By Philippe Alezard With Wiener, modern finance had found a way to give uncertainty a mathematical form. Brownian motion made it possible to conceive of price fluctuations as the cumulative effect of an infinite number of elementary shocks – random, unpredictable, yet nevertheless capable of being placed within a rigorous probabilistic framework. In other words, uncertainty ceased to be a mere market intuition and became a mathematical object. However, this initial breakthrough did not exhaust the issue. For knowing that prices fluctuate according to a stochastic dynamic does not yet tell us how an investor should behave in the face of this instability. Once uncertainty had been described, the next step was to structure how it was used. It is precisely at this point that Harry Markowitz enters the picture. Whereas Wiener provided finance with the probabilistic grammar of uncertainty, Markowitz developed its decision-making logic. His primary concern was no longer the evolution of a price over time, but rather the selection of a portfolio of assets in a world where the future remains irreducibly uncertain. With him, finance crossed a new threshold of formalisation: it no longer contented itself with modelling market movements, but sought to determine how a rational agent should allocate their capital within these movements. The only son of a Chicago grocery store owner couple, Harry Markowitz was born in Chicago on 24 August 1927. At secondary school, his first interests were physics and philosophy [1]. One of the arguments that particularly impressed him was David Hume’s claim that, even if we drop a ball a thousand times and it falls to the ground each time, we have no necessary proof that it will fall the thousand and first time. In 1947, he enrolled at the University of Chicago to study for a Bachelor of Philosophy degree on the OII (‘Observation, Interpretation and Integration’) programme, but by 1950, he was drawn to the economics of uncertainty. At that time, he was interested in the work of von Neumann [2] and Morgenstern on expected utility, as well as that of Milton Friedman and Leonard Savage on the utility function. Having never taken a single finance course and never bought a single share, he was invited to join the renowned Cowles Commission for Research in Economics [3], an institution that has produced twelve Nobel Prize winners in Economics to date, including Markowitz himself. At the time, its director was Tjalling Koopmans [4], who would go on to win the Nobel Prize in 1975 for his work on the theory of the optimal allocation of resources. Among the lecturers who would teach the young Markowitz were, notably, Milton Friedman and Leonard J. Savage [5]. For the record, it is to the latter that we owe the rediscovery of Louis Bachelier’s thesis, which he had Paul Samuelson read. It was also while reading John Burr Williams’ The Theory of Investment Value [6] that Markowitz came up with the idea for his doctoral thesis topic. As he himself recounts in his autobiography, published on the occasion of his Nobel Prize award, ‘Williams proposed that the value of a share should be equal to the present value of its future dividends. Since future dividends are uncertain, I interpreted Williams’ proposition as meaning that a share should be valued on the basis of its expected future dividends. But if the investor were concerned only with the expected values of securities, he or she would be concerned only with the expected value of the portfolio; and, to maximise the expected value of a portfolio, it would be sufficient to invest in a single security. I knew that this was neither how investors behaved nor how they should behave. Investors diversify because they are as concerned about risk as they are about return.” Markowitz’s insight [7], though seemingly simple, is in fact of considerable significance. Prior to him, financial analysis tended to assess investments primarily on an individual basis, based on their promised returns, their soundness or their reputation. Markowitz radically shifted the focus of the problem by demonstrating that, from the investor’s perspective, the relevant unit is not the individual asset, but the portfolio as a whole. In his seminal article, ‘Portfolio Selection’, published in the March 1952 issue of the Journal of Finance, he proposed representing a portfolio not as the simple sum of several securities, but as an overall structure resulting from their combination. This is because what matters is not only the intrinsic quality of each asset, but the combination of their behaviours, since the risk of a portfolio depends not only on the risk inherent in each security, but also on how these securities vary in relation to one another. The financial decision thus ceases to be a simple matter of selecting good securities and becomes a question of portfolio composition. This shift is decisive, as it reveals that risk itself cannot be considered in a purely individual manner. An asset may be highly volatile when considered in isolation, but it can become fully acceptable within a portfolio if, through its relationships with other assets, it helps to stabilise the whole. Conversely, apparently safe securities, if they all react in the same way to the same events, can collectively generate greater fragility than one might imagine. In this way, Markowitz introduces the idea that financial rationality is not a property of individual instruments, but of the way they are combined. This idea is formulated through the distinction between expected return and risk. According to Markowitz, the investor optimises this return–risk pair at the portfolio level, either by seeking the highest return for a given risk or by seeking the lowest risk for a given return. It thus becomes possible to represent the portfolio using utility functions that depend solely on the expected return, i.e., the mathematical expectation, and on a measure of risk, i.e., variance. In Markowitz’s work, variance derives its legitimacy not from its common use in statistics, but from its economic relevance. It is justified by the
Edouard ROBLOT , Vivre sans CO2, Édition Hermann, 2026, 200 pages.
Edouard Roblotdescribes electricity as a natural resource that should continue to be supported, and even developed, given the increasing scarcity of fossil fuels. He outlines the history of electricity since the 1970s, with the development of nuclear power in France, the aim of which was already to move away from fossil fuels and achieve energy independence. The author identifies the various sectors in which the development of electricity presents an opportunity in the years to come, particularly in domestic applications. He then addresses the power supply for electric vehicles, whether private cars or road transport, whose widespread adoption of electric power would require the installation of charging stations at all parking spaces to enable them to be charged. The author also proposes reducing daily travel distances by clustering residential areas, thereby limiting emissions, with the added benefit of revitalising local shops. Another challenge outlined is the need to promote the thermal renovation of buildings, but also, and above all, to eliminate energy-inefficient buildings, by implementing a programEdouard me for new, eco-friendly buildings with the support of the State. This would have the advantage of avoiding certain shortcomings of the current thermal renovation programmes, which involve the preparation of voluminous applications that rarely lead to successful outcomes. Finally, the large-scale deployment of low-cost, low-carbon electricity generated from renewable energy sources is a key issue in securing the future of energy in France, given the ageing nuclear power plants. In this context, the proposal is to focus on new nuclear power, offshore wind energy, solar energy for car parks and buildings, and hydropower. Edouard Roblot emphasises the importance of concentrating on these seven battles to be fought, without spreading oneself too thin and ultimately achieving nothing in an effective and meaningful way, by focusing on the fight against global warming and CO₂ emissions. These are challenges that need to be addressed within a reasonable timeframe. Throughout the book, the technological shifts proposed could lead to a societal change that would support these new developments, as possible future solutions to emerge from the current crisis and envisage a better life. Edouard Roblot is a graduate of the École Polytechnique and the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, specialising in energy transition. His career has focused on the energy sector, where he held the position of Low-Carbon Buildings Director at IDEX. He has worked as a Renewable Energy Project Manager at the Energy Regulatory Commission and as a Foresight Manager for the Total Group. Pona SAMNIK
FACCHINI françois, Quelle fiscalité pour demain ?, décrypter les enjeux des futures réformes, DBS, 2026, 312 pages.
This book deserves the attention of elected officials and election candidates, as well as that of all taxpayers. It traces the history of the taxes, duties and contributions that increasingly affect the French population. While presented as a textbook on comparative taxation, it encompasses an in-depth examination of the theoretical foundations, the triggering events, the positive and negative externalities, and, above all, the possible avenues for reform of the French socio-tax system. The book is structured into five chapters covering taxes on expenditure (VAT), personal income, corporations, inheritance and property wealth. The book is rounded off by two chapters on the full cost of public funds and on the ‘Laffer effect’. The evolution of the CSG (contribution sociale généralisée – general social contribution) illustrates the entire history of French taxation: a contribution that initially had a broad base and a reduced rate has, for electoral reasons, become a complex tax with numerous exemptions. The author analyses the causes of the inefficiency of public services, demonstrating that demand for most public services has more negative effects than demand for equivalent private services, since, in a market, everyone must pay the price of what they consume. He identifies the inactivity traps created by certain taxes. He deconstructs certain claims advanced by the ‘egalitarian economists’, who developed the numerous theories underpinning France’s socio-tax systems. He distinguishes between economic taxes and ideological (or ‘clientelist’) taxes, and observes that the latter are increasingly dominating the former. His analysis of the Laffer curve is original. In principle, the curve, or the theorem, makes it possible to determine the rate at which taxation becomes inefficient, as it is perceived as excessive by the taxpayer and leads to deviant behavior. The author observes that the effects of over-taxation are unpredictable due to the differences between countries in the elasticity of income and/or profits in relation to taxation. The author concludes by arguing that the taxation of the future must be fair and efficient. To achieve this, it is necessary to shift the tax burden as far as possible onto consumption, to introduce a proportional rate of income tax, to set corporate tax at 15%, and to abolish inheritance tax and property wealth tax. Priority should be given to broad-based, low-rate taxes. Taxation must not hinder the functioning of markets, which generate productive jobs and create value. Every citizen must take responsibility for themselves. Taxation is not intended to be redistributive. To achieve this objective, the tax structure must be fundamentally reformed. The main economic handicaps are of fiscal origin. If the French do not abandon their utopian egalitarian ideal, France will come under the control of other nations and the financial markets. François Facchini is professeur in économics at Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne University. Jean-Jacques Pluchart
Cybersecurity in France: Current Situation and Challenges
Nadia Antonin The explosion of data in the digital world, referred to as the concept of big data, poses numerous challenges for contemporary society. Data security is now a major challenge of unprecedented scale in the face of data breaches. ‘For almost two years now, not a week – or even a day – has gone by without us hearing about a new data breach in France,’ says Clément Domingo, a security expert. Recent examples of massive data breaches illustrating France’s digital vulnerability On 18 February 2026, the Ministry of Finance revealed in a press release that, since the end of January 2026, a cybercriminal had been able to access 1.2 million accounts in the National Bank Account Database (FICOBA). The hack is said to have been made possible by the theft of a civil servant’s login credentials, with access lasting approximately one month. The personal data disclosed included ‘bank details (RIB/IBAN), the account holder’s identity, their address and, in some cases, the user’s tax identifier’. What about securing such a sensitive application? Can access to such sensitive databases be based solely possessing a username and a password? According to Clément Domingo, ‘an employee’s password and email address are sufficient, in each case, to hack sensitive data’. According to Etienne Wery, a lawyer practising in Brussels and Paris, ‘In principle, access to such sensitive databases requires strong authentication mechanisms, strict limitation of the rights granted, and detailed tracking of the accesses made. In addition, there are monitoring requirements.” On 27 February 2026, the French Ministry of Health confirmed the enormous scale of a health data breach. The cyberattack targeted 1,500 doctors who use the Cegedim software. Gérôme Billois, a cybersecurity expert at Wavestone, sees this as the result of ‘years of underinvestment in cybersecurity’ in the healthcare sector. Cyberattacks can also have disastrous consequences for businesses (theft of sensitive data, financial losses, damage to reputation, etc.) and, in the worst-case scenario, can lead them to bankruptcy. An overview of cybersecurity in France According to Check Point’s annual report on the threat landscape in France, published in February 2026, France ranks second among the most targeted European countries. With 13% of attacks, it ranks second, behind the United Kingdom (17%). Furthermore, according to data published on 19 February 2026 by the Public Statistics Service for Internal Security, around 17,600 cyberattacks were recorded in France in 2025, an increase of 4% compared to 2024. Why is France being targeted? How can we explain the targeting of French companies or public authorities? According to the aforementioned report, the main hypotheses put forward are: France’s economic clout, its increasing use of digital technologies, and its geopolitical role, particularly within the EU and in its support for Ukraine. The sectors most targeted are the government sector, with 22% of attacks, business services (18%), and retail (15%). The most common forms of attack remain the same, with a marked increase in phishing, which, according to the third cybersecurity barometer by Docaposte and Cyblex Consulting, affects 38% of organisations, ransomware, which remains high at 28%, and data loss or theft, which stands at 17%. Finally, cybercrime comes at a considerable cost. According to Statista, the annual cost of cybercrime in France is estimated at €118 billion in 2024, equivalent to 4% of GDP. In 2023, it reached €93.5 billion, whereas in 2016, it stood at €5.1 billion. The gap between the measures put in place to combat cybercrime and the level of the threat continues to widen, due in particular to underinvestment in cybersecurity, a lack of an overarching strategy, etc. Overall, we are observing a lack of ‘digital hygiene’ within businesses and public administrations, i.e., a set of best practices to protect data and avoid digital pitfalls. A cybersecurity culture should not be optional: it is essential Neglecting security is a serious mistake. It is essential to develop a genuine culture of digital security. In mid-January 2026, the Minister of the Interior, Laurent Nunez, acknowledged before the Senate a ‘lack of digital hygiene’ in connection with the cyberattack on his ministry. Good digital hygiene is not based solely on tools, but also on a culture of cybersecurity. A cybersecurity culture refers to the set of attitudes, behaviours, knowledge and practices adopted by individuals and organisations to protect IT systems, networks and data from cyberattacks and unauthorised access. Developing an effective and sustainable cybersecurity culture requires a number of principles: – Understanding that security is everyone’s responsibility. It is a collective responsibility rather than a matter for experts alone; – Acknowledge that human error remains the primary vulnerability in cybersecurity. 82% of data breaches are linked to human factors; – Provide regular training for employees; – Integrating cybersecurity into all projects from the design stage (security by design); – Implement cyberattack simulations that enable the proactive identification and remediation of security vulnerabilities, before they can be exploited by real criminals. Organisations such as the French National Agency for the Security of Information Systems (ANSSI) and the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) emphasise the importance of this cultural approach. In short, cybersecurity is a collective mindset, a daily discipline and a cornerstone of modern governance. Not investing in a cybersecurity culture means accepting major risks.
Ernest MENYOMO, Anselme Armand AMOUGOU AFOUBOU (dir), Rationalités africaines, révolution numérique et devenir de l’humain , l’Harmattan, 2026, 347 pages.
This collective work seeks to define African rationality (or, more accurately, African rationalities) by combining philosophical, historical, semiological and sociological analyses. The authors seek to move away from the Western approach to rationality inherited from the thought of Descartes and Kant. African rationality is based on a vision of Africans seeking to free themselves from natural and historical determinisms, and from Cartesian, Kantian and Comtean logics, as well as from existentialist and spiritualist logics. The authors’ ambitious goal is to develop a new African hermeneutic. They undertake a ‘decolonisation of African knowledge’, adopting an original methodology based on an analysis of the logics applied to African languages by the developers of digital algorithms. The languages of AI algorithms are striving to translate the many dialects and languages of African countries. They represent a lever that is both unifying for the peoples of Africa and promising for Africa’s youth. The authors of the book describe this process as ‘digital humanism’, as it influences the relationship of Africans not only with the Western world but also with the Global South. Although digitalised, the ‘New African Thought’ nevertheless retains its originality. The ‘Afrocentric’ and ‘Eurocentric’ approaches are based on original representations of homo africanus and homo economicus. Inspired by Kwame Nkrumah, the authors draw notably on the ideas of Edgar Morin and Bruno Latour, according to whom rationality is neither ‘absolute’ nor ‘limited’, but rather ‘expanded’, ‘plural’ and ‘contextual’. It is shaped by empirical and experimental processes, amplified by social media, AI models and new technologies. The way of thinking of Homo africanus – particularly in the management of organisations – may incorporate practices related to the paranormal, telepathy, metamorphosis or divination, based on beliefs that only partially conform to conventional scientific criteria. ‘To think differently does not mean to think against reason, but to think using other forms of reason.’ This heterodox approach to science is justified by the fact that science does not progress in a continuous manner, but rather experiences a random series of ‘derationalising’ revolutions based on inspirations, flashes of insight or hallucinations. The boundary between the rational and the irrational, the scientific and the non-scientific, thus continues to shift. Science is made up of narratives whose rationality evolves over time and across space. A demanding reading of the book therefore invites us to reflect on cultural otherness. The authors, who are lecturer-researchers at African universities. Jean-Jacques Pluchart
CHIRAT, A., IVALDI, G., SARTRE, E., L’économie politique du populisme, La découverte, 2026, 127 pages.
This short book has the merit of presenting the numerous scholarly works devoted to the themes and practices related to populist economics and cultures around the world. The authors outline the numerous ideological, discursive, socio-cultural and economic definitions and approaches to populism. They review the histories and analyze the agendas of the three main currents: the left (LFI in France), the right (RN) and the center (the ‘Gilets Jaunes’). The first group bases its program on a critique of neoliberalism, a fight against inequality, and a form of communitarianism. The second focuses its actions on an identity-based withdrawal and on sovereignty. The third group criticizes the elites and the tax system. In particular, the authors present the work of Downs, who argues that populism is based on ‘rational ignorance and irrationality’, as populist agendas rely on reasoning that is both superficial and biased. They seek a ‘minimal democratic consensus’. Overall, populist economists seek to demonstrate that technological progress favours capital and destroys labour, and that deindustrialization – a factor in unemployment and inequality – results from insufficient control of imports (which do not comply with national and international standards). Socio-cultural research attributes the rise of right-wing populism to fears of the decline of traditional or religious values and, above all, of social decline. The authors also highlight the partisan role played by certain media outlets and social networks. Both right- and left-wing movements are engaging in ‘platform populism’ through the use of AI. In a final section, the authors present a map of populist movements in the Americas (North and South) and Europe (West and East), categorized according to their more or less non-aligned ideologies. They analyze the findings of key scientific studies (including those by Nobel Prize-winning economists), demonstrating that all radical populist agendas have failed and have led to a decline of at least 10% in the GDP of the country under populist rule over a 10-year period. The authors consider whether ‘illiberal democracies’ are viable in the long term. Alexandre Chirat is a lecturer and researcher at the University of Besançon. Gilles Ivaldi is a researcher at the CNRS, and Emilie Sartre is a lecturer at the University of Nottingham. Jean-Jacques Pluchart
Hippolyte D’Albis, Économie des âges de la vie, Eds Odile Jacob, 296 pages.
The idea of a generational conflict has now become a recurring framework through which public debate in France is interpreted. Baby boomers, born in the immediate post-war period and now largely retired, are often portrayed as the beneficiaries of a system whose advantages they are said to have appropriated at the expense of subsequent generations, whose future prospects and retirement security have thereby been undermined. Should this indictment be regarded as an objective reality, or rather as the product of a contemporary myth sustained by clichés? Hippolyte d’Albis invites us to move beyond such oversimplified representations by drawing on the economics of age, now established as an autonomous field of economic analysis, grounded in the use of statistical data and national transfer accounts. The value of this method lies in its ability to capture all the flows that contribute to individuals’ well-being throughout the course of life, whether these derive from the family, the market, or the state. In this respect, it departs from traditional approaches based on rigid administrative age categories—children, working-age adults, retirees—in order to privilege a functional reading of life trajectories. What matters is no longer belonging to a given age category, but rather the actual capacity of individuals to generate sufficient income to cover their current consumption, or conversely, the extent to which they find themselves in a situation of deficit or surplus. Such an approach makes it possible to better understand how generations are articulated with one another within the broader framework of collective production and redistribution. Since national transfer accounts have been available since 1979, it is possible to observe over the long term the transformations of these equilibria. Two major lessons emerge from this analysis. The first concerns the evolution of the economic life cycle. Contrary to what one might expect, the age at which individuals enter the surplus phase has not been postponed. It remains fixed at 24, despite the lengthening of higher education. This apparently paradoxical result can be explained by the low incomes earned at the beginning of careers in the 1980s, which at the time delayed full economic autonomy. By contrast, the age at which individuals enter the second deficit phase has shifted markedly upward, rising from 58 in 1980 to 60 today, a change explained primarily by the increase in senior employment rates. Far from freezing generational positions, the analysis thus highlights the plasticity of economic ages. The second lesson concerns the structure of well-being transfers. Since the late 1970s, the state has remained the principal provider of resources, with a relatively stable share of around 70 percent. At the same time, the role of the family has declined considerably, its contribution having been cut in half, while that of the market has tripled. This reconfiguration has not, however, taken place uniformly across age groups. The role of the state has strengthened in favor of the young, partly offsetting the erosion of family support, while it has diminished for older people, among whom market-based resources—especially those derived from assets and wealth—have come to occupy a growing place. Such an evolution directly contradicts the idea that baby boomers systematically benefit from more favorable treatment than younger generations. In reality, solidarity mechanisms benefit the young first and foremost, through spending on education, training, and labor-market integration. Older generations rely more heavily on capital income than on increased public support. The real source of tension therefore lies less in any supposed intergenerational appropriation of collective resources than in the effects of a particular demographic structure: the numerical weight of the baby-boom cohorts places specific pressure on the balance of the social protection system. But can one reasonably blame a generation for being numerous ? Still, this clarification does not settle the normative question. For while it would be absurd to hold a generation responsible for its own demographic weight, it does not follow that current generations should bear alone the cost of the resulting imbalance. The demographic argument cannot suffice to justify an unequal distribution of effort. This is why some rebalancing appears inevitable—not in order to condemn past generations, but to restore a measure of justice between those that succeed one another. Hippolyte d’Albis, Professor at ESSEC and Vice-President of the Cercle des économistes. Ph Alezard
Clément Carbonnier, Nathalie Morel, Bruno Palier, Michaël Zemmour (dir.), Les politiques publiques par la défiscalisation, Presses de Sciences Po, 2024, 333 pages.
In Public Policies through Tax Expenditures, the authors analyse a phenomenon that has become central to French public action: the growing use of taxation as a tool to steer economic and social behaviour. The book focuses on tax expenditures — often referred to as “tax loopholes” — and assesses their rationale, cost and effectiveness. The main argument is clear: tax incentives are a form of public policy in their own right. Even when they do not appear as visible budgetary spending, they mobilise collective resources and shape the decisions of households and firms. Over time, this instrument has expanded into many areas, including employment, health, family policy, long-term care, research and development, housing, and philanthropy. The authors show that this trend follows a strong political logic. Tax measures are easier to introduce than direct spending programmes and often appear less costly, since they take the form of foregone revenue rather than explicit expenditure. Yet their multiplication makes the system more complex and increasingly difficult to manage. A recurring finding of the book is that the effectiveness of these measures is uneven. In several cases, evaluations highlight windfall effects or benefits concentrated among higher-income households. Family policies, certain long-term care measures and housing-related tax incentives illustrate the gap that can emerge between stated objectives and actual outcomes. Once implemented, these mechanisms also become difficult to reverse, which encourages their accumulation over time. Employment policy provides a particularly telling example. France has relied heavily on tax and social contribution reductions to lower labour costs. While these measures have produced some positive effects, their overall cost raises questions about their real efficiency and about the opportunity cost compared with direct investment or training policies. The chapter on research and development points to another limitation: despite significant tax incentives, innovation performance remains below that of several comparable economies. Here again, the authors highlight issues of targeting and uneven effectiveness across programmes. The analysis of housing and philanthropy extends this diagnosis. Tax incentives can contribute to inflationary effects or indirectly steer public resources towards the preferences of wealthier taxpayers. The debate therefore goes beyond financial cost and raises broader questions about governance and policy coherence. The book does not reject tax incentives as a whole. Instead, it reminds readers that a tax advantage remains a form of public spending and should be assessed accordingly. As governments increasingly rely on taxation to implement policy, the risk is that public action becomes less transparent and harder to control. The book ultimately raises a simple question: when is fiscal incentive the right tool, and when should governments rely on direct, clearly debated public spending? Clément Carbonnier is an economist (Paris 1, CES, LIEPP),Nathalie Morel is a political scientist (Sciences Po-CEE, LIEPP),Bruno Palier is a political scientist (CNRS, Sciences Po-CEE, LIEPP),Michaël Zemmour is an economist (Lyon 2, Triangle, LIEPP). Benoit FRAYER
2026: The Year of Adam Smith
Jean-Jacques Pluchart In a collective work entitled ‘Nouvelles réflexions sur la richesse des Nations. Les leçons de Turgot et de Smith’ (‘New Reflections on the Wealth of Nations. The Lessons of Turgot and Smith’), published in 2025, the Club Turgot examined the legacy of Adam Smith’s ideas in recent works on political economy written in French. Les leçons de Turgot et de Smith’, published in 2025, the Club Turgot examined the legacy of Adam Smith’s ideas in recent French-language books on political economy. The Turgot Club’s conclusion was that the ideas put forward in Smith’s seminal work, published in 1776 and entitled ‘An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations’, were still relevant today. In 1776, England and France were in transition from an agricultural society to a pre-industrial world. These countries were entering an era of institutional, economic and social transformation. At that time, Smith observed that the drivers of prosperity did not stem primarily from land, gold or the state, but rather from the organization of labour. He argued that, through the division of labour, the manufacture of goods became more efficient. He cites the well-known example of a worker who, on his own, could only make a few pins a day, whereas a production line organized according to the division of labour could make thousands. This pioneering vision remains relevant in most industries today. Today, global supply chains, made up of digital platforms and specialized companies, operate on the same principle. Furthermore, the specialization of suppliers and subcontractors fosters technical and organizational innovation. The ‘invisible hand of the market’ ensures coordination between producers and consumers, who, while pursuing their own particular interests, contribute to the public interest through competition and the dual interplay of supply and demand. Today, this market mechanism is even more efficient thanks to Artificial Intelligence and new information and communication technologies. However, Adam Smith opposes uncontrolled market freedom. He entrusted the state with the roles of regulating competition, guaranteeing the right of co-ownership, punishing price manipulation, and defending the domestic market against external threats. In particular, he opposed the formation of monopolies, the granting of subsidies or the setting of excessively protectionist customs tariffs, believing that these measures hindered the free market. He also tasks the state with promoting trade through appropriate infrastructure, in line with the state’s current initiatives to develop digital networks, electricity infrastructure and research activities. Smith therefore opposes mercantilism, which regulates the market through customs duties and interventions that run counter to the international division of labour and harm a country’s prosperity. 250 years after its publication, ‘The Wealth of Nations’ remains much more than a historical document; it is neither an ideology nor a scientific theory; it is a rational principle and an intellectual logic that lie at the heart of today’s and tomorrow’s political and social debates.
How can we attract more women to higher education courses in science and technology?
Jean-Jacques Pluchart Since its creation in 1987, the Turgot Club has observed a recurring statistical imbalance between male and female authors in the publication of French-language economic and financial works. Is this inequality attributable to the French educational guidance process or to other factors of a more sociological nature? A recent survey by the Chair for Women’s Employment and Entrepreneurship (Sciences Po Paris) on gender diversity in ‘science and technology’ courses – and in economics in particular – sought to answer this question. The results of this survey were published by the Well-Being Observatory of the Centre for Economic Research and its Applications (Cepremap). The survey complements the latest government initiatives to promote gender diversity in all higher education programmes. It follows on from the ‘Filles et maths’ (‘Girls and Maths’) action plan, launched by the Ministry of National Education, Higher Education and Research in May 2025. This plan aims to support growth in high-potential sectors while reducing inequalities, particularly in terms of pay. The survey was conducted among a sample of 1,400 final-year pupils applying to enrol in public or private higher education via the Parcoursup platform in 2025. The results clearly show that girls are less likely than boys to choose science-related courses: boys account for around 70% of applications for science and technology courses (including economics), while girls account for 75% of applications for courses in health, humanities and social sciences, literature, languages and the arts. More male students than female students reported that they only liked science subjects at secondary school (29% of male students compared to 14% of female students). These disparities can be explained by multiple factors – such as gender stereotypes, early rejection of mathematics, the attractiveness of better-paid jobs for men, or the pursuit of more diversified educational pathways for women – but these factors alone are not sufficient to account for such disparities. The survey reveals that the majority of women prefer to forgo well-paid careers in order to pursue their interests in health, social or cultural fields. These preferences on the part of girls are reportedly encouraged by their parents during their secondary education, whereas parents are said to encourage boys more to pursue courses that will ultimately be more lucrative. Paradoxically, the lack of parental guidance on girls’ choices may explain why they are more likely to follow their passions and why they subsequently find themselves more constrained in the labour market. So, how can we attract women to science and technology? The authors of the study argue in favour of greater diversification of these courses and more interactive teaching methods in order to foster greater enthusiasm among pupils, particularly girls. Highlighting the contributions of these sciences and technologies to the success of the ongoing and future digital, energy, environmental and social transitions would be one of the drivers for achieving greater gender diversity in science education.