishes to adapt to the changes of the contemporary world. This elite is aware that Africa is the richest of all continents in terms of its raw material resources, its youth (more than a third of the population), its social structures (more than 2,000 ethnic groups) and its cultures. This elite, trained in European and American universities is striving to ease the tension between the legacy of post-colonial traditions and post-modern models based on innovation, individualism and freedoms. It notes that too many African states are still victims of political instability, institutional precariousness, social inequalities and lack of funding.It is confronted with struggles between governments that are rarely democratic, but above all, between local castes for the appropriation of income from the exploitation of natural resources. It is confronted by certain Western (increasingly less European), Asian (increasingly Chinese) and Russian multinational groups. African nation-states are traversed by convergent and divergent dynamics. They are striving to settle the legacy of colonisation, to consolidate their access to independence, to achieve their full sovereignty and to influence the balance of power between the continents of the west, the east and the global south. African youth want the emergence of an original managerial model, the advent of an “active African modernity”, conceived as an adaptation of Anglo-Saxon models, and as a “plural construction, combining science and conscience, but also reflecting the realities of the continent”. It perceives modernity as “a historical construction aimed at freeing the individual from certain social and cultural constraints “. This modernity is characterised by a loosening of traditional practices, a search for pragmatism and above all, an appropriation of the technologies of the digital economy – and in particular of AI and crypto-assets – as well as by the development of large environmentally friendly infrastructure projects. It seeks new types of alliances, cooperation and investment, based on more balanced exchanges. The priorities of the new African leaders and managers are to ensure more stable, inclusive and transparent governance, better regional integration and a stimulating dynamic for young people. The new management methods are oriented towards the creation of companies by African youth, aiming to better exploit local resources and to develop skills in the professions sought by international investors. Another priority of the cooperation is to train Africans in specialities that contribute to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in particular SDG 1 (“No poverty”), SDG 2 (“Zero hunger”), SDG 5 (Gender equality), SDG 8 (Decent work and economic growth), SDG 10 (Reduced inequalities and social inclusion) and SDG 13 (Combating climate change). The impetus for this dynamic is collaborative research and educational innovation, in which French-speaking teacher-researchers must take part. [1] Literature commented on each week on clubturgot.com.
Antonio Damasio, L’intelligence naturelle et l’éveil de la conscience, Eds Odile Jacob, 280 pages.
This book tells the extraordinary story of life and natural intelligence, from the emergence of protocells four billion years ago to the appearance, 500 million years ago, of organisms endowed with mind, feelings and consciousness, thanks to a radical novelty: the nervous system. For the author, current advances in neurobiology can provide satisfactory answers to the question of the “manufacture” of consciousness. According to him, this is “the biological process that allows everyone to experience their individual life, in other words, to know that we are alive and that we exist“. The complex beings that we are come into the world equipped with biological mechanisms to protect the life we have against major threats that could jeopardise it. These mechanisms are “homeostatic” feelings, which participate in the regulation of life by maintaining key organs or functions in an ideal range: “homeostasis”. This is the fundamental break proposed by Damasio. Consciousness is not born in the brain, but in the feelings necessary to sustain life. It emerges from a permanent dialogue, via the spinal cord and the vagus nerve, between the inside of the body and certain areas of the brain, much more differentiated than those dedicated to cognition. This dialogue is that of interoception. The continuation of life depends on the reliability of the information it provides and the responses that the subject provides. We feel before we think. Hunger, thirst, pain or fatigue are conscious biological responses to the vulnerability of life. Interoceptive or homeostatic feelings are spontaneously conscious, with a single purpose: to inform the entire mental process with warning signals that cannot be ignored. We are thus viscerally aware, what the author calls the “sensitive mind”. Nature has given this sensitive spirit two valuable allies: exteroception, which brings together all the sensory receptors – sight, hearing, taste, touch, smell – allowing us to connect to our environment, and proprioception, which makes all voluntary movements such as walking, eating, running or talking possible. Consciousness is therefore not a software installed in the brain, but the juxtaposition of all these living processes. The brain alone does not hold the key to mental processes: it depends on the physiology of the body and the non-neural components of the brain. Natural intelligence is a property of the living, which sets it apart from artificial intelligence, which does not have to worry about its life since it does not have one. AI has no homeostatic feelings. Machines can process huge amounts of information, speed up many tasks and reduce costs, but they cannot rely on the feelings that allow us to sort things out. They remain dependent on their human owners – and humans can be bad. It is this conscious vulnerability, a distinctive feature of human intelligence, that should be introduced into AI. It would induce a form of artificial prudence that could inhibit risky behaviour just as it has led to the development of moral systems and justice in humans. Antonio Damasio, Professor of Neuroscience, Neurology, Psychology and Philosophy at the University of California. He heads the Brain and Creativity Institute. Member of the National Academy of Medicine and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Ph Alezard
Eric CARREY et Hubert LANDIER, De l’économe financière à l’économie du sens et du soin, L’Harmattan, 2025, 238 pages.
The latest book by Eric Carrey and Hubert Landier raises an issue that is currently much debated in all cultures around the world, centered on the two strongly synergistic concepts of “meaning and care” applied to the planet, humanity, society, business and the individual. The authors emphasize that the numerous measures implemented over the past half-century at the international, national and local levels, in terms of sustainable development and social, environmental and governance responsibility, despite their progress, are insufficient to meet the expectations of producers, consumers and citizens. Their quest for meaning in their actions and their aspirations for solidarity and well-being are thwarted by governments’ desire to restore major economic and financial balances, by the attempts of workers’ attempt to adapt to new technologies, by f consumers ’fears of facing shortages, but also by the determination of more and more social actors to achieve the energy, ecological and digital transitions. The authors invite us to go beyond the canonical notions of homo economicus by recalling the genealogy of the concepts that have marked out the vast field of “meaning and care”: the economies of gift-giving, the common good, well-being, happiness; circular and frugal economies; cooperative, associative and partnership-based governance, CARE and CURE practices, etc. They revisit the notions of sustainability, resilience, responsibility, solidarity, etc. Using illuminating ideal-type cases, the authors analyze the application of these concepts to the planet (water, air, earth) and to different objects (clothes, bottles, etc.).They strive to perceive the weak signals that herald the turning points in our civilization, its vital principles, its essential practices, its mobilizing values and its new languages. Hubert Landier (Doctor of Economics) is Professor Emeritus of Universities. Eric Carrey (St Cyr, Exeter and ESSEC) is a professor of social and solidarity economics. Jean Jacques Pluchart
The geoeconomic stakes and challenges of artificial intelligence
The geoeconomic stakes and challenges of artificial intelligence Nadia ANTONIN Power factors have changed in the contemporary period. Recent examples of power politics reveal that economic means have become essential in the exercise of power by states. This paradigm shift is summarised by the term “geo-economics”. Economic interests take precedence over political interests. While in classical geopolitical analysis, it was in the territory and military means that the State found the basis of its sovereignty, geoeconomics assumes that power and security are not only linked to the physical control of the territory. Today, the objective is to acquire or maintain a dominant economic position on the international scene, in particular by mastering innovation. This is the thesis defended by the economist and historian Edward Luttak. In the early 1990s, this economist analysed how the decline in the importance of military power led to a shift from geopolitics to geoeconomics, “States and economic entities replacing the armed forces as the main actors (“From Geopolitics to Geo-economics. Logics of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce”, The National Interest, Summer 1990). Among the new instruments of economic and geopolitical power, artificial intelligence is today a major lever, an instrument of strategic competition and a factor in the reconfiguration of global industrial power relations in the same way as energy, finance or armaments. Analysis of the geoeconomics concept For Professor Antto Vihma, geoeconomics “consists […] in shaping and managing the strategic environment in which states operate for the pursuit of their national interests by economic means“ (2018). The concept of “geoeconomics” was developed in the United States by Edward Luttwak and in France by the political scientist Pascal Lorot, who created the journal Géoéconomie in 1997. It covers the study of the relationship between the economy and the political geography of a territory. A branch of geopolitics, geoeconomics is at the crossroads of economics and international relations. Luttwak (1990) highlighted geoeconomics as “a modern form of rivalry between international powers for which the role of the State and its financial capacities constitute the foundations of diplomacy and the “economic” deployment of nations“. As for Lorot (1999), he sees in geoeconomics “an instrument for analysing the economic and commercial strategies determined by the policies and diplomacy of national governments seeking the reciprocal international influence of these national enterprises and the State“. Block strategy for a dominant position A global struggle for artificial intelligence has entered the international arena. In other words, as artificial intelligence has become a major geoeconomic issue, the major powers of the United States, China and the European Union (EU) are engaged in a technological and economic race to carve out the lion’s share. Each is seeking to master the technologies, infrastructures and standards that will shape the economy of the 21st century. AI is redefining the global hierarchy: the United States dominates through innovation, China through state strategy, and the European Union through standards. – At present, only the USA holds a monopoly on AI and has managed to rise to the rank of leader in the AI race, despite China’s rise in this field. China is the main rival of the United States. The US’s supremacy in AI innovation is based on three pillars: 1) academic excellence: 2) Silicon Valley, which remains the heart of the technology and innovation industry; 3) significant public and private funding. – China is accelerating the integration of AI in all sectors. In addition, a major revision of the Chinese cybersecurity law (October 2025) reflects the state’s desire to technically and ethically regulate the meteoric growth of artificial intelligence in various applications. By updating its legislative framework, China is seeking not only to assert itself on the world stage as a leader in cybersecurity, but also to better manage the risks associated with AI and infrastructure. - The European Union has chosen the standard as a strategic and competitive weapon in order to impose its vision and conquer new markets. Wanting to become a pioneer in “a field that fascinates as much as it worries“, the European Union has taken the lead over the USA or China, to regulate AI. Thus, on 14 June 2023, the European Parliament largely approved the draft regulation on artificial intelligence, the Artificial Intelligence Act, which entered into force in 2025. The geoeconomic challenges of artificial intelligence The deployment of AI raises geoeconomic issues, particularly in terms of resources, ethics, employment and regulation. - Artificial intelligence depends on three essential resources: data (“new black gold”), semiconductors and computing power. The battle for these resources is at the heart of current geoeconomic tensions. - In addition, given the biased algorithms, the discrimination that AI can generate, security issues and data protection, etc., the adoption of this technology raises ethical questions. The AI economy must be based on trust. - The rise of artificial intelligence is profoundly transforming global geoeconomic balances, in particular through its effects on employment. Three major issues can be identified: 1) first, global competition for talent is intensifying; 2) second, AI is causing a recomposition of global value chains; 3) finally, AI is destroying intermediate jobs, while promoting the creation of highly skilled jobs, requiring a set of advanced technical and cognitive skills. - With regard to regulation and digital sovereignty, countries are seeking to regulate AI to protect their economic interests and values. In conclusion, the countries that succeed in innovating quickly, while ethically and legally regulating the uses of AI and preserving their technological sovereignty, will be the big winners of the AI revolution.
Corporate culture, the best defence against storms
Business leaders have always learned to juggle the unpredictable. In a world today marked by successive crises — health, geopolitical, climate, economic — resilience is an essential quality. Whatever the size of the company, there are leveraging effects that will promote this resilience. There is one that remains largely underestimated: corporate culture. Sometimes reduced to a few symbols or values, corporate culture is too often confined to a human resources component. However, it is a strong dimension of the company, a set of values and behaviours capable of driving innovation and growth. When everything is faltering, it is not the tools or processes that will save the company. These are often invisible elements, which do not appear on the company’s balance sheet or in the profit and loss accounts. Corporate culture exists from the moment the entrepreneur starts his or her entrepreneurial adventure surrounded by his or her first employees. Indeed, in a company where the culture is strong, clear and embodied, employees know how to behave, what matters, and what is expected of them, even when the benchmarks change. This makes it possible to react quickly, to reorganise without chaos, and to remain faithful to the company’s identity without succumbing to organisational panic. Conversely, a company without a shared culture quickly becomes a field of tension: power games, inertia, strategic misalignment. In a storm, the absence of culture is paid for in cash. So, is corporate culture a brake on innovation or growth? This is a common mistake, but one that has never been proven! Corporate culture creates a secure framework that enables strategies to be implemented. So many business leaders wonder about the causes of the failure of their strategies: the answer probably lies in the presence or absence of a corporate culture! Corporate culture is also the remedy to prevent the company from going through difficult times. In other words, there can be no innovation without a strong culture. Companies that innovate sustainably are often those where the culture values curiosity, questioning, cooperation and responsibility. Not those where innovation is confined to an isolated unit or driven by sterile indicators. We can ask ourselves about the causes of the sharp rise in business failures in our country. The lack of corporate culture could be one of the causes of failure, because when the culture no longer supports the strategy, the company becomes misaligned and takes the risk of becoming stagnant. But a ship that does not move forward moves backwards! What if corporate culture was simply the conscience of the legal entity? This consciousness capable of perceiving and interpreting events. But this is without counting on the cognitive biases that are increasingly being put forward to warn us about what we think we see when the reality is quite different. Corporate culture is no exception. It is up to the entrepreneur to preserve and maintain this cognitive capital: it is vital for their business! The world of tomorrow will remain uncertain… that’s for sure! Crises will continue, in other forms. Innovation will remain vital, but difficult to maintain without benchmarks. In this context, corporate culture becomes a factor of strategic robustness. It does not protect against storms: it gives the posture to cross them, and sometimes even to emerge strengthened. François NAUX is Managing Director of WICS Consulting, independent director, member of APIA and member of the Turgot Club. Column published in the newspaper Les Echos, 1 December 2025;