Philippe Alezard With Bachelier, finance had found its founding insight: stock market prices can be thought of as random movements and options as rights whose value depends on the probability of future prices. With Wiener, this intuition is given a rigorous mathematical foundation: the Brownian motion becomes a continuous process, with independent and Gaussian increments, capable of giving shape to uncertainty. Finally, with Markowitz, uncertainty is no longer merely described; it becomes the subject of a rational decision, organised at the level of a portfolio. However, a decisive question remained: if chance governs prices, is it possible to give a rigorous price to a contract that relates precisely to this chance? This is the question that Fischer Black, Myron Scholes and Robert C. Merton answered in the early 1970s. Their contribution is not just about producing a famous formula. It transforms the very nature of financial valuation. Before them, an option essentially appeared as a bet: the right to buy or sell an asset at a fixed price, in an uncertain future. After them, the option became an object that can be replicated, hedged and valued based on arbitrage reasoning. The price is no longer just an opinion about the future; it becomes the logical consequence of a dynamic hedging strategy. The intellectual and financial context of the 1960s and 1970s is essential to understanding this breakthrough. In the United States, finance was then in the process of becoming an independent academic discipline. Business schools were moving closer to the markets, price databases were developing, and Markowitz’s portfolio theory had introduced variance and covariance into the language of investors, while the CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model) of Sharpe, Lintner and Mossin sought to establish a balanced relationship between expected return and systematic risk. At the same time, the options markets, long dominated by over-the-counter transactions, were undergoing an institutional change. In April 1973, the Chicago Board Options Exchange opened its doors and offered, for the first time, an organised market for standardised stock option contracts. The publication of the Black-Scholes model came in the same year, almost at the exact moment when the market needed a common language to price, compare and hedge these new instruments. Fischer Sheffey Black was born in 1938 in Washington D.C. His career path was less linear than that of traditional academic economists. He first studied physics at Harvard before turning to applied mathematics and computer science. He obtained a doctorate from Harvard in 1964 in applied mathematics with a thesis devoted[1] to what we would now call artificial intelligence, at a time when this discipline was still in its infancy. Nothing in this initial career path would have predicted that he would become one of the founders of modern finance. However, this interdisciplinary background, spanning physics, calculus, logic and dynamic systems, undoubtedly explains his ability to view markets as formalisable mechanisms. After his studies, Black worked, among other places, at Arthur D. Little, a consulting firm where he met Jack Treynor[2], one of the pioneers of modern portfolio theory and the equilibrium model of financial assets. This meeting was decisive. Treynor introduced Black to financial problems and encouraged him to think about the links between risk, return and market equilibrium. Black then developed a very personal approach to finance: he was less interested in institutions than in the abstract forces that must govern prices if arbitrage opportunities are eliminated. His mind is that of a theoretical engineer: he seeks the hidden constraint, the necessary relationship, the equation that must be true if the market is consistent. Myron Scholes was born in 1941 in Timmins, Ontario, Canada, to a family with deep ties to the business world. In his Nobel autobiography, he emphasises the importance of this family environment: from a very young age, he was interested in trade, accounting, probability and risk. An eye operation during his adolescence disrupted his schooling and forced him to develop special working methods based on listening, memory and conceptualisation. This personal constraint would play an important role in his way of thinking: Scholes was not only a calculation technician, he was attentive to the economic structure of problems. He continued his studies at McMaster University, then at the University of Chicago, where he obtained his doctorate in 1969. Chicago was then one of the most powerful centres of the new financial economy. Eugene Fama was working there on market efficiency, Merton Miller on corporate finance, Milton Friedman on monetary theory, and the university’s intellectual tradition valued equilibrium reasoning, price consistency and the discipline imposed by competitive markets. There, Scholes received an economic education that was very different from the more institutional European tradition: the objective was not only to describe the markets, but to deduce what prices should be in a world where agents exploit all the possibilities of arbitrage. Robert Cox Merton was born in 1944 in New York. His father, Robert K. Merton, was one of the most influential sociologists of the 20th century, known in particular for his work on “self-fulfilling prophecy” and “unintended consequences”. Young Robert therefore grew up in an exceptional intellectual environment, but quickly chose a different path. He first studied mathematical engineering at Columbia in 1966, then applied mathematics at the California Institute of Technology, where he obtained his MS in 1967. He then joined MIT for his PhD in economics, under the supervision of Paul Samuelson. This point is crucial: Samuelson is one of Bachelier’s successors in American finance. Through him, Merton inherited a tradition in which mathematical physics, probability and economics could be brought together in a single analytical architecture. Merton had a more advanced technical mastery of stochastic calculus than most financial economists of his time. Where Black and Scholes construct a highly powerful arbitrage intuition, Merton gives the model its mathematical generality. His 1973 article[3], “Theory of Rational Option Pricing”, published in the Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, broadens the framework, clarifies the conditions of validity, establishes general restrictions on option prices and embeds
Pauline ROSSI, Le déclin démographique, une urgence économique – Editions PUF, 158 pages, 2026
This very concise book deals with a subject that is very much in the news: the decline in the birth rate. This has also been a concern for most governments for several years. The angle chosen by the author is interesting insofar as he is primarily concerned with the impact of this demographic phenomenon on the economy, which it affects significantly. This book is based on recent research to make a diagnosis of France before expanding its analysis to a global scope. The decline in the birth rate in France has been steady since the second half of the 18th century, with only one real reversal during the “Glorious Thirty”. The recent acceleration of this decline and the increase in the number of deaths today are leading to a crossing of the curves, which is creating economic concern. Only the large net migration has made it possible to observe an increase in the population. Although for a long time a number of children per woman of around 2.1 has been considered a figure that allows the renewal and safeguarding of social and pension systems, the current figure of 1.6 children per woman is cause for concern. This trend is generally shared in most countries, except in a number of African countries or in the United States in the future due to high immigration. This factual situation will pose problems for the financing of social security and pensions, despite an increase in the rate of the working population, with an increase in the number of elderly people, who are, however, in poorer health. All this is expected to lead to a decline in economic growth with a reduced workforce, a decline in business innovation and an increase in automation. Governments have launched programs to try to halt this decline in the birth rate with numerous initiatives such as job security for women or tax measures, but these have generally proved ineffective, whether due to time constraints, particularly with women working more, or also biological constraints with the arrival of children later in life, which have overall lowered the number of children per woman. The alternative to this situation is often the integration of immigrant populations who generally have more children, even though this solution is highly controversial in terms of social acceptability and future impact. The structural factors behind this low birth rate are very well described, starting with the socialisation of risks, which allows an interesting parallel to be drawn between pensions and fertility. Indeed, there is a paradox in the fact that generous pensions ultimately do not encourage people to have large families. The emancipation of women has also reduced the need for a large number of children, which could be seen as security for the future. The decline in marriages, which are often later, reduces the childbearing period, as does celibacy, which is more often imposed than chosen and particularly affects men without children, whose numbers have increased significantly. On the other hand, a child is today often considered a parental investment, both in terms of optimising the time dedicated to them and financing their education, with quality largely taking precedence over quantity. Faced with a structural change whose future is not completely clear, the author recommends that we adapt our economic and social model to this demography. There are obviously opportunities linked to degrowth, particularly environmental ones, even if the impact of the number of inhabitants must be qualified by the lifestyle observed since the 1960s. This also makes it possible to rebalance the use of resources between rich countries and developing countries, with quite different trends in birth rates. In the short term, this situation should make it possible to save on public finances with fewer unemployed people or less funding, particularly for education. This situation will also open up significant “Silver Economy” opportunities for many companies. To take a longer-term view, however, it is necessary to prepare for the impact of this decline on the economy: investing in innovation and human capital to increase productivity, enhancing skills, better integrating young people, mobilising older people and reforming the social protection and pension system (in particular through supplementary schemes). In conclusion, the author draws a parallel with the recent awareness of climate change and urges us to organise ourselves quickly to deal with the impact of the falling birth rate on the economy in the short and medium term. Pauline ROSSI is Professor of Economics at the Ecole Polytechnique Olivier STEPHAN
Pierre-André BUIGUES, La France à la loupe européenne, Eds Dunod, 2026, 220 pages.
The author repeatedly highlights a glaring lack of investment in research, innovation and digital transformation. To close the gap, France would need to increase its R&D spending to 3% of GDP, compared to 2.19% in 2023. Unlike Germany, which uses its investments abroad to strengthen its domestic economy, France has focused on the internationalisation of its multinationals, whose success brings little benefit to the country. Another weakness highlighted is the management of public spending: despite budgets above the European average in key areas such as health and education, the tangible results are struggling to convince the public. In conclusion, this book, which is rich in factual data, offers a nuanced view of France: a country that is performing well in some areas, struggling in others, and sometimes in decline. However, solutions do exist, as the country possesses strengths and potential that urgently need to be harnessed. This book is recommended for all curious minds seeking a clear, well-documented view of France today. Pierre-André Buigues is an economist. For 22 years, he held senior positions at the European Commission, and subsequently worked as a lecturer at Toulouse Business School. An expert on European affairs, he has also worked as an international consultant and adviser for various global institutions. He is the author of numerous reference works. Book review by Sophie FRIOT
David Mc WILLIAMS , Argent . Une histoire de l’humanité, Bérengère Viennot (Translation), 2026, Editeur Presses de La Cite. 348 pages.
The object of our desires, the driving force behind our ingenuity… What if money were also humanity’s greatest invention? Did you know that the piastre was the predecessor of the dollar? That Hitler and Lenin used currency to manipulate the masses? That *The Wizard of Oz* is actually about the deflation associated with the gold standard? That our financial future lies not in Bitcoin but in phone credit? From the Sumerians’ barley grains to cryptocurrencies, via the revolutionary assignats and the invention of the dollar, David McWilliams traces, with a lively and accessible pen, the history of this invention which—just like the wheel or fire—has shaped human relationships. Far from the dry economic treatises, David McWilliams shows us that money is not merely an instrument of power. It can also lead to cooperation and collective progress. This is not the first book on money in literature or in the Cercle Turgot’s list of reviews. The renewed interest in this type of work lies in the author’s background and his own perception of money. This informs his choice of historical timeline and examples. Admittedly, we begin with Part 1, which is devoted to antiquity and the famous “fortune,” and continue with: money in the Middle Ages, revolutionary money, modern money, and finally, liberated money (who controls money, the psychology of money, the evolution of money, modern monetary theory, and M-Pesa). The book also explores numerous cultures that have contributed to the development of money and the innovations each has brought. The mastery of money coincided with other major advances such as writing, mathematics, law, democracy, and philosophy. This evolution raises a question: was money the cause of these other developments, or did these developments lead to the evolution of money? Which came first, the chicken or the egg? This is the originality of this book, which was named Book of the Year by the Financial Times: it provides food for thought in an attempt to answer that question. David McWilliams is a social commentator, so he has drawn on a wide range of advice and contributions, and expresses opinions—and… errors—that are his own and those of the people cited in the book. The reader’s task is not to identify any potential blunders, but to understand the intellectual journey of the contributors that may have led to “deviations from the consensus of economists specializing in monetary matters.” A book that should be read by anyone curious about ideas and their interpretation: money and currency are personal concepts. It is a common good and an…individual good as well! Dominique Chesneau
François HEISBOURG, L’Europe face aux prédateurs, Eds Odile Jacob, 170 pages.
Europe, probably the greatest political and human enterprise of modern times, was built upon the reconciliation between France and Germany, as well as the definitive rejection of the use of force between these two nations. This project, born in the minds and voices of former deportees as early as the autumn of 1945, was the prelude to the creation of the Common Market and later the European Union, which grew from six to twenty-seven member states within a few decades. However, Europe poorly understands the ontological blind spot that weakens it: it protects us from our own demons, but it does not protect us from external aggression. This objective was never truly political, nor even part of its identity, and the protection provided by the American umbrella after the Second World War long distanced us from any ambition of strategic autonomy. By politically and institutionally delegating its defense to NATO, and therefore to the United States, Europe contributed to the formation of the American empire: a protective empire that now seems, in some respects, to be joining the club of predators. China, Russia, and the United States now speak about Europe in remarkably similar terms, marked by strategic contempt. For Donald Trump, Europe belongs to the past: it is a civilization in decline. For Vladimir Putin, we are a soft planet made up of weak and “woke” societies. For Xi Jinping, we are democracies in irreversible decline. Paradoxically, this convergence among predatory powers could open the door for Europe’s affirmation. By neglecting the transatlantic alliance, the United States is giving Europe the opportunity to seize its strategic autonomy. By invading Ukraine, Russia is forcing the Old Continent to urgently rethink its rearmament and security. Finally, through its commercial predation, China is compelling Europe to rebuild its weakened competitiveness and relearn the logic of power. Europe must understand that power relations are not negotiated solely through law or trade. Greenland recently provided a demonstration of this reality, illustrating the brutality of a world in which great powers no longer hesitate to impose their interests. For Europe is far less weak than it believes itself to be. The demographic decline that causes so much concern is in fact a global phenomenon. In the same way, Europe’s dependence on Asia should not be mistaken for inevitability. Europe remains wealthy, possesses a powerful market, and retains significant productive capacity. Its weaknesses are known and widely described. The real difficulty lies less in identifying them than in acting upon them. Facing these three predatory empires, the technocratic and regulatory empire that Europe has become will have to reinvent itself. It must regain speed of execution, agility in the fields of security, technology, and energy. It must also relearn how to engage with the countries of the Global South, without remaining trapped by a colonial guilt linked to a history that is centuries old, sometimes dating back several hundred years. Ultimately, Europe must stop internalizing its supposed weakness and servility. To achieve this, it must learn the brutality of the world without renouncing its principles. Clearly asserting its interests, making them understood, and ensuring they are respected with determination has now become essential. Ph Alezard
DUBERTRET J., RAGACHE N., La longue dérive de la dette française. Histoire budgétaire de la Ve République, PUF. 2026 , 670 p.
Reading the book will be particularly useful for future candidates in the 2027 elections, as thedrift in French public debt has reached such a level that its merestabilisation requires increasingly technical and radical reforms. The authors clearly show that the slippages in public spending and compulsory levies result from political compromises or non-decisions on the part of both right- and left-wing governments. The retrospective covers the period from 1958 to 2025, marked by four sequences: from 1958 to 1980 (balance, the key to the Fifth Republic); from 1981 to 1997 (imbalance, the new norm); from 1997 to 2007 (European collective balance, a fragile safeguard); and since 2007 (balance, crises, imbalance). Each sequence has three phases, which reveal little-known aspects of the historyof the French budget, such as the budgetary slippage following the oilshock, the “turning point of austerity” in 1983, which was austerity in name only; thereasons for the failure of the “Juppé plan” of 1995; the errors in macroeconomicforecasts, particularly in 2025… The study clearly shows that successive governments, regardless of their political leanings, have made – or failed to make – certain decisions that have had long-term detrimental effects on public finances. The drift in expenditure is due in particular to the increase in public expenditure, with the number of employees (estimatedat 5.9 million at the beginning of 2026) in State, local and hospital functionshaving increased by more than 20% over thelast 20 years, compared to 15% for the French population as a whole. The multiplication of social benefits through various channels (in particular that of tax niches), the decentralization of certain State functions to local authorities and France’s contribution to the Community and then European budget have been increasingly difficult to control. France has thus reached the highest rate of compulsory levies (with increasingly declining returns) in the OECD. The authors conclude by stating that the debt has reached a “limit point” and that any recovery will be all the more difficult due to the country’s political instability. Jean Dubertret was an adviser to the Prime Minister, a senior official at the Inspectorate of Finance and an expert at the IMF. Nicolas Ragache is Chief Economist of the AFEPafter having been a ministerial adviser. Jean-Jacques Pluchart
The paradoxical effects of geopolitical conflictson the energy transition
Jean-Jacques Pluchart Is the rise in crude oil by more than 70% over the last six months changing the equation of the global energy transition? The replacement of fossil fuels (oil, gas, coal) by alternative energies (solar, wind, biomass) is in principle governed by their differential prices. The level of $105-110 reached in May 2026 by a barrel of crude oil (Brent) should in principle make most new energy sources competitive, and the risks of shortages caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz should encourage European and Asian countries to promote their domestic energy sources. Despite these incentives, the decision-makers of the companies that consume the most energy still seem hesitant to make the long-term investments needed for each link in the value creation chain of the various energy sources: production, mass transport, distribution, consumption. The stock market prices of the stakeholders in these chains are still undervalued compared to those of the dominant groups in the fossil fuel sectors. The governments of consumer countries are slow to implement massive plans to support the development of alternative energies. There are various explanations for this hesitation. The volatility of crude oil and natural gas prices is due to the uncertainty surrounding the outcomes of the Ukrainian and Iranian conflicts. A significant drop in prices following their settlement would compromise the profitability of projects undertaken in alternative energy sectors. Are investors subject to game theory and its law of minimum regret? In the most indebted countries, such as France, the room for manoeuvre to support energy supply and demand remains limited. The financing of green investments remains hampered by the uncertainty surrounding their long-term profitability, the foreign sources of supply of certain components and their supply infrastructure, as in the case of electric cars and solar panels. For all these reasons, while the latest conflicts are helping to change the strategies of the private and public stakeholders involved in the energy transition, their unpredictable outcomes and the inconsistency of public policies mean that it is not yet possible to see all the effects.
Paul SEABRIGHT, La divine Economie, Eds Markus Haller, 571 pages,2026
In the 21st century, religion is thriving worldwide, despite its apparent decline in certain parts of Europe and America. Throughout history, various religious movements have engaged in fierce competition for wealth and power. In this book, the author argues that religious movements are a particular form of enterprise and, as such, are something quite different: they are communities, sources of inspiration or concern for outside observers, crucibles of ambition and frustration for recruits, or the stage for the fulfilled or dashed hopes of those who invest their lives or fortunes in them. It is the diversity of services offered that has enabled religions to consolidate their power and exercise it. If one were to take the title’s “promise”—which suggests presenting religions as a political economy—at face value, one would be disappointed. But that would be a mistake. While the book is brief on this subject, it is exhaustive in sociological terms, and it serves as an academic review of the history of the development of religions. The aim is not to confirm the concept of “natural religion” dear to René Guénon, but to explain why—apart from any spiritual need, which is not denied but not addressed here—and how religions emerged, developed, and became established; from spiritualist religions to historical and contemporary monotheisms. This book attempts to address certain difficult questions in three categories: What individual needs do these religious movements fulfill? Is religiosity a collection of diverse traits with no common ground? Why has it been said that, on average, women are more religious than men? Why does religion seem to be in decline in some parts of the world and flourishing in others? Next come questions related to their organization. Finally, there are political questions concerning power, its uses, and its abuses. “Religions owe their current form to the competition among these service platforms to attract new members and new resources—a competition that will determine the scope of action for religious movements and their political supporters in the coming century.” The book is structured like an academic text: at the beginning of each section and chapter, there is a summary of what follows. This makes the book easy to read, understand, and remember. Anyone interested in this timely topic—in our uncertain world shaped by the influence of religions—should read this outstanding sociological work! Dominique Chesneau
ABDILLAHY M., Le chercheur en devenir. Voyage méthodique à travers les sciencessociales, Eds l’Harmattan, 2026.
This short booklet, written by a university professor from Senegal, is worth reading for all African students. It provides useful advice to future social science researchers who are going to write a dissertation or a doctoral thesis. As in all textbooks, it defines what scientific research is, how to construct a research question, how to compile a precise literature review, how to choose a suitable field of observation, how to select and apply a robust research methodology, how to present the results – preferably valid and rigorous – of the observations clearly, and then how to discuss them, identifying their theoretical and practical contributions. The author accompanies his lessons with concrete examples and life stories drawn from African issues. Strangely, he makes no reference to the many works devoted to the epistemology of the social sciences. It is written in a precise and concise style, as befits any teaching manual. But this book is more than a methodological guide; it is a message to the young people of Africa who are eager to contribute to the prosperity of their village, their region and their country; it is a warning against facile discourse and improbable ideologies; it is an incentive to acquire useful assets, to exercise critical thinking, to feed the public debate, and to propose solutions rooted in social reality. “The budding researcher, through their rigour, humility and passion, becomes a guardian of freedom”, “a key player in the transformation of their country”. These are lessons that should also be taught on the Old Continent. Mistoihi Abdillahy is a university professor in social sciences and the founding president of ADP Consulting. Jean-Jacques Pluchart
David McWILLIAMS, Argent.- Une histoire de l’humanité , Bérengère Viennot (Traduction) 2026 , Presses de La Cité, 348 pages.
The object of our desires, the driving force behind our ingenuity… What if money were also humanity’s greatest invention? Did you know that the piastre was the predecessor of the dollar? That Hitler and Lenin used currency to manipulate the masses? That *The Wizard of Oz* is actually about the deflation associated with the gold standard? That our financial future lies not in Bitcoin but in phone credit? From the Sumerians’ barley grains to cryptocurrencies, via the revolutionary assignats and the invention of the dollar, David McWilliams traces, with a lively and accessible pen, the history of this invention which—just like the wheel or fire—has shaped human relationships. Far from the dry economic treatises, David McWilliams shows us that money is not merely an instrument of power. It can also lead to cooperation and collective progress. This is not the first book on money in literature or in the Cercle Turgot’s list of reviews. The renewed interest in this type of work lies in the author’s background and his own perception of money. This informs his choice of historical timeline and examples. Admittedly, we begin with Part 1, which is devoted to antiquity and the famous “fortune,” and continue with: money in the Middle Ages, revolutionary money, modern money, and finally, liberated money (who controls money, the psychology of money, the evolution of money, modern monetary theory, and M-Pesa). The book also explores numerous cultures that have contributed to the development of money and the innovations each has brought. The mastery of money coincided with other major advances such as writing, mathematics, law, democracy, and philosophy. This evolution raises a question: was money the cause of these other developments, or did these developments lead to the evolution of money? Which came first, the chicken or the egg? This is the originality of this book, which was named Book of the Year by the Financial Times: it provides food for thought in an attempt to answer that question. David McWilliams is a social commentator, so he has drawn on a wide range of advice and contributions, and expresses opinions—and… errors—that are his own and those of the people cited in the book. The reader’s task is not to identify any potential blunders, but to understand the intellectual journey of the contributors that may have led to “deviations from the consensus of economists specializing in monetary matters.” A book that should be read by anyone curious about ideas and their interpretation: money and currency are personal concepts. It is a common good and an…individual good as well! Dominique Chesneau