Jean-Jacques Pluchart
By favoring competition, the Council and the Commission of the European Union have not engaged in a real industrial strategy in most sectors of activity, and in particular in those of production and electric mobility. This gap is revealed in particular by the new industrial ambitions displayed in these areas by the United States and China.
The policy of technological neutrality applied by the 27 EU governments highlights their differences on the fundamental subject of the industrial competitiveness of the Old Continent. EU leaders have set mainly environmental objectives in certain sectors, without adequate regulation and financing. Thus, from 2020, the desired sharp reduction in CO₂ emissions has forced manufacturers to urgently convert to electric mobility, without sufficient mastery of technologies (particularly hybrids), sources of supply (batteries), recharging infrastructures, dedicated financing, accounting frameworks and training channels. In the absence of concerted directives, European car manufacturers have favored the production of high-end electric vehicles with very mixed success, while Chinese manufacturers have embarked on the mass production of small electric vehicles. It seems that the Parliament lacks industrial culture and the European Commission lacks experts capable of controlling the manufacturers’ lobbies.
The “Draghi report”, made public in September 2024, denounced the European deficit of competitiveness over the United States and China in several key industrial sectors. The report recommends stimulating innovation, particularly in the field of artificial intelligence. It estimates the cumulative investment to be made over 10 years at €800 billion… the same amount as that allocated to defence by the “Rearm plan”. The “Draghi report” also proposed the launch of a joint plan for the decarbonization of industrial activities, security of supply and a reduction in Europe’s dependence on critical resources. The report extends its recommendations in particular to the hydrogen, space launchers and micro-nuclear sectors. It appeals to Europeans’ economic patriotism and urges them to overcome their divisions in the face of the pooling of sensitive resources, the orientation of investments and the taking of protectionist measures (in particular through ecological standards).
But there are still some weak signals. Directly confronted with Chinese competition in the automotive sector, Germany has recently questioned its dogma of budgetary austerity, and has shown its willingness to build a sector dedicated to electric mobility.
France anticipated this movement by committing in October 2021 to its “France 2030” plan, the objective of which is to strengthen the country’s industrial and technological sovereignty. With an investment envelope of €54 billion (half of which is dedicated to SMEs), this plan sets 10 objectives and activates 6 levers to support the transformation of the French economy, focusing on sectors of the future such as digital, hydrogen, batteries, space, health and decarbonisation. 14 of the 16 indicators are in line with the set trajectory. By the end of 2024, funding has supported 7,457 projects, 6,103 patent applications, and mobilized 196,824 jobs, including 156,009 jobs after project implementation, demonstrating their lasting impact. Several results have been made public in terms of GHG emissions, bio-drugs, new modes of transport, the electronics industry, robotics, new materials, quantum computers, hydrogen development and training in new technologies. The “France 2030” plan also aims to ensure the emergence, industrialization and growth of start-ups. More than €7 billion in aid has been allocated to support 925 projects and finance 130 venture capital funds by early 2025. However, as in most other European countries, the continued implementation of this plan involves harmonizing and simplifying the regulatory, financial and tax frameworks.
Will Europe seize the opportunity offered by the global geopolitical reconfiguration initiated by the United States?
The European Union has long favored a policy of competition rather than a real industrial strategy, which has left continental manufacturers relatively unarmed in the face of competitors benefiting from stronger state support.
The difficulties of the electric transition, political hesitations, the lack of clarity of European directives and the need to develop a strong European industrial sector, including battery production, are the challenges ahead for the European electric mobility industry. Moreover, this is in an immediate context of great uncertainty related to recent announcements by President Trump.
If Europe has in the past and until very recently refused to assume a strategic role to guide the development of a competitive industrial sector along the entire value chain of electric vehicles, as is happening in Asia and the United States, the situation may be changing. Especially under the German impulse.
Bernard Julien is a lecturer in economics at the University of Bordeaux. Director of the Permanent Study and Research on the Industry and the Employees of the Automobile (Gerpisa) until 2015, he then founded a research firm, FERIA, dedicated to training, research and studies on the automotive industry. He explained to Techniques de l’Ingénieur the difficulty for Europe to assume a real industrial policy in the automotive field, and how this state of affairs could evolve with the current period.
Techniques de l’Ingénieur: Can we really talk about a European industrial policy in the automotive sector?
Bernard Julien: Not really. Historically, Europe has never implemented an explicit industrial policy for the automobile. More generally, Europe has never even implemented an industrial policy worthy of the name. Brussels has instead relied on a liberal vision, in the sense that the European institutions have allowed both competition to take its course between large European firms, and the industrialists themselves to decide their technological orientations.
