Europe, probably the greatest political and human enterprise of modern times, was built upon the reconciliation between France and Germany, as well as the definitive rejection of the use of force between these two nations. This project, born in the minds and voices of former deportees as early as the autumn of 1945, was the prelude to the creation of the Common Market and later the European Union, which grew from six to twenty-seven member states within a few decades. However, Europe poorly understands the ontological blind spot that weakens it: it protects us from our own demons, but it does not protect us from external aggression. This objective was never truly political, nor even part of its identity, and the protection provided by the American umbrella after the Second World War long distanced us from any ambition of strategic autonomy. By politically and institutionally delegating its defense to NATO, and therefore to the United States, Europe contributed to the formation of the American empire: a protective empire that now seems, in some respects, to be joining the club of predators. China, Russia, and the United States now speak about Europe in remarkably similar terms, marked by strategic contempt. For Donald Trump, Europe belongs to the past: it is a civilization in decline. For Vladimir Putin, we are a soft planet made up of weak and “woke” societies. For Xi Jinping, we are democracies in irreversible decline. Paradoxically, this convergence among predatory powers could open the door for Europe’s affirmation. By neglecting the transatlantic alliance, the United States is giving Europe the opportunity to seize its strategic autonomy. By invading Ukraine, Russia is forcing the Old Continent to urgently rethink its rearmament and security. Finally, through its commercial predation, China is compelling Europe to rebuild its weakened competitiveness and relearn the logic of power. Europe must understand that power relations are not negotiated solely through law or trade. Greenland recently provided a demonstration of this reality, illustrating the brutality of a world in which great powers no longer hesitate to impose their interests. For Europe is far less weak than it believes itself to be. The demographic decline that causes so much concern is in fact a global phenomenon. In the same way, Europe’s dependence on Asia should not be mistaken for inevitability. Europe remains wealthy, possesses a powerful market, and retains significant productive capacity. Its weaknesses are known and widely described. The real difficulty lies less in identifying them than in acting upon them. Facing these three predatory empires, the technocratic and regulatory empire that Europe has become will have to reinvent itself. It must regain speed of execution, agility in the fields of security, technology, and energy. It must also relearn how to engage with the countries of the Global South, without remaining trapped by a colonial guilt linked to a history that is centuries old, sometimes dating back several hundred years. Ultimately, Europe must stop internalizing its supposed weakness and servility. To achieve this, it must learn the brutality of the world without renouncing its principles. Clearly asserting its interests, making them understood, and ensuring they are respected with determination has now become essential. Ph Alezard

Reading the book will be particularly useful for future candidates in the 2027 elections, as thedrift in French public debt has reached such a level that its merestabilisation requires increasingly technical and radical reforms. The authors clearly show that the slippages in public spending and compulsory levies result from political compromises or non-decisions on the part of both right- and left-wing governments. The retrospective covers the period from 1958 to 2025, marked by four sequences: from 1958 to 1980 (balance, the key to the Fifth Republic); from 1981 to 1997 (imbalance, the new norm); from 1997 to 2007 (European collective balance, a fragile safeguard); and since 2007 (balance, crises, imbalance). Each sequence has three phases, which reveal little-known aspects of the historyof the French budget, such as the budgetary slippage following the oilshock, the “turning point of austerity” in 1983, which was austerity in name only; thereasons for the failure of the “Juppé plan” of 1995; the errors in macroeconomicforecasts, particularly in 2025…    The study clearly shows that successive governments, regardless of their political leanings, have made – or failed to make – certain decisions that have had long-term detrimental effects on public finances. The drift in expenditure is  due in particular to the increase in public expenditure, with the number of employees (estimatedat 5.9 million at the beginning of 2026) in State, local and hospital functionshaving increased by more than 20% over thelast 20 years,  compared to 15% for the French population as a whole.  The multiplication of social benefits through various channels (in particular that of tax niches), the decentralization of certain State functions to local authorities and France’s contribution to the Community and then European budget have been increasingly difficult to control. France has thus reached the highest rate of compulsory levies (with increasingly declining returns) in the OECD. The authors conclude by stating that the debt has reached a “limit point” and that any recovery will be all the more difficult due to the country’s political instability.  Jean Dubertret was an adviser to the Prime Minister, a senior official at the Inspectorate of Finance and an expert at the IMF. Nicolas Ragache is Chief Economist of the AFEPafter having been a ministerial adviser. Jean-Jacques Pluchart

In the 21st century, religion is thriving worldwide, despite its apparent decline in certain parts of Europe and America. Throughout history, various religious movements have engaged in fierce competition for wealth and power. In this book, the author argues that religious movements are a particular form of enterprise and, as such, are something quite different: they are communities, sources of inspiration or concern for outside observers, crucibles of ambition and frustration for recruits, or the stage for the fulfilled or dashed hopes of those who invest their lives or fortunes in them. It is the diversity of services offered that has enabled religions to consolidate their power and exercise it. If one were to take the title’s “promise”—which suggests presenting religions as a political economy—at face value, one would be disappointed. But that would be a mistake. While the book is brief on this subject, it is exhaustive in sociological terms, and it serves as an academic review of the history of the development of religions. The aim is not to confirm the concept of “natural religion” dear to René Guénon, but to explain why—apart from any spiritual need, which is not denied but not addressed here—and how religions emerged, developed, and became established; from spiritualist religions to historical and contemporary monotheisms. This book attempts to address certain difficult questions in three categories: What individual needs do these religious movements fulfill? Is religiosity a collection of diverse traits with no common ground? Why has it been said that, on average, women are more religious than men? Why does religion seem to be in decline in some parts of the world and flourishing in others? Next come questions related to their organization. Finally, there are political questions concerning power, its uses, and its abuses. “Religions owe their current form to the competition among these service platforms to attract new members and new resources—a competition that will determine the scope of action for religious movements and their political supporters in the coming century.” The book is structured like an academic text: at the beginning of each section and chapter, there is a summary of what follows. This makes the book easy to read, understand, and remember. Anyone interested in this timely topic—in our uncertain world shaped by the influence of religions—should read this outstanding sociological work! Dominique Chesneau

This short booklet, written by a university professor from Senegal, is worth reading for all African students. It provides useful advice to future social science researchers who are going to write a dissertation or a doctoral thesis. As in all textbooks, it defines what scientific research is, how to construct a research question, how to compile a precise literature review, how to choose a suitable field of observation, how to select and apply a robust research methodology, how to present the results – preferably valid and rigorous – of the observations clearly, and then how to discuss them, identifying their theoretical and practical contributions. The author accompanies his lessons with concrete examples and life stories drawn from African issues. Strangely, he makes no reference to the many works devoted to the epistemology of the social sciences. It is written in a precise and concise style, as befits any teaching manual. But this book is more than a methodological guide; it is a message to the young people of Africa who are eager to contribute to the prosperity of their village, their region and their country; it is a warning against facile discourse and improbable ideologies; it is an incentive to acquire useful assets, to exercise critical thinking, to feed the public debate, and to propose solutions rooted in social reality. “The budding researcher, through their rigour, humility and passion, becomes a guardian of freedom”, “a key player in the transformation of their country”. These are lessons that should also be taught on the Old Continent. Mistoihi Abdillahy is a university professor in social sciences and the founding president of ADP Consulting. Jean-Jacques Pluchart

The object of our desires, the driving force behind our ingenuity… What if money were also humanity’s greatest invention? Did you know that the piastre was the predecessor of the dollar? That Hitler and Lenin used currency to manipulate the masses? That *The Wizard of Oz* is actually about the deflation associated with the gold standard? That our financial future lies not in Bitcoin but in phone credit? From the Sumerians’ barley grains to cryptocurrencies, via the revolutionary assignats and the invention of the dollar, David McWilliams traces, with a lively and accessible pen, the history of this invention which—just like the wheel or fire—has shaped human relationships. Far from the dry economic treatises, David McWilliams shows us that money is not merely an instrument of power. It can also lead to cooperation and collective progress. This is not the first book on money in literature or in the Cercle Turgot’s list of reviews. The renewed interest in this type of work lies in the author’s background and his own perception of money. This informs his choice of historical timeline and examples. Admittedly, we begin with Part 1, which is devoted to antiquity and the famous “fortune,” and continue with: money in the Middle Ages, revolutionary money, modern money, and finally, liberated money (who controls money, the psychology of money, the evolution of money, modern monetary theory, and M-Pesa). The book also explores numerous cultures that have contributed to the development of money and the innovations each has brought. The mastery of money coincided with other major advances such as writing, mathematics, law, democracy, and philosophy. This evolution raises a question: was money the cause of these other developments, or did these developments lead to the evolution of money? Which came first, the chicken or the egg? This is the originality of this book, which was named Book of the Year by the Financial Times: it provides food for thought in an attempt to answer that question. David McWilliams is a social commentator, so he has drawn on a wide range of advice and contributions, and expresses opinions—and… errors—that are his own and those of the people cited in the book. The reader’s task is not to identify any potential blunders, but to understand the intellectual journey of the contributors that may have led to “deviations from the consensus of economists specializing in monetary matters.” A book that should be read by anyone curious about ideas and their interpretation: money and currency are personal concepts. It is a common good and an…individual good as well! Dominique Chesneau

The former deputy chief of staff to Pierre Mauroy, from 1981 to 1983, paints a polemical portrait of the economic, social, political and trade-union situation of our country. Democracy is weakened, society is fractured, the economy is in decline, public finances are heavily in deficit, and the political and trade-union world continues to demonstrate its inability to meet these challenges. The vertical concentration of power at every level, the refusal of dualism, the denial of reality, economic illiteracy, compounded by the intellectual fraud of a few, have pushed France into such disorder that democracy itself is threatened with disappearance. France is not capable, on its own, of forming a cohesive society. Post-revolutionary historical facts remind us of this: from the Terror to the Third Republic, which established itself after militarily defeating the Commune, France has reformed itself through riots and bloodshed. The various social forces and numerous political parties seek only to gain access to this supreme vertical power. Each therefore defends its own positions in its own interest, without concern for the common good. For the author, the current situation is not without resemblance to that of the July Monarchy. The crisis threatening us is at once economic, financial and political. Both the deficit and the debt are out of control, and our productive apparatus suffers from a lack of competitiveness. Employers’ organisations and trade unions remain entrenched in their positions, while, on the political side, the left, still profoundly anti-capitalist, remains trapped in the myth of the ultra-rich who should be taxed ever more heavily, and the right indulges in illusions, believing that it would be enough to reduce public spending without touching social expenditure. Meanwhile, extremists on both the left and the right, whose programmes have not the slightest capacity to restore the country’s economy, hold out promises of change and social upheaval in order to attract those at the bottom of the social ladder. And yet solutions do exist to address each of these problems. They are known and documented. But who, on the left or on the right, is prepared to state and explain what should be implemented? Solutions are born of drama: this is a very French habit. So must we first plunge into chaos — this being the most likely scenario according to the author — in order to see, once again, the emergence of a providential man or woman capable of solving the fundamental problems and finally changing our methods of governance ? Ph Alezard

The aim of the book is to ‘revisit the work of a great French economist, little known in his own country but recognised abroad, for example in the United States, in the light of the current situation in 21st-century France’. The economist Florin Aftalion said of him: ‘Bastiat’s understanding of the workings of the state was so keen that he predicted the introduction of social security and that it would run into deficit even before it existed.’ In his book, Michel Albouy clearly demonstrates the continuing relevance of Bastiat’s ideas more than 150 years later. Bastiat believes that ‘the defence of the market and of competition appears to be one of the most enlightening issues for our era of resurgent socialism and interventionism’. He asks ‘why we pay such high taxes’, why the national education system struggles so much to properly educate young French people, why a war does not create jobs… By posing these questions, Bastiat proves to be a ‘visionary’. In his view, ‘the market and free trade are the foundations of national prosperity’, protectionism is recessionary, and price freezes create shortages. Bastiat criticises the inconsistency of citizens who approve of subsidies for businesses but criticise tax increases. At the heart of Bastiat’s thinking is also private property, which he considers a natural right predating the law, constituting ‘a bulwark against the arbitrariness of the State’ and a factor of freedom. He is a staunch advocate of the market economy, which makes it possible to ‘meet the real needs of ordinary people’, because it is ‘the most modest people, the poorest populations, who benefit from competition’. Using a bibliography of Frédéric Bastiat’s works as a starting point, Michel Albouy sets out his own understanding of the social role of economists, which he believes is to explain the consequences of economic policies and to inform public decision-making. This is precisely what Frédéric Bastiat did through his books and colums. Michel Albouy is Professor Emeritus of Finance. In particular, he observed that ‘it is the shareholder who finances their own dividend’ or that, in the event of a takeover bid, people criticise the resulting redundancies, forgetting that ‘the company in question was poorly managed and/or that the merger would make it possible to save what could still be saved’. Jean Jacques Pluchart

The author opens his essay with a stark observation. After the Trente Glorieuses, a period during which Europe and France recorded growth rates of around 5 to 6% per year, enabling them to regain a level of GDP per capita almost comparable to that of the United States, a profound divergence gradually set in from the mid-1980s onward. This divergence has become so pronounced that France, like most European countries, now finds itself, in terms of GDP per capita, in a situation that is not unlike that of the post-war years. According to the author, the root cause of this decline lies in the accumulation of delays in achieving economic sustainability, but also in our inability to redirect the productive system toward innovation. The economic and social model shaped over the past four decades has allowed neither companies truly to take risks nor disruptive innovation to be financed effectively. Europe has thus become a space constrained by an entanglement of administrative, bureaucratic and regulatory norms. Each of these norms, in the social, financial, economic, industrial or environmental spheres, admittedly stems from legitimate preferences; yet their accumulation, as much as their interlocking nature, has generated such complexity that it now hampers the development of European businesses. This evolution has resulted in a decline in productivity at the very moment when productivity was being driven first in the United States by the spread of new technologies — personal computers, microprocessors, digital services and artificial intelligence — and then, over the past two decades, by China. Europe now finds itself in a position of heavy dependence on American digital services. The deficit associated with these services is estimated at more than €150 billion per year. Beyond this trade imbalance, such dependence above all reveals the inadequacy of a technological and industrial ecosystem capable of processing, hosting and enhancing strategic data. This weakness directly undermines Europe’s ability to develop high-performing, autonomous and competitive artificial intelligence models. The situation appears all the more worrying as power relations with Donald Trump’s United States and with China are hardening, while this transformation is unfolding in a particularly strained budgetary context for France. And yet, this context could also represent a historic opportunity for the Old Continent. It could compel Europe to reconnect with a genuine industrial ambition. For that to happen, Europe would need to be given a true driver of innovation, to stop artificially designating champions that capture funding, and to allow competition, experimentation and risk-taking to play a greater role in distributing the chances of success. It is equally necessary to stem the hemorrhage of talent, ideas and capital, and to put an end to the fragmentation of markets and career paths by offering more attractive careers, more flexible and dynamic environments, and better-adapted, more rewarding savings products. Artificial intelligence is undoubtedly still in its infancy; Europe could therefore reshuffle the deck by moving toward a more frugal model, compatible with climate objectives, and capable of establishing itself as a desirable benchmark. Economic history shows that setbacks are never irreversible. But such a recovery requires us to accept uncomfortable truths, finally to build a genuine capital markets union, to reject fragmentation and all that it entails, and to break both with the easy recourse to deficits and with the fear of change. For our social model can only be preserved over the long term at the cost of renewed economic efficiency. Ph Alezard

In his essay, France’s social debt (1974-2024), Nicolas Dufourcq performs far more than a mere fiscal autopsy; he conducts an ontological deconstruction of the French welfare state. As the head of BPI France, the country’s public investment bank, Mr Dufourcq exposes what he terms a “family secret”: that two-thirds of France’s sovereign debt, some €2 trillion, has morphed into a colossal “consumer credit” facility, used to bankroll daily benefits rather than to invest in the nation’s future. The diagnosis is as clinical as it is compelling. Mr Dufourcq identifies 1974 as the year of the fall, when France inaugurated its first “whatever it takes” policy, shifting from a contributory insurance model to a permanent infusion of debt-funded assistance. Invoking Clément Rosset’s philosophy of “the real and its double,” the author lambasts a collective denial that ignores the “longevity revolution” and its impact on a sclerotic economy. While the “social horse” gallops ahead, fueled by the “white powder” of debt, the “economic horse” is left gasping for air. To break this cycle, he proposes an “Iron Rule”: a constitutional mandate for strictly balanced social accounts. The work is meticulously documented, drawing on testimonies from fifty members of the political and administrative elite. Yet, despite being dedicated to the nation’s entrepreneurs, they are conspicuously absent from the interviews. Here lies the work’s tragic paradox, and perhaps that of France itself: by giving voice solely to the mandarins of the state, the analysis remains partially confined within the circle of those who managed, justified, or presided over the very imbalances it decries. When former minister Marisol Touraine “vigorously contests that deficits stem from runaway social spending”, the reader perceives the extent to which the chronicle of failure is still being written by its own protagonists. The original sin of the system has been the progressive decoupling of social rights from the requirement of production. This is the hamartia of a system that, by substituting social entitlements for wealth creation, has condemned its pact of solidarity to become little more than a pious wish, broken by the unforgiving arithmetic of economy and demographics. Recalling Virgil’s labor improbus omnia vincit, Mr Dufourcq reminds us that one does not reform a country by fighting against reality. The ultimate lesson is clear: the social Republic will be saved neither by incantations nor denial, but by rehabilitating wealth creation as the prerequisite for solidarity. France must now decide if it is ready for the discipline of the real. A lifetime civil servant and graduate of HEC Paris and Sciences Po, Nicolas Dufourcq is a former official of the Inspection générale des finances and has served as Chief Executive Officer of Bpifrance since its inception in 2013. Yoann Lopez

The multitude  of  regional  conflicts  raging across our planet  (Ukraine,  Iran, Palestine, the Middle  East, the Asia-Pacific region, among others)  is fuelling growing    fears about the  risks  of  globalisation ultimately leading to    the outbreak of a  third world  war. A ‘non-zero’ risk, as experts would say!  However, it  would be too hasty to forget  that the supreme art  of war,  as advocated by   Sun  Tzu, is  to subdue the enemy  without  combat.  The importance of strategy and cunning, of subtle tactics to neutralise the adversary    without engagement, therefore remains the true victory: the ability to neutralise the enemy’s actions without resorting to brute force.   In  this new publication, Jean-Luc Buchalet, a renowned expert, lecturer  and author of numerous books on economics (winner of the Turgot Special Prize in 2013), draws on  his in-depth knowledge  of  Chinese history  and culture  to  convey a form of subliminal message through a work of fiction with clear family ties. As the pages unfold  , a  highly  complex Chinese reality emerges, intertwined with  that of contrasting personalities    and  great leaders – profoundly human figures, most often  dark and manipulative,  from Mao to Xi.  Through the intersecting perspectives, the history    and the  testimonies of the extraordinary characters  in this novel,  some of whom are members    of the author’s own family  (his own father-in-law, a veterinarian  who was in charge  of a  region and was imprisoned, and  whose wife, a  soldier and Red Guard, saved his life), we also discover    the harsh reality of China’s modern history. Under  Xi, digitalisation ‘has  become a tool of mass control, extending the authoritarian legacy  of the Cultural Revolution’. China’s growing rivalry with the United States raises the spectre of a major conflict, particularly   over Taiwan… But the worst is never  over… at least,  we can hope so!  The plot of  this remarkable novel combines historical  narrative and suspense, offering an intimate immersion into the ‘Chinese soul’. The author’s excellent writing skills play a significant role in this. This is also one of his  great strengths  , which readers will particularly appreciate. Jean-Luc Buchalet: agricultural engineer and economist – lecturer at the Sorbonne and at IAE Paris, speaker, columnist, author of numerous books and leading specialist on China  Jean-Luc  CHAMBON