The author opens his essay with a stark observation. After the Trente Glorieuses, a period during which Europe and France recorded growth rates of around 5 to 6% per year, enabling them to regain a level of GDP per capita almost comparable to that of the United States, a profound divergence gradually set in from the mid-1980s onward. This divergence has become so pronounced that France, like most European countries, now finds itself, in terms of GDP per capita, in a situation that is not unlike that of the post-war years.
According to the author, the root cause of this decline lies in the accumulation of delays in achieving economic sustainability, but also in our inability to redirect the productive system toward innovation. The economic and social model shaped over the past four decades has allowed neither companies truly to take risks nor disruptive innovation to be financed effectively. Europe has thus become a space constrained by an entanglement of administrative, bureaucratic and regulatory norms. Each of these norms, in the social, financial, economic, industrial or environmental spheres, admittedly stems from legitimate preferences; yet their accumulation, as much as their interlocking nature, has generated such complexity that it now hampers the development of European businesses. This evolution has resulted in a decline in productivity at the very moment when productivity was being driven first in the United States by the spread of new technologies — personal computers, microprocessors, digital services and artificial intelligence — and then, over the past two decades, by China.
Europe now finds itself in a position of heavy dependence on American digital services. The deficit associated with these services is estimated at more than €150 billion per year. Beyond this trade imbalance, such dependence above all reveals the inadequacy of a technological and industrial ecosystem capable of processing, hosting and enhancing strategic data. This weakness directly undermines Europe’s ability to develop high-performing, autonomous and competitive artificial intelligence models. The situation appears all the more worrying as power relations with Donald Trump’s United States and with China are hardening, while this transformation is unfolding in a particularly strained budgetary context for France.
And yet, this context could also represent a historic opportunity for the Old Continent. It could compel Europe to reconnect with a genuine industrial ambition. For that to happen, Europe would need to be given a true driver of innovation, to stop artificially designating champions that capture funding, and to allow competition, experimentation and risk-taking to play a greater role in distributing the chances of success. It is equally necessary to stem the hemorrhage of talent, ideas and capital, and to put an end to the fragmentation of markets and career paths by offering more attractive careers, more flexible and dynamic environments, and better-adapted, more rewarding savings products. Artificial intelligence is undoubtedly still in its infancy; Europe could therefore reshuffle the deck by moving toward a more frugal model, compatible with climate objectives, and capable of establishing itself as a desirable benchmark.
Economic history shows that setbacks are never irreversible. But such a recovery requires us to accept uncomfortable truths, finally to build a genuine capital markets union, to reject fragmentation and all that it entails, and to break both with the easy recourse to deficits and with the fear of change. For our social model can only be preserved over the long term at the cost of renewed economic efficiency.
Ph Alezard