Jean-Jacques PluchartEditor-in-Chief Clubturgot.com celebrates its 100th issue. Since March 2024, the leading French- and English-language newsletter on economic and financial literature has published over 300 articles, book reviews and tributes to the works of leading economists. Over the weeks, in order to better meet the expectations of their readers, the newsletter’s editors have published their articles first in French and then in English, focusing on the work of theorists and the insights of practitioners in the increasingly numerous and complex fields of economics and finance.Every week, in just a few minutes, the 30,000 readers of clubturgot.com are thus able to learn about the key economic and financial events of the day. The authors of the articles published on clubturgot.com are Turgot Prize winners, representatives of partner associations and members of the Club Turgot, which pre-selects the books submitted to a jury of distinguished figures chaired by Jean-Claude Trichet. Since the Turgot Prize was established in 1987, the Club has read around 5,000 books and reviewed nearly 4,000, and the jury has awarded, first in the halls of the Senate and then at Bercy, 39 Grand Prizes, 41 Jury Prizes, 102 honourable mentions and 120 Special Prizes (for collective works, educational books, French-language books, young authors, the DFCG and AF2i). Together with Prize winners brought together in the Cercle Turgot, the Club Turgot has also published 22 collective works on key economic and managerial issues. The reviews of the award-winning books have been compiled into three volumes: La pensée économique française (French Economic Thought, 2 volumes) and Les leçons de Turgot et de Smith (The Lessons of Turgot and Smith). For its 100th issue, clubturgot.com presents: - An original review by Jean-Jacques Pluchart on the impact of Artificial Intelligence on the banking profession, – a presentation by Philippe Alezard on the work of Norbert Wiener, a leading mathematician in the field of finance, – an analysis by Sophie Ffriot of Eric Weil’s book Retraites, un blocage français (Pensions, a French Impasse).
Wiener’s Process: From Pollen to Financial Markets
Phlippe Alezard According to classical economic theory, the price of an asset is determined by the interaction between supply and demand: between a seller wishing to dispose of the asset and a buyer wishing to acquire it. The stronger the demand, for various reasons, the higher the price of the asset will be pushed. Indeed, in theory, demand can be almost unlimited, whereas the asset, by definition, is limited in number. Conversely, when demand is low, the seller seeking to dispose of their asset will tend to lower the price in order to find a buyer. We can therefore understand that, at any given moment, the price corresponds to the point of equilibrium between supply and demand.All of this is true in an ideal, theoretical world. In reality, a wide range of events can occur at any time: geopolitical, climatic, informational, economic or financial events. These events trigger emotional reactions – panic, rumours, euphoria – which in turn lead to human decisions, as well as algorithmic positioning in one direction or another. This multitude of random shocks affects the behaviour of economic agents and creates erratic and unpredictable movements in the short term. It is precisely these random fluctuations, this constant uncertainty, that mathematicians have sought to model in the form of stochastic processes. The first person to have this insight was Louis Bachelier. In his now famous thesis[1] ‘Théorie de la spéculation’ (‘Theory of Speculation’), submitted in 1900, he introduced the use of probabilities to describe price movements and showed that price changes can be represented as a sequence of independent, identically distributed random variables. He went even further by constructing histograms that showed that these variations were distributed according to a bell-shaped curve, in other words, a Gaussian distribution. In this way, Bachelier laid the initial foundations for finance based on Brownian motion, a diffusion process, and the normal distribution.However , the history of Brownian motion begins long before finance. In 1827, Robert Brown[2] used a microscope to observe the persistent agitation of pollen particles suspended in a fluid. This phenomenon can be explained by the incessant and random impacts of the fluid molecules on the particles. The individual movement of each molecule is negligible, but the combined effect of all these impacts produces a completely erratic overall movement. The Brownian motion of a particle can therefore be modelled as a stochastic process characterised by a succession of independent increments, with a mean of zero, whose magnitude and direction vary unpredictably.In finance, the pollen particle becomes the price of an asset suspended in a market. The molecules of the fluid are replaced by the multitude of buy and sell orders, which are themselves driven by an infinite amount of information, events and sometimes conflicting decisions. For a process to be classified as standard Brownian motion, three properties must be satisfied: 1. All trajectories start at the origin, or more precisely, in the probabilistic sense, the probability that the trajectory starts at zero is equal to one. 2. Each increment of the process is independent of the previous one: future changes do not depend on the past. Brownian motion has no memory. 3. The distribution of the increments P(t+1) – P(t) at each instant follows a normal distribution with a mean of zero, whose variance (t+1) – t is proportional to the elapsed time. It was precisely these properties that Bachelier had already observed when studying the prices on the Paris Stock Exchange. However, it was Norbert Wiener who would provide this phenomenon with its rigorous mathematical formalisation. Born in 1894 in Columbia, Missouri, Wiener came from a Russian Jewish family who had immigrated to the United States. His father, Leo Wiener, a translator of Leo Tolstoy’s complete works and later a professor of Slavic languages at Harvard, personally oversaw his son’s education, employing innovative teaching methods. A child prodigy, Norbert received his primary education at home, entered secondary school in 1903 and obtained his equivalent of the baccalaureate in 1906, at the age of twelve. He then attended Tufts University before moving on to Harvard, where he defended a thesis on mathematical logic. At the age of just eighteen, he became the youngest doctoral graduate in the history of this prestigious university. After his thesis defence, he travelled to Europe: in Cambridge, he attended Bertrand Russell’s lectures; in Göttingen, he studied with David Hilbert, one of the greatest mathematicians of the 20th century. Back in the United States, after several temporary positions, Wiener joined MIT in 1919, where he would spend the majority of his career. There, he developed a remarkably diverse body of scientific work, spanning the fields of mathematical analysis, probability, engineering and the philosophy of science. Brownian motion had been known since Brown’s observation in 1827. In 1900, Bachelier had applied it to price fluctuations. In 1905, Albert Einstein published his theory of Brownian motion, while Marian Smoluchowski [3] independently developed an approach based on the random collisions of molecules. These works provided a physical interpretation of Brownian motion. However, a fundamental question remained: how could a continuous random trajectory over time be rigorously defined in mathematics? By 1923, discrete random walks, such as those resulting from a game of heads or tails, were already well understood. At that time, a finite number of random variables were used. However, the transition to continuous time posed a major conceptual challenge: how could a probability be defined over a non-countable infinity of random variables? In his article ‘Differential-Space [4]’, Wiener proposed an elegant solution. He considered the set of possible trajectories as the points of a functional space of infinite dimension. To construct a probability measure on this space, he begins by discretising time by subdividing the interval [0,1] into n segments: 0 = t0 < t1 < t2 … < tn =1 He then studied only the increments: X1 = J(t1) – J(0) X2 = J(t2) – J(t1) …. Xn = j(tn) – J(tn−1) Three points are crucial: 1. It is not the successive positions that are independent, but the displacements over each interval;2 . Each increment follows a normal distribution, the variance of which is proportional to the length of the interval.3 .
The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Banking Professions
Jean-Jacques Pluchart The spectacular advances in AI – and in particular in generative AI since 2022 – are disrupting the strategies, organisational structures and practices of an increasing number of industries, particularly in the banking and insurance sectors. The scale and speed of these transformations can be seen in the fluctuations in the margins, earnings and share prices of listed institutions. The most erratic fluctuations in certain stock prices reflect the uncertainty felt by savers and investors regarding the ability of banks and insurers to adapt their value creation chains and rebuild their business models. Banking businesses are built on the secure management of personal data and the coverage of risks of various kinds. Traditionally, banking businesses are divided into retail banking and wholesale banking. However, they are becoming increasingly differentiated according to the bank’s predominant strategy, which may focus on volume or on the differentiation of its products and services. In the former case, they cover ‘document-intensive’ functions, and in the latter, ‘high-responsibility’ functions. The former encompass the administration of day-to-day operations, the generation of contracts, customer relationship management (CRM), accounting and financial analyses, etc. The latter involve trade-offs between transactions, the issuance of credit, legal, tax and financial arrangements, and strategic decisions, etc. The former can increasingly be replaced by automated processes. The latter can only be supported by dedicated AI-based models for recognition, classification, simulation, projection, correlation, etc. Distinguishing between these two types of activities is becoming increasingly difficult due to the rapid progress of AI and LLMs, which are based on the massification of data, the acceleration of data processing, the proliferation of specialised AI agents and, above all, the ability to quickly code new programs using natural language (machine learning or automatic encoding). As a result, new functions are being ‘augmented’ by AI: the development of more sophisticated chatbots for interacting with prospects and customers, the security of data and data processing, the systematisation of securities rating, the automation of compliance (due diligence), the optimisation of securities settlement and delivery, etc., as well as the enhancement of the reliability of forecasting models (predictive trading) and the simulation of credit and market risks. Functions that were previously performed by specialists with rare skills are thus becoming ‘commodities’ provided by standard applications (benchmarks). Advances in AI and LLMs are leading to the disintermediation of value creation chains, the reconfiguration of banks’ business models, and the reshaping of their ecosystem. These shifts can be observed in the changes in the margins and stock market prices of banking institutions and their subcontractors. SaaS software outsourcing licences are gradually being replaced by proprietary models generated through ‘Vibe Coding’ at low marginal cost. This transition to token-based pricing has already led to a drop in the MSCI USA Software index. For example, the share prices of Salesforce, Thomson Reuters and LegalZoom have been affected. The downward trend in margins and valuation multiples is beginning to affect software publishers, property and personal insurance companies, and financial and non-financial rating agencies. Insurify’s launch of a purchasing agent capable of instantly comparing millions of policies caused a sharp drop in the value of Willis Towers Watson and Aon. In the fields of accounting (auditors, analysts) and credit rating, the same phenomenon has affected certain agencies, such as S&P Global, Moody’s and FactSet. Retail banks, which focus on providing advice and credit to individuals and SMEs, are directly exposed to a loss of competitive advantage unless they demonstrate their ability to adapt quickly to the changes brought about by AI. In contrast, investment or merchant banks benefit from barriers to entry based on the personalisation of client relationships (i.e., on trust and personalised historical data), on financial, legal and tax structuring (M&As, major projects, etc.), particularly at the international level, on wealth management, on the securitisation of receivables, on the management of derivatives, on strategic decisions, and even on certain functions related to shadow banking (management of investment funds or tax avoidance schemes, etc.). The quality of the banking relationship creates value when it is developed during a monetary and financial crisis or simply in a volatile market environment. The involvement of a human adviser provides the client with ‘mental and emotional well-being’ and greater confidence in the future. This transformation of banking models prompts us to revisit the lessons taught by Michael Porter since the 1980s, which distinguish between corporate strategies based on volume and those based on service differentiation. It appears that, in the wake of advances in AI, these lessons are once again becoming increasingly relevant. Banks are being compelled to adopt strategies that focus on innovative and phygital activities, combining these two approaches.
WEIL, Eric. Retraites, un blocage français, Editions PLON, 2025, 208 pages
Ultimately, taking a close interest in the pension system is not a question of age. As he approaches the age of 30, and in contrast to his peers, Eric Weil has made pensions his favourite subject and, in this book, offers us an in-depth reflection on the system. His aim is to help us see things more clearly, so that we can exercise greater discernment in the often heated debates on the subject. First, he explains, in an accessible manner and supported by statistical evidence, how the current system works and its history. Reforming the system often brings the French out onto the streets, although most of them do not always know exactly what it is all about. Indeed, he points out that while one-third of French people say they know how the system works, only 8% truly understand it. He highlights the principles and rules of the system, in particular the differences between the statutory retirement age / the age at which entitlement begins (AOD), the required insurance period (DAR) and the age at which the reduction in pension entitlement is cancelled (AAD): whether poorly understood or imprecise, these concepts often cause confusion among working people. A chapter is dedicated to the ten misconceptions about pensions and offers the reader a useful overview. All the sticking points that divide the French public and politicians are addressed: the status of civil servants, long working lives, the points-based system and retirement at 60, among others. As for the perspective on the financing of the pension system, the book clarifies that the issue of the pension deficit cannot be separated from that of the overall balance of public finances. While deductions are necessary to finance the largest item of the public deficit, increasing contributions is not an end in itself, as this will have an impact on employees’ net pay and on the competitiveness of businesses. Subsequently, a second section seeks to demonstrate that, although the system is inequitable, complex and difficult to manage, it is far more generous than elsewhere and represents an exception among OECD countries. Finally, the author takes the debate further by proposing reforms that could be implemented in the short and medium term. Our ‘good old pay-as-you-go system’ has become less cost-effective over time. It cannot be continuously pitted against the funded system. The author believes that a mixed system would be more appropriate, for example by encouraging retirement savings through voluntary personal pension accounts (PERs). In addition, he advocates the creation of a ‘single pension account’, which would eventually enable the transition from around forty schemes with disparate rules to a single scheme. In summary, he believes that, among all the proposed solutions, it seems difficult not to ask current pensioners to make an effort and to encourage them to work longer. In any event, the reform will have to be implemented gradually in order to be accepted by the French public, with the support of at least one major trade union. This book is recommended for all readers seeking a better understanding of our system and the issues it faces, and above all, for all young people who are convinced that they will not have a retirement pension in 30 or 40 years’ time. Eric Weil is a former ministerial adviser responsible for pensions. A graduate of ESSEC, he has also provided strategy consultancy services to French and foreign companies. Book review by Sophie FRIOT
Basel IV: a new name for a strengthened Basel III
Over the past few years, one expression has become common across banks: Basel IV. It is heard in ALM committees, risk departments and discussions between finance teams and business lines. Yet officially, this term does not exist. Regulators continue to refer to the “finalisation of Basel III”. This distinction is not merely semantic — it reflects the very philosophy of the reform. In reality, Basel IV is not a new regulatory framework. It is a strengthened, refined and more harmonised version of Basel III. The objective remains unchanged: to reinforce the resilience of the banking system after the 2008 financial crisis. However, years of implementation have revealed a key issue — comparable banks could report significantly different capital levels depending on their internal models. The recent adjustments aim primarily to reduce these discrepancies. At the core of the reform lies the output floor. Its principle is straightforward: risk-weighted assets calculated using internal models cannot fall below 72.5% of those calculated under standardised approaches. Sophistication is still allowed, but it can no longer endlessly reduce capital consumption. This represents a major shift in logic. For years, the ability to develop advanced internal models was a competitive advantage. That advantage is now framed within clear boundaries. Models are not disappearing, but they are being brought back into a common corridor. This is one of the main reasons why banks have adopted the term Basel IV: the philosophy has changed. The industry is moving from a system where optimisation played a central role to a more harmonised and comparable framework. But this is not the only evolution. Credit risk has been significantly revised. The scope of internal models has been restricted, and key parameters are now subject to floors. Standardised approaches have become more risk-sensitive, particularly for real estate exposures, specialised lending and off-balance-sheet commitments. The objective is clear: to prevent structural underestimation of risk. Operational risk is also evolving. Former methodologies — often complex and highly dependent on internal modelling — are being replaced by a simpler, standardised approach. Once again, the guiding principles are comparability and readability. Counterparty risk and market risk are also being reshaped. The Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB), postponed to 2027 in Europe, redefines the boundary between the banking book and the trading book while strengthening sensitivity to market conditions. Taken individually, these adjustments may appear technical. Taken together, they produce a structural effect: a reduction in banks’ room for interpretation when calculating capital requirements. Yet the most silent transformation may lie elsewhere — in data. The reform goes beyond capital ratios. It deeply reshapes prudential reporting and external disclosure. Data reported to supervisors and data published under Pillar 3 are now converging. Every prudential figure becomes potentially public. This increase in transparency raises the bar significantly in terms of data quality, consistency and traceability. Banks must now produce two views of capital: one based on internal models and another incorporating the prudential floor. This dual perspective changes internal steering. An activity that appeared efficient under historical modelling assumptions may become more capital-consuming once the floor applies. This shift explains why the term Basel IV has gained traction. It may not represent an official regulatory break, but it clearly reflects an operational one. Why, then, do supervisors avoid this term? Because they want to emphasise continuity. From their perspective, this is not a new philosophy but the logical completion of the post-crisis framework. Acknowledging a Basel IV would imply that Basel III was incomplete. Why, on the other hand, do banks continue to use it? Because it helps describe an internal change of paradigm. Capital steering becomes more constrained, more standardised and increasingly data-driven. The impact on pricing, capital allocation and commercial strategy is significant enough to justify a new label in everyday language. In practice, the truth lies somewhere in between. Yes, Basel IV does not exist legally. Yes, it is the final stage of Basel III. But yes as well: for banks, the transformation is deep enough to feel like a new chapter. The gradual implementation through 2033 confirms that this is not a simple technical update. It is a long adaptation phase requiring changes in organisations, systems and management culture. Ultimately, the real novelty is not regulatory — it is managerial. Capital becomes a resource to be actively managed in real time, just like liquidity or commercial profitability. Business decisions will increasingly need to integrate prudential considerations from the outset. Perhaps that is the best definition of what the market calls Basel IV: not a new standard, but a Basel III that has reached maturity. And as often in banking, what changes most is not the rulebook itself — but the way institutions learn to live with it. Benoit Frayer
RAVEAUD Gilles. Inflation. La Grande Arnaque, Editions Les échappés, 2025, 170 pages
What is the level of inflation that allows each citizen to live at an adequate standard of living? What are the causes of inflation that is too high or too low? In this study, Gilles RAVEAUD provides answers on the “Very High Inflation” observed in France over the period 2022-2024; leading to a sharp decline in the standard of living of the French. First of all, he questions the measurement of inflation by INSEE, which seems to underestimate the rise in prices and overestimate the rise in income. INSEE uses the CPI (consumer price index) but should use the European HICP index (harmonized index of consumer prices), which would be more faithful to the real structure of household consumption although it would mean a sharp increase in public spending. The latest price increases have mainly concerned food and energy, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In addition, he also believes that inflation is due to excessive profits over the period and not to wage increases. Indeed, according to the author, the “Very Great Inflation” in Europe over the period can be explained by corporate profits, which account for almost half of the increase. The latter are accused of having taken advantage of the energy shock on their costs to increase their margins. This was also observed by the IMF, which posted in June 2023: “the increasing profits of companies have been the main contributor to inflation in Europe over the last 2 years “. The author then focuses on the centralization of the European electricity market and the setting of its price. He criticises the fact that the sharp rise in electricity prices in 2022 is linked to the sharp rise in gas prices in Europe. Mario Draghi also made the observation: “gas produces only 20% of European electricity, but it dictates prices 63% of the time” The ECB saw inflation as a serious and immediate danger that it had to fight. The ECB therefore raised its interest rates in order to penalize credit and consumption. This monetary tightening has had a major impact on the real estate sector. ”In 2024, only 250,000 homes were built in France, an unprecedented level since …1960 “. The victory over inflation has reduced access to property for many first-time buyers. In summary, the author presents 7 proposals to allow France to take its destiny back into its own hands and to be more in control of its public debt, its industry and its agriculture, with the guarantee of a minimum purchase price, among other things. He does not hesitate to reshuffle the cards of the great principles that govern our economy and those of the central bankers. The reader will be able to find well-defined opinions through reasoned analyses and thus continue the perpetual debate on inflation. Gilles RAVEAUD is a lecturer in economics atthe Institute of European Studies of the University of Paris 8-Saint-Denis. Sophie FRIOT
Aurélien RAGAIGNE, Jean-Laurent VIVIANI, Hélène RAINLELLI-WEISS coord., Evaluer l’impact extra-financier des organisations, Eds EMS, 2026, 288 pages.
This work is eminently collective: no less than 21 contributors, most of them from the University of Rennes (Accounting – Finance of the IGR-IAE Rennes) to analyse the extra-financial impact of organisations.Despite institutionalised extra-financial evaluation practices and systematic reporting by large companies, ambiguity and tension seem to determine the evaluation of the extra-financial impact of organisations. Ambiguity of the place given to evaluations by beneficiary organisations when the activities of the Vigéo agency (social and environmental rating agency created in 2002 with Nicole Notat, former secretary general of the CFDT) were bought by Moody’s in 2019. Therefore, it becomes difficult not to underline the link of subordination that exists between the financial and the extra-financial. We already know that finance is a long-term process. The authors highlight the recurring tensions between financial and extra-financial performance, two objectives that are at the heart of sustainable finance. Three avenues of reflection are envisaged: (i) promotion of a new balance between these two objectives, leaving more room for the expression of stakeholders, (ii) implementation of a more relevant regulation, replacing the relative ESG measures with absolute measures of extra-financial performance, (iii) determination of the real level of stakeholder involvement to support more sustainable business models. If the authors’ stated ambition is to provide a structuring support for the development of partnerships dedicated to the study of contemporary issues of overall performance and responsibility of organizations, it can be said that the book has arrived at the right time. Indeed, Patrick d’Humières, author of “Entreprise et géopolitique” (Business and Geopolitics) does not fail to point out that the request for ESG information first came from investors and that we can only be surprised that this lever is not used against the Chinese manufacturing submersion to “stop illegitimate dumping in the name of social, environmental and loyalty differentials, contrary to the values that constitute the foundation of our model of society”. Aurélien Ragaigne works on the subject of extra-financial indicators and managerial situationssubject to tensions and paradoxes. Jean-Laurent Viviani’s research focuses oncorporate finance, risk management and sustainable finance. HélèneRAINELLI-WEISS is Director of the Master’s in Finance, Treasury course, and is interestedin how organisational theories can help to understand thefunctioning of the financial industry. Alain Brunet
Gilles Lipovetsky, L’odyssée de la surpuissance, Eds Odile Jacob, 380 pages.
Power, or superpower, has been asserting itself since the dawn of time. It is rooted in all civilizations. From the Dogons of Mali to the Tukanos of the Amazon, and the Australian Aborigines, people believe in creators, gods, mythical figures of superpower whose extraordinary powers far exceed those of human beings. This advent of superpower is affirmed with monotheism and the idea that there exists one single creator. God reigns without rival, and His power is absolute over the entire universe. With the emergence of states, around the third millennium BCE, and of god-kings, superpower entered the human world. Modernity took shape in Europe from the eighteenth century onwards. Although democratic in essence, it nevertheless remained archaic in many ways, and the centralized, militarized, and organized state constituted the core element of modern superpower. For the author, this state-centered superpower is no longer ours. The hypertrophy of law, supranational institutions, external constraints, financial markets, and hyper-individualism have reduced the room for manoeuver of nation-states. Politics is receding in favor of polycentric systems organized around technology and economy. Technoscience and hyper-capitalism have become the driving forces of a technical superpower that seems to go hand in hand with political impotence. Liberal democracies are weakened by excessive media coverage and fake news; new technologies are taking over and posing unprecedented challenges to political leaders. Social media is shaping a citizen into consumers of immediate, fragmented information.The hypermodern uniformity of a Western civilization sharing the same values was a myth. Europe, deemed too “woke,” too regulated, too bureaucratic, too liberal in terms of values, is no longer considered a partner by D. Trump. We are living in a time of the West against the West, of the “de-Europeanization” of the world; economically, it is the opposition between market capitalism and state capitalism. Democracies are retreating while authoritarian regimes are on the rise.Today’s superpower, with its ts capabilities, speed, and intensity, has nothing in common with anything humanity has ever known before. It is an anthropotechnical metamorphosis whose limits we do not know. And this absence of limits generates fear and insecurity. This is the paradox of boundless superpower: the feeling of insecurity extends to all spheres of daily life — the air we breathe, GMOs, 5G, the erosion of biodiversity, climate change, gluten, pesticides. Everything is perceived as threatening. This heightened sensitivity to risk intensifies a demand for protection that becomes obsessive. And yet, never before has humanity possessed so many means to transform the world; never before have measurable indicators of living standards, life expectancy, access to healthcare, and human rights been so high.We undeniably live better today than we did yesterday. However, what about our quality of life? Is happiness faltering, or have we lost the ability to appreciate moments of intense joy? Much is still to be expected from advances in technoscience; but it would be an illusiory to believe that these could domesticate happiness into scientific laws or algorithms. Perhaps therein lies the limit of the superpowered society: this anthropological, faceless and unmasterable limit — the inappropriable happiness of each individual. Gilles Lipovetsky is a philosopher and essayist. Ph Alezard
Bruno CABRILLAC, Pierre JAILLET (dir), Revue d’économie financière, n°160, Mutation géopolitiques, fragmentations économiques et financières.
So-called “happy” globalisation is now a thing of the past. With it, the promise of continuous growth based on the indefinite intensification of international trade has faded. The turn of the 2020s marks a profound rupture in the global economic and geopolitical order, under the combined effect of major shocks — the Covid-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, the rise of economic sanctions, the resurgence of inflation, the resurgence of protectionism — as well as the rise of the fourth industrial revolution driven by digital technology and artificial intelligence. In this context, the transformations brought about by technological giants with unprecedented capitalisation are reshaping the economic, social and political balance on a global scale. This volume of the Revue d’économie financière analyses these recompositions through the contributions of thirteen experts, articulated around three structuring axes. The first part examines the questioning of the international order. Geopolitical tensions have led to an increasing fragmentation of world trade, which is now structured around strategic blocs. Security is emerging as an organising principle of international relations, reconfiguring economic interdependencies. The asymmetries resulting from globalisation, formerly vectors of integration, are becoming instruments of power and coercion. In this context, Europe is faced with an imperative to strengthen its strategic autonomy, both militarily and energetically, as well as financially and digitally. The second part analyses the changes in contemporary capitalism in an environment marked by systemic crises since 2008. The hypothesis of convergence towards a single model has given way to a plurality of trajectories. American market capitalism and Chinese state capitalism now structure the global economy, while Europe is developing its own path, based on normative framework and the search for a balance between innovation and protection. These differences are particularly evident in the development of artificial intelligence, which has become a major strategic issue. The third part deals with monetary and financial fragmentation. It recalls, from a historical perspective, the constant intertwining of finance and geopolitics, characteristic of the great economic powers. The question of monetary sovereignty is addressed in close connection with that of the sovereignty of payments. While Europe has a sovereign currency, it remains dependent on largely extraterritorial payment infrastructures. This vulnerability is a major strategic issue in a context where financial instruments can become levers of economic pressure. Through these analyses, this volume aims to contribute to the debate on the new dynamics of power and the conditions for European strategic autonomy in a permanently fragmented world. Philippe Alezard
AFRICA, A BEACON OF MODERN MANAGEMENT
Jean-Jacques Pluchart Management in post-colonial Africa has long been reduced to the management of SMEs or domestic cooperatives and the administration of subsidiaries of Western groups. Recent African literature [1] shows that the continent is going through a period of transition marked by the redeployment of sectors of activity such as agri-food, energy, construction, tourism, as well as health and telephony sectors. These transformations are being driven by a new African elite, itself stimulated by a youth that refuses to be condemned to emigration and wishes to adapt to the changes of the contemporary world. This elite is aware that Africa is the richest of all continents in terms of its raw material resources, its youth (more than a third of the population), its social structures (more than 2,000 ethnic groups) and its cultures. This elite, trained in European and American universities is striving to ease the tension between the legacy of post-colonial traditions and post-modern models based on innovation, individualism and freedoms. It notes that too many African states are still victims of political instability, institutional precariousness, social inequalities and lack of funding.It is confronted with struggles between governments that are rarely democratic, but above all, between local castes for the appropriation of income from the exploitation of natural resources. It is confronted by certain Western (increasingly less European), Asian (increasingly Chinese) and Russian multinational groups. African nation-states are traversed by convergent and divergent dynamics. They are striving to settle the legacy of colonisation, to consolidate their access to independence, to achieve their full sovereignty and to influence the balance of power between the continents of the west, the east and the global south. African youth want the emergence of an original managerial model, the advent of an “active African modernity”, conceived as an adaptation of Anglo-Saxon models, and as a “plural construction, combining science and conscience, but also reflecting the realities of the continent”. It perceives modernity as “a historical construction aimed at freeing the individual from certain social and cultural constraints “. This modernity is characterised by a loosening of traditional practices, a search for pragmatism and above all, an appropriation of the technologies of the digital economy – and in particular of AI and crypto-assets – as well as by the development of large environmentally friendly infrastructure projects. It seeks new types of alliances, cooperation and investment, based on more balanced exchanges. The priorities of the new African leaders and managers are to ensure more stable, inclusive and transparent governance, better regional integration and a stimulating dynamic for young people. The new management methods are oriented towards the creation of companies by African youth, aiming to better exploit local resources and to develop skills in the professions sought by international investors. Another priority of the cooperation is to train Africans in specialities that contribute to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in particular SDG 1 (“No poverty”), SDG 2 (“Zero hunger”), SDG 5 (Gender equality), SDG 8 (Decent work and economic growth), SDG 10 (Reduced inequalities and social inclusion) and SDG 13 (Combating climate change). The impetus for this dynamic is collaborative research and educational innovation, in which French-speaking teacher-researchers must take part. [1] Literature commented on each week on clubturgot.com.