Jean-Jacques Pluchart
The digitization of currencies is currently marked by a rivalry between two models, that of stablecoins backed by the US dollar and that of the digital euro representing the Central Bank Digital Currency of the eurozone. This rivalry reflects the opposition between two fundamental systems of the economy, one being mainly regulated in the short term by the market and the other being governed in the long term by the State. It therefore reflects a new “tragedy of horizons”, according to Mark Carney’s famous formula delivered in 2015.
The digital euro system, approved by the European Council on 19 February 2025, should be in place by 2028-2029, following an institutional timetable defined by the European Central Bank, while the stablecoin system based on the dollar is already in full development. Monetary stablecoins strive to combine the flexibility of bitcoins and the stability of fiat currencies issued by central banks. They are in principle guaranteed by solid assets such as US Treasury bills and Fed reserves, and their transactions are secured by the blockchain. Their assets are liquid and are not remunerated so as not to compete with banking products. In principle, they only perform the functions of payment (in particular cross-border) and “bridge currency” between currencies. In countries with unstable economies, they can act as an informal store of value. However, they do not fully comply with certain criteria required of systemic currencies. Unity between issuers is not guaranteed in the event of a crisis, and competition and therefore a hierarchy can then be established between them. The elasticity of stablecoins may be affected in the event of a monetary shock, as the system is not guaranteed by a central bank. In the absence of a lender of last resort, cryptocurrencies are suspected of being procyclical. Due to the decentralization of their issuers and the differences between their national regulations, the integrity of the stablecoin system and the protection of their users may be threatened.
The market for monetary stablecoins also has an almost monopolistic structure, being largely dominated by the issuers Theter and Circle. Their consolidated outstanding amount is estimated at $350 billion as of 31 December 2025. But due to the uncertainties weighing on their future, the capitalization of stablecoins backed by the US currency is estimated at between $500 and… $3,700 billion by 2030. Other types of stablecoins that can be backed by baskets of cryptocurrencies, indexed to metal indices (such as gold) or commodities, are generally unsecured and are marked by even more erratic fluctuations.
According to some economists, especially Anglo-Saxon ones, an inactive and unpaid MNBC cannot replace the large-scale adoption of stablecoins distributed by platforms. They consider that the risk of a threat by stablecoins to monetary sovereignty can only arise in payment networks, because the value of a national or federal currency is stabilised by the balance sheet of the Central Bank, and the convertibility between deposits is guaranteed by banking regulations.
According to most monetary economists, the use of dollar-backed stablecoins is still limited (at 11% of global monetary assets at the end of 2025), because they are directly competed with by bank savings products, and above all, because they can indirectly suffer from the erosion of confidence in major currencies such as the US dollar. Monetary stablecoins therefore risk suffering the fate of certain private currencies that have now disappeared, which have marked world monetary history.