The book deals with a topical issue due to the questioning of development aid initiated by the United States and the reorientation of the French policy of cooperation and development aid. The author has mainly tried to objectively analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the development aid policy.
The author declines this problem in its multiple dimensions, historical, economic, cultural, geopolitical, and philosophical. It shows in particular that it responds to the principles of “donation -against donation” theorized by Marcel Mauss.
Development aid for developing and emerging countries covers various actions that meet the 3D principles (Diplomacy, Defense, Development). It comes in the form of donations, loans to states and companies in the countries that issue and benefit from industrial projects, infrastructure and services, including health and cultural services, teaching and research missions (especially related to the Francophonie), but also the protection of nationals, the reception of migrants, military interventions, etc.
France’s policy has evolved a lot since 1945, depending on diplomatic relations with the countries of the French Community and then with all the countries of the global South. It was first devoted to the establishment of institutions (on the French model), basic industrial equipment (accompanied by “national champions”) and infrastructure in the former colonies, then gradually oriented towards multilateral projects in favor of emerging economies, including China, Turkey, Brazil, etc. The share of donations has been reduced in favor of subsidized loans that now cover more than 80% of aid. The “Françafrique” system set up by Jacques Foccart, under the presidencies of General de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou, has been replaced by various forms of cooperation and partnership: “aid-sanction”, “aid-blackmail”, but above all, “aid-compensation”, with counterparts in the form of access to natural and/or food resources, but also votes in the UN and the WTO. France, like most other industrial states, has sought to establish “win-win” relationships with the beneficiary countries, based on acceptable return on investment times.
The French budget for cooperation has varied according to the political parties in power, to settle on average at 1% of GDP (excluding overseas departments and territories). The “evaporation rate” of aid (for the benefit of local elites and consulting firms) fluctuated between 40% and… 100%. The implementation of the projects has mobilized a growing number of actors: heads of state (cooperation is a reserved presidential domain), ministries of cooperation, foreign affairs, economy, industry, cultural affairs, the French Development Agency, COFACE, large companies, engineering firms, banks, NGOs, etc. Their coordination was mainly provided by former students of the National School of France Overseas, then the ENA and the INSP.
The book is well structured, documented, and written. It is enriched with case studies and dialogues (sometimes tragicomic) between heads of state. Reading it allows us to better understand the decline of France’s influence in Africa, invested by diplomats, commercial advisers and/or the armies of the United States, Russia, China, and India. It indirectly allows a better understanding of the facade strategy adopted by the new American presidency.
Philippe MARCHESIN is a teacher – researcher at the University of Paris I and author of numerous books and articles on international cooperation.
Note by J-J. Pluchart
